AN
ENQUIRY
CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
MORALS.

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OF

MORALS.

By DAVID HUME, Esq;

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ERRATA.

Page 1. Line 10. for *excepted* read *expected*. P. 12. L. 24. read *our own Gratification*. P. 15. L. 2. for *one* read *a*. P. 18. L. 3. for *others* read *other Motives*. P. 19. L. 9. for *for* read *of*. P. 21. L. 1. for *from it* read *from Fame*. P. 36. L. 6. for *Fellow* read *Fellows*. P. 43. L. 1. for *pointed* read *painted*. P. 46. L. 22. read *ſerve to no manner*. P. 47. L. 4. for *to whom he is not bound by any Ties* read *to none of which he is bound*. P. 50. L. ult. read *Render Poſſeſſions ever ſo equal, Men's different Degrees*. P. 69. L. 17. *where the Search for Health or Pleaſure brings*. P. 82. L. 18. for *then* read *theſe*. P. 83. L. 4. read *that of the Community*. P. 86. L. 15. read *Circumſtance*. P. 91. L. 1. read *threaten'd*. P. 95. L. 1. for *alone* read *along*. P. 98. L. 5. for *will* read *ſhall*. P. 117. L. 10. read *pretty nearly of the ſame Kind or Species*. P. 129. L. 11. for *proſſes* read *poſſeſſes*. P. 145. L. 5. read *this Paſſage*. P. 150. L. 22. for *even* read *ever*. P. 174. L. 18. read *ſerve to no manner*. P. 178. L. 24. read *ariſe*. P. 202. L. 9. read *is often highly laudable*. P. 205. L. 6. read *and muſt ſuſpend*. P. 217. L. penult. read *tends*. P. 227. L. 17. read *had been courted*. P. 233. L. 11. read *that there was a Nation*.

In the Notes,

Page 15. Line penult. for *theſe Eſſays* read *this Enquiry*. P. 55. L. 9. for *Eſſay* read *Section*.

SECTION I.

Of the General Principles of MORALS.

DISPUTES with Perſons, pertinaciouſly obſtinate in their Principles, are, of all others, the moſt irkſome; except, perhaps, thoſe with Perſons, who really do not believe at all the Opinion they defend, but engage in the Controverſy, from Affectation, from a Spirit of Oppoſition, or from a Deſire of ſhowing Wit and Ingenuity, ſuperior to the reſt of Mankind. The ſame blind Adherence to their own Arguments is to be excepted in both; the ſame Contempt of their Antagoniſts; and the ſame paſſionate Vehemence, in inforcing Sophiſtry and Falſhood. And as reaſoning is not the Source, whence either Diſputant derives his Tenets; 'tis in vain to expect, that any Logic, which ſpeaks not to the Affections, will ever engage him to embrace ſounder Principles.

SECTION I.

THOSE who have refuſed the Reality of moral Diſtinctions, may be ranked in the latter Claſs, amongſt the diſingenuous Diſputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human Creature could ever ſeriouſly believe, that all Characters and Actions were alike entitled to the Affection and Regard of every one. The Difference, which Nature has plac'd betwixt one Man and another, is ſo wide, and this Difference is ſtill ſo much farther widened, by Education, Example, and Habit, that, where the oppoſite Extremes come at once under our Apprehenſion, there is no Scepticiſm ſo ſcrupulous, and ſcarce any Aſſurance ſo determin'd, as abſolutely to deny all Diſtinction betwixt them. Let a Man's Inſenſibility be ever ſo great, he muſt often be touch'd with the Images of RIGHT and WRONG; and let his Prejudices be ever ſo obſtinate, he muſt obſerve, that others are ſuſceptible of like Impreſſions. The only Way, therefore, of converting an Antagoniſt of this Kind, is to leave him to himſelf. For, finding that No-body keeps up the Controverſy with him, 'tis probable he will, at laſt, of himſelf, from mere Wearineſs, come over to the Side of common Senſe and Reaſon.

THERE has been a Controverſy ſtarted of late, much better worth Examination, concerning the general

general Foundation of MORALS, whether they are derived from REASON or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the Knowledge of them by a Chain of Argument and Deduction, or by an immediate Feeling and finer internal Senſe; whether, like all ſound Judgment of Truth and Falſhood, they ſhould be the ſame in every rational intelligent Being; or whether, like the Perception of Beauty and Deformity, they are founded entirely on the particular Fabric and Conſtitution of the human Species.

THE antient Philoſophers, tho' they often affirm, that Virtue is nothing but Conformity to Reaſon, yet, in general, ſeem to conſider Morals as deriving their Exiſtence from Taſte and Sentiment. On the other Hand, our modern Enquirers, tho' they alſo talk much of the Beauty of Virtue, and Deformity of Vice, yet have commonly endeavoured to account for theſe Diſtinctions by metaphyſical Reaſonings, and by Deductions from the moſt abſtract Principles of human Underſtanding. Such Confuſion reign'd in theſe Subjects, that an Oppoſition of the greateſt Conſequence could prevail betwixt one Syſtem and another, and even in the Parts almoſt of each individual Syſtem; and yet No-body, till very lately, was ever ſenſible of it. The elegant and ſublime Lord *Shaftesbury*, who firſt gave Occaſion to remark this Diſtinction, and who, in general, adher'd to the

Principles of the Antients, is not, himſelf, entirely free from the ſame Confuſion.

It muſt be acknowledged, that both Sides of the Queſtion are ſuſceptible of ſpecious Arguments. Moral Diſtinctions, it may be ſaid, are diſcernible by pure *Reaſon:* Elſe, whence the many Diſputes, that reign, in common Life, as well as in Philoſophy, with regard to this Subject: The long Chain of Proofs often adduc'd on both Sides; the Examples cited, the Authorities appeal'd to, the Analogies employ'd, the Fallacies detected, the Inferences drawn, and the ſeveral Concluſions adjuſted to their proper Principles. Truth is diſputable; not, Taſte: What exiſts in the Nature of Things is the Standard of our Judgment; what each Man feels within himſelf is the Standard of Sentiment. Propoſitions in Geometry may be prov'd, Syſtems in Phyſics may be controverted; but the Harmony of Verſe, the Tenderneſs of Paſſion, the Brilliancy of Wit muſt give immediate Pleaſure. No Man reaſons concerning another's Beauty; but frequently concerning the Juſtice or Injuſtice of his Actions. In every Trial of Criminals, their firſt Object is to diſprove the Facts alledged, and deny the Actions imputed to them: The ſecond to prove, that even if theſe Actions were real, they might be juſtified, as innocent and lawful. 'Tis confeſſedly by Deductions of the Underſtanding, that the firſt Point is aſ-

certain'd: How can we ſuppoſe, that a different Faculty of the Mind is employ'd in fixing the other?

ON the other Hand, thoſe, who would reſolve all moral Determinations into *Sentiment*, may endeavour to ſhow, that 'tis impoſſible for Reaſon ever to draw Concluſions of this Nature. To Virtue, ſay they, it belongs to be *amiable*, and Vice *odious*. This forms their very Nature or Eſſence. But can Reaſon or Argumentation diſtribute theſe different Epithets to any Subjects, and pronounce *a priori*, that this muſt produce Love, and that Hatred? Or what other Reaſon can we ever aſſign for theſe Affections, but the original Fabric and Formation of the human Mind, which is naturally adapted to receive them?

THE End of all moral Speculations is to teach us our Duty; and by proper Repreſentations of the Deformity of Vice and Beauty of Virtue, beget correſpondent Habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from Inferences and Concluſions of the Underſtanding, which, of themſelves, have no Hold of the Affections, nor ſet the active Powers of Men in Motion and Employment? They diſcover Truth; but where the Truths they diſcover are indifferent, and beget no Deſire or Averſion, they can have no Influence on Conduct and Behaviour. What is ho-

nourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes Poſſeſſion of the Heart, and animates us to embrace and to maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool Aſſent of the Underſtanding; and gratifying a ſpeculative Curioſity, puts an end to our Reſearches.

Extinguish all the warm Feelings and Prepoſſeſſions in favour of Virtue, and all Diſguſt or Averſion againſt Vice: Render Men totally indifferent towards theſe Diſtinctions; and Morality is no longer a practical Study, nor has any Tendency to regulate our Lives and Actions.

These Arguments on both Sides (and many more might be adduc'd) are ſo plauſible, that I am apt to ſuſpect they may, both of them, be ſolid and ſatisfactory, and that *Reaſon* and *Sentiment* concur in almoſt all moral Determinations and Concluſions. The final Sentence, 'tis probable, which pronounces Characters and Actions amiable or odious, praiſeworthy or blameable; that which ſtamps on them the Mark of Honour or Infamy, Approbation or Cenſure; that which renders Morality an active Principle, and conſtitutes Virtue our Happineſs, and Vice our Miſery: 'Tis probable, I ſay, that this final Sentence depends on ſome internal Senſe or Feeling, which

which Nature has made univerſal to the whole Species. For what elſe can have an Influence of this Nature? But, in order to pave the Way for ſuch a Sentiment, and give Men a proper Diſcernment of its Object, 'tis often neceſſary, we find, that much Reaſoning ſhould precede, that nice Diſtinctions be made, juſt Concluſions drawn, diſtant Compariſons form'd, accurate Relations examin'd, and general Facts fix'd and aſcertain'd. Some Species of Beauty, eſpecially the natural Kinds, on their firſt Appearance, command our Affection, and Approbation; and where they fail of this Effect, 'tis impoſſible for any Reaſoning to redreſs their Influence, or adapt them better to our Taſte and Sentiment. But in many Orders of Beauty, particularly thoſe of the finer Arts, 'tis requiſite to employ much Reaſoning, in order to feel the proper Sentiment; and a falſe Reliſh may frequently be corrected by Argument and Reflection. There are juſt Grounds to conclude, that moral Beauty partakes much of this latter Species, and demands the Aſſiſtance of our intellectual Faculties, in order to give it a ſuitable Influence on the human Mind.

BUT tho' this Queſtion, concerning the general Principle of Morals, be extremely curious and important; 'tis needleſs for us, at preſent, to employ farther Care in our Enquiries concerning it. For if we can be ſo happy, in the Courſe of this Enquiry,

as to fix the juſt Origin of Morals, 'twill then eaſily appear how far Sentiment or Reaſon enters into all Determinations of this Nature *. Mean while, it will ſcarce be poſſible for us, 'ere this Controverſy is fully decided, to proceed in that accurate Manner, requir'd in the Sciences; by beginning with exact Definitions of VIRTUE and VICE, which are the Objects of our preſent Enquiry. But we ſhall do what may juſtly be eſteem'd as ſatisfactory. We ſhall conſider the Matter as an Object of Experience. We ſhall call *every Quality or Action of the Mind*, virtuous, *which is attended with the general Approbation of Mankind:* And we ſhall denominate vicious, *every Quality, which is the Object of general Blame or Cenſure.* Theſe Qualities we ſhall endeavour to collect; and after examining, on both Sides, the ſeveral Circumſtances, in which they agree, 'tis hop'd we may, at laſt, reach the Foundation of Ethics, and find thoſe univerſal Principles, from which all moral Blame or Approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a Queſtion of Fact, not of abſtract Science, we can only expect Succeſs, by following this experimental Method, and deducing general Maxims from a Compariſon of particular Inſtances. The other ſcientifical Method; where a general abſtract Principle is firſt eſtabliſh'd, and is afterwards branch'd

* See Appendix Firſt.

out

out into a Variety of Inferences and Concluſions, may be more perfect in itſelf, but ſuits leſs the Imperfection of human Nature, and is a common Source of Illuſion and Miſtake, in this as well as in other Subjects. Men are now cured of their Paſſion for Hypotheſes and Syſtems in natural Philoſophy, and will hearken to no Arguments but thoſe deriv'd from Experience. 'Tis full Time they ſhould begin a like Reformation in all moral Diſquiſitions; and reject every Syſtem of Ethics, however ſubtile or ingenious, that is not founded on Fact and Obſervation.

SECTION II.

Of BENEVOLENCE.

PART I.

THERE is a Principle, ſuppos'd to prevail amongſt many, which is utterly incompatible with all Virtue or moral Sentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the moſt deprav'd Diſpoſition, ſo in its Turn it tends ſtill farther to foſter and encourage that Depravity. This Principle is, that all *Benevolence* is mere Hypocriſy, Friendſhip a Cheat, Public Spirit a Farce, Fidelity a Snare to procure Truſt and Confidence; and while all of us, at the Bottom, purſue only our private Intereſt, we wear theſe fair Diſguiſes, in order to put others off their Guard, and expoſe them the more to our Wiles and Machinations. What Heart one muſt be poſſeſs'd of, who profeſſes ſuch Principles, and who feels no internal Sentiment to belye ſo pernicious a Theory, 'tis eaſy to imagine: And alſo, what Degree of Affection and Benevolence he can bear to a Species,

whom he repreſents under ſuch odious Colours, and ſuppoſes ſo little ſuſceptible of Gratitude or any Return of Affection. Or if we will not aſcribe theſe Principles altogether to a corrupted Heart, we muſt, at leaſt, account for them from the moſt careleſs and precipitate Examination. Superficial Reaſoners, indeed, obſerving many falſe Pretences amongſt Mankind, and feeling, perhaps, no very ſtrong Reſtraint in their own Diſpoſition, might draw a general and a haſty Concluſion, that all is equally corrupted, and that Men, different from all other Animals, and indeed from all other Species of Exiſtence, admit of no Degrees of Good or Bad, but are, in every Inſtance, the ſame Creatures, under different Diſguiſes and Appearances.

THERE is another Principle, ſomewhat reſembling the former; which has been much inſiſted on by Philoſophers, and has been the Foundation of many a fair Syſtem; that whatever Affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no Paſſion is, or can be diſintereſted; that the moſt generous Friendſhip, however ſincere, is a Modification of Self-love; and, that even unknown to Ourſelves, we ſeek only our Gratification, while we appear the moſt deeply engag'd in Schemes for the Liberty and Happineſs of Mankind. By a Turn of Imagination, by a Refinement of Reflection, by an Enthuſiaſm of Paſſion, we

we ſeem to take Part in the Intereſts of others, and imagine Ourſelves diveſted of all ſelfiſh Views and Conſiderations: But at the Bottom, the moſt generous Patriot and moſt niggardly Miſer, the braveſt Hero and moſt abject Coward, have, in every Action, an equal Regard to their own Happineſs and Welfare.

WHOEVER concludes, from the ſeeming Tendency of this Opinion, that thoſe, who make Profeſſion of it, cannot poſſibly feel the true Sentiments of Benevolence, or have any Regard for genuine Virtue, will often find himſelf, in Practice, very much miſtaken. Probity and Honour were no Strangers to *Epicurus* and his Sect. *Atticus* and *Horace* ſeem to have enjoy'd from Nature, and cultivated by Reflection, as generous and friendly Diſpoſitions as any Diſciple of the auſterer Schools. And amongſt the Moderns, *Hobbes* and *Locke*, who maintain'd the ſelfiſh Syſtem of Morals, liv'd moſt irreproachable Lives; tho' the former lay not under any Reſtraints of Religion, which might ſupply the Defects of his Philoſophy.

AN *Epicurean* or a *Hobbiſt* readily allows, that there is ſuch a Thing as Friendſhip in the World, without Hypocriſy or Diſguiſe; tho' he may attempt, by a philoſophical Chymiſtry, to reſolve the Elements of this Paſſion, if I may ſo ſpeak, into thoſe of another, and explain every Affection to be Self-love, twiſted

and

and moulded into a Variety of Shapes and Appearances. But as the ſame Turn of Imagination prevails not in every Man, nor gives the ſame Direction to the original Paſſion; this is ſufficient, even according to the ſelfiſh Syſtem, to make the wideſt Difference in human Characters, and denominate one Man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly intereſted. I eſteem the Man, whoſe Self-love, by whatever Means, is ſo directed as to give him a Concern for others, and render him ſerviceable to Society: As I hate or deſpiſe him, who has no Regard to any Thing beyond his own pitiful Gratifications and Enjoyments. In vain would you ſuggeſt, that theſe Characters, tho' ſeemingly oppoſite, are, at the Bottom, the ſame, and that a very inconſiderable Turn of Imagination forms the whole Difference betwixt them. Each Character, notwithſtanding theſe inconſiderable Differences, appears to me, in Practice, pretty durable and untranſmutable. And I find not, in this, more than in other Subjects, that the natural Sentiments, ariſing from the general Appearances of Things, are eaſily deſtroy'd by refin'd Reflections concerning the minute Origin of theſe Appearances. Does not the lively, cheerful Colour of a Countenance inſpire me with Complacency and Pleaſure; even tho' I learn from Philoſophy, that all Difference of Complexion ariſes from the moſt mi-

nute Differences of Thickneſs, in the moſt minute Parts of the Skin; by which Differences one Superficies is qualify'd to reflect one of the original Colours of Light, and abſorb the others?

BUT tho' the Queſtion, concerning the univerſal or partial Selfiſhneſs of Man, be not ſo material, as is uſually imagin'd, to Morality and Practice, it is certainly of great Conſequence in the ſpeculative Science of human Nature, and is a proper Object of Curioſity and Enquiry. It may not, therefore, be improper, in this Place, to beſtow a few Reflections upon it *.

THE moſt obvious Objection to the ſelfiſh Hypotheſis, is, that being contrary to common Feeling and our moſt unprejudic'd Notions and Opinions; there

* Benevolence naturally divides into two Kinds, the *general* and *particular*. The firſt is, where we have no Friendſhip or Connexion or Eſteem for the Perſon, but feel only a general Sympathy with him or a Compaſſion for his Pains, and a Congratulation with his Pleaſures. The other Species of Benevolence is founded on an Opinion of Virtue, on Services done us, or on ſome particular Connexions. Both theſe Sentiments muſt be allow'd real in human Nature; but whether they will reſolve into ſome nice Conſiderations of Self-love, is a Queſtion more curious than important. The former Sentiment, *viz.* that of general Benevolence or Humanity or Sympathy, we ſhall have Occaſion frequently to treat of in the Courſe of theſe Eſſays; and I aſſume it as real, from general Experience, without any other Proof.

is requir'd the higheſt Stretch of Philoſophy to eſtabliſh ſo extraordinary a Paradox. To the moſt careleſs Obſerver, there appear to be ſuch Diſpoſitions as Benevolence and Generoſity; ſuch Affections as Love, Friendſhip, Compaſſion, Gratitude. Theſe Sentiments have their Cauſes, Effects, Objects, and Operations, markt by common Language and Obſervation, and plainly diſtinguiſh'd from the ſelfiſh Paſſions. And as this is the obvious Appearance of Things, it muſt be admitted; till ſome Hypotheſis be diſcover'd, which, by penetrating deeper into human Nature, may prove the former Affections to be Nothing but Modifications of the latter. All Attempts of this Kind have hitherto prov'd fruitleſs, and ſeem to have proceeded entirely from that Love of *Simplicity*, which has been the Source of much falſe Reaſoning in Philoſophy. I ſhall not here enter into any Detail on the preſent Subject. Many able Philoſophers have ſhown the Inſufficiency of theſe Syſtems. And I ſhall take for granted what, I believe, the ſmalleſt Reflection will make evident to every impartial Enquirer.

BUT the Nature of the Subject furniſhes the ſtrongeſt Preſumption, that no better Syſtem will ever, for the future, be invented, to account for the Origin of the benevolent from the ſelfiſh Affections, and reduce all the various Emotions of the human Mind to a perfect

fect Simplicity and Uniformity. The Caſe is not the ſame in this Species of Philoſophy as in Phyſics. Many an Hypotheſis in Nature, contrary to firſt Appearances, has been found, on more accurate Scrutiny, ſolid and ſatisfactory, Inſtances of this Kind are ſo frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty Philoſopher * has ventur'd to affirm, if there be more than one Way, in which any Phænomenon may be produc'd, that there is a general Preſumption for its ariſing from the Cauſes, which are the leaſt obvious and familiar. But the Preſumption always lies on the other Side, in all Enquiries concerning the Origin of our Paſſions, and the internal Operations of the human Mind. The ſimpleſt and moſt obvious Cauſe, that can there be aſſign'd for any Phænomenon, is probably the true one. When a Philoſopher, in the Explication of his Syſtem, is oblig'd to have Recourſe to ſome very intricate and refin'd Reflections, and to ſuppoſe them eſſential to the Production of any Paſſion or Emotion, we have Reaſon to be extremely on our Guard againſt ſo fallacious an Hypotheſis. The Affections are not ſuſceptible of any Impreſſion from the Refinements of Reaſon or Imagination; and 'tis always found, that a vigorous Exertion of the latter Faculties, from the narrow Capacity of the human Mind, deſtroys all Energy and Activity in the former.

* Monſr. *Fontenelle*.

Our

Our predominant Motive or Intention is, indeed, frequently conceal'd from Ourſelves, when it is mingled and confounded with others, which the Mind, from Vanity or Self-conceit, is deſirous of ſuppoſing of greater Force and Influence: But there is no Inſtance, that a Concealment of this Nature has ever ariſen from the Abſtruſeneſs and Intricacy of the Motive. A Man, who has loſt a Friend and Patron, may flatter himſelf, that all his Grief ariſes from generous Sentiments, without any Mixture of narrow or intereſted Conſiderations: But a Man, who grieves for a valuable Friend, that needed his Patronage and Protection; how can we ſuppoſe, that his paſſionate Tenderneſs ariſes from ſome metaphyſical Regards to a Self-intereſt, which has no Foundation or Reality? We may as well imagine, that minute Wheels and Springs, like thoſe of a Watch, give Motion to a loaded Waggon, as account for the Origin of Paſſion from ſuch abſtruſe Reflections.

ANIMALS are found ſuſceptible of Kindneſs, both to their own Species and to ours; nor is there, in this Caſe, the leaſt Suſpicion of Diſguiſe or Artifice. Shall we account for all *their* Sentiments too, from refin'd Deductions of Self-intereſt? Or if we admit a diſintereſted Benevolence in the inferior Species, by what Rule of Analogy can we refuſe it in the Superior?

LOVE

Love betwixt the Sexes begets a Complacency and Good-will, very distinct from the Gratification of an Appetite. Tenderness to their Offspring, in all sensible Beings, is commonly able alone to counterballance the strongest Motives of Self-love, and has no Manner of Dependance on that Affection. What Interest can a fond Mother have in View, who loses her Health by assiduous Attendance on her sick Child, and afterwards languishes, and dies for Grief, when freed, by its Death, from the Slavery of that Attendance?

Is Gratitude no Affection of the human Breast, or is that a Word merely, without any Meaning or Reality? Have we no Complacency or Satisfaction in one Man's Company above another's, and no Desire of the Welfare of our Friend, even tho' Absence or Death should prevent us from all Participation in it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any Participation in it, even while alive and present, but our Affection and Regard to him?

These and a thousand other Instances are Marks of a generous Benevolence in human Nature, where no *real* Interest binds us to the Object. And how an *imaginary* Interest, known and avow'd for such, can be the Origin of any Passion or Emotion, seems difficult

ficult to explain. No ſatisfactory Hypotheſis of this Kind has yet been diſcover'd; nor is there the ſmalleſt Probability, that the future Induſtry of Men will ever be attended with more favourable Succeſs.

But farther, if we conſider rightly of the Matter, we ſhall find, that the Hypotheſis, which allows of a diſintereſted Benevolence, diſtinct from Self-love, has really more *Simplicity* in it, and is more conformable to the Analogy of Nature, than that which pretends to reſolve all Friendſhip and Humanity into this latter Principle. There are bodily Wants or Appetites, acknowledged by every one, which neceſſarily precede all ſenſual Enjoyment, and carry us directly to ſeek Poſſeſſion of the Object. Thus, Hunger and Thirſt have eating and drinking for their End; and from the Gratification of theſe primary Appetites ariſes a Pleaſure, which may become the Object of another Species of Deſire or Inclination, that is ſecondary and intereſted. In the ſame Manner, there are mental Paſſions, by which we are impell'd immediately to ſeek particular Objects, ſuch as Fame or Power or Vengeance, without any Regard to Intereſt; and when theſe Objects are attain'd, a pleaſing Enjoyment enſues, as the Conſequence of our indulg'd Affections. Nature muſt, by the internal Frame and Conſtitution of the Mind, give an original Propenſity to Fame, 'ere we can reap any Pleaſure from

from it, or purſue it from Motives of Self-love, and a Deſire of Happineſs. If I have no Vanity, I take no Delight in Praiſe: If I be void of Ambition, Power gives no Enjoyment: If I be not angry, the Puniſhment of an Adverſary is totally indifferent to me. In all theſe Caſes, there is a Paſſion, which points immediately to the Object, and conſtitutes it our Good or Happineſs; as there are other ſecondary Paſſions, which afterwards ariſe, and purſue it as a Part of our Happineſs, when once it is conſtituted ſuch, by our original Affections. Were there no Appetites of any Kind, antecedent to Self-love, that Propenſity could ſcarce ever exert itſelf; becauſe we ſhould, in that Caſe, have felt few and ſlender Pains or Pleaſures, and have little Miſery or Happineſs, to avoid or to purſue.

Now where is the Difficulty of conceiving, that this may likewiſe be the Caſe with Benevolence and Friendſhip, and that, from the original Frame of our Temper, we may feel a Deſire of another's Happineſs or Good, which, by Means of that Affection, becomes our own Good, and is afterwards purſued, from the conjoin'd Motives of Benevolence and Self-enjoyment? Who ſees not that Vengeance, from the Force alone of Paſſion, may be ſo eagerly purſued, as to make us knowingly neglect every Conſideration of Eaſe, Intereſt, or Safety; and, like

ſome

ſome vindictive Animals, infuſe our very Souls into the Wounds we give an Enemy * ? And what a malignant Philoſophy muſt it be, that will not allow, to Humanity and Friendſhip, the ſame Privileges, which are indiſputably granted to the darker Paſſions of Enmity and Reſentment ? Such a Philoſophy is more like a Satyr, than a true Delineation or Deſcription, of human Nature ; and may be a good Foundation for paradoxical Wit and Raillery, but is a very bad one for any ſerious Argument or Reaſoning.

PART II.

IT may be eſteem'd, perhaps, a ſuperfluous Task to prove, that the benevolent or ſofter Affections are VIRTUOUS ; and wherever they appear, attract the Eſteem, Approbation, and Good-will of Mankind. The Epithets *ſociable, good-natur'd, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent*, are known in all Languages, and univerſally expreſs the higheſt Merit, which *human Nature* is capable of attaining : Where theſe amiable Qualities are attended with Birth and Power and eminent Abilities, and diſplay themſelves in the good Government or

* Animaſque in vulnere ponunt. VIRG.
Dum alteri noceat, ſui negligens, ſays *Seneca* of Anger. De Ira. L. 1.

uſeful Inſtruction of Mankind, they ſeem even to raiſe the Poſſeſſors of them above the Rank of *human Nature*, and approach them, in ſome Meaſure, to the Divine. Exalted Capacity, undaunted Courage, proſperous Succeſs; theſe may only expoſe a Hero or Politician to the Envy and Malignity of the Public: But as ſoon as the Praiſes are added of humane and beneficent; when Inſtances are diſplay'd of Lenity, Tenderneſs, or Friendſhip; Envy itſelf is ſilent, or joins the general Voice of Applauſe and Acclamation.

WHEN *Pericles*, the great *Athenian* Stateſman and General, was on his Death-bed, his ſurrounding Friends, eſteeming him now inſenſible, began to indulge their Sorrow for their expiring Patron, by enumerating his great Qualities and Succeſſes, his Conqueſts and Victories, the unuſual Length of his Adminiſtration, and his nine Trophies, erected over the Enemies of the Republic. *You forget*, cries the dying Hero, who had heard all, *you forget the moſt eminent of my Praiſes, while you dwell ſo much on thoſe vulgar Advantages, in which Fortune had a principal Share. You have not obſerv'd, that no Citizen has ever yet wore Mourning on my Account* *.

* Plut. in Pericle.

In Men of more ordinary Talents and Capacity, the ſocial Virtues become, if poſſible, ſtill more eſſentially requiſite; there being nothing eminent, in that Caſe, to compenſate for the Want of them, or preſerve the Perſon from our ſevereſt Hatred, as well as Contempt. A high Ambition, an elevated Courage is apt, ſays *Cicero*, in leſs perfect Characters, to degenerate into a turbulent Ferocity. The more ſocial and ſofter Virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. Theſe are always good and amiable *.

The principal Advantage, which *Juvenal* diſcovers in the extenſive Capacity of the human Species, is, that it renders our Benevolence alſo more extenſive, and gives us larger Opportunities of ſpreading our kindly Influence than what are indulg'd to the inferior Creation †. It muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that by doing Good only, can a Man truly enjoy the Advantages of being eminent. His exalted Station, of itſelf, but the more expoſes him to Tempeſt and Thunder. His ſole Prerogative is to afford Shelter to Inferiors, who repoſe themſelves under his Cover and Protection.

But I forget, that it is not my preſent Buſineſs to recommend Generoſity and Benevolence, or to paint,

* Cic. de Officiis, Lib. 1. † Sat. xv. 139, & ſeq.

in

in their true Colours, all the genuine Charms of the ſocial Virtues. Theſe, indeed, ſufficiently engage every Heart, on the firſt Apprehenſion of them; and 'tis difficult to abſtain from ſome Sally of Panegyric, as often as they occur in Diſcourſe or Reaſoning. But our Object here being more the ſpeculative, than the practical Part of Morals, 'twill ſuffice to remark, what will readily, I believe, be allow'd, that no Qualities are more entitled to the general Good-will and Approbation of Mankind, than Beneficence and Humanity, Friendſhip and Gratitude, Natural Affection and Public Spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender Sympathy with others, and a generous Concern for our Kind and Species. Theſe, wherever they appear, ſeem to transfuſe themſelves, in a Manner, into each Beholder, and to call forth, in their own Behalf, the ſame favourable and affectionate Sentiments, which they exert on all around them.

PART III.

WE may obſerve, that, in diſplaying the Praiſes of any humane, beneficent Man, there is one Circumſtance, which never fails to be amply inſiſted on, *viz.* the Happineſs and Satisfaction, deriv'd to Society from his Intercourſe and Good-

offices. To his Parents, we are apt to ſay, he endears himſelf, by his pious Attachment and duteous Care, ſtill more than by the Connexions of Nature. His Children never feel his Authority, but when employ'd for their Advantage. With him, the Ties of Love are conſolidated by Beneficence and Friendſhip. The Ties of Friendſhip approach, in a fond Obſervance of each obliging Office, to thoſe of Love and Inclination. His Domeſtics and Dependants have in him a ſure Reſource; and no longer dread the Power of Fortune, but ſo far as ſhe exerciſes it over him. From him, the hungry receive Food, the naked Cloathing, the ignorant and ſlothful Skill and Induſtry. Like the Sun, an inferior Miniſter of Providence, he cheers, invigorates, and ſuſtains the ſurrounding World.

If confin'd to private Life, the Sphere of his Activity is narrower; but his Influence is all benign and gentle. If exalted into a higher Station, Mankind and Poſterity reap the Fruit of his Labours.

As theſe Topics of Praiſe never fail to be employ'd, and with Succeſs, where we would inſpire Eſteem for any one; may we not thence conclude, that the UTILITY, reſulting from the ſocial Virtues, forms, at leaſt, a *Part* of their Merit, and

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is *one* Source of that Approbation and Regard ſo univerſally pay'd them ?

WHEN we recommend even an Animal or Plant as *uſeful* and *beneficial*, we give it an Applauſe and Recommendation ſuited to its Nature. As on the other Hand, Reflection on the baneful Influence of any of theſe inferior Beings always inſpires us with the Sentiments of Averſion. The Eye is pleas'd with the Proſpect of Corn-fields and loaded Vineyards ; Horſes grazing, and Flocks paſturing : But flies the View of Bryars and Brambles, affording Shelter to Wolves and Serpents.

A Machine, a Piece of Furniture, a Garment, a Houſe, well contriv'd for Uſe and Conveniency, is ſo far beautiful, and is contemplated with Pleaſure and Approbation. An experienc'd Eye is here ſenſible to many Excellencies, which eſcape Perſons ignorant and uninſtructed.

CAN any Thing ſtronger be ſaid in Praiſe of a Profeſſion, ſuch as Merchandize or Manufactory, than to obſerve the Advantages, which it procures to Society ? And is not a Monk and Inquiſitor enrag'd, when we treat his Rank and Order as uſeleſs or pernicious to Mankind ?

The Hiſtorian exults in diſplaying the Benefit ariſing from his Labours. The Writer of Romances alleviates or denies the bad Conſequences aſcrib'd to his Manner of Compoſition.

In general, what Praiſe is imply'd in the ſimple Epithet, *uſeful!* What Reproach in the contrary!

Your Gods, ſays *Cicero* *, in Oppoſition to the *Epicureans*, cannot juſtly claim any Worſhip or Adoration, with whatever imaginary Perfections you may ſuppoſe them endow'd. They are totally uſeleſs and inactive. And even the *Egyptians*, whom you ſo much ridicule, never conſecrated any Animal but on Account of its Utility.

The Sceptics aſſert †, tho' abſurdly, that the Origin of all religious Worſhip was deriv'd from the Utility of inanimate Objects, as the Sun and Moon, to the Support and Well-being of Mankind. This is alſo the common Reaſon, aſſign'd by Hiſtorians, for the Deification of eminent Heroes and Legiſlators ‡.

To plant a Tree, to cultivate a Field, to beget Children; meritorious Acts, according to the Religion of *Zoroaſter*.

* De Nat. Deor. Lib. 1. † Sext. Emp. adverſus Math. Lib. 8. ‡ Diod. Sic. paſſim.

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IN all Determinations of Morality, this Circumſtance of public Utility is ever principally in View; and wherever Diſputes ariſe, whether in Philoſophy or common Life, concerning the Bounds of Duty, the Queſtion cannot, by any Means, be decided with greater Certainty, than by aſcertaining, on any Side, the true Intereſts of Mankind. If any falſe Opinion, embrac'd from Appearances, has been found to prevail; as ſoon as farther Experience, and ſounder Reaſoning have given us juſter Notions of human Affairs; we retract our firſt Sentiments, and adjuſt a-new the Boundaries of moral Good and Evil.

ALMS to common Beggars is naturally prais'd; becauſe it ſeems to carry Relief to the diſtreſt and indigent: But when we obſerve the Encouragement thence ariſing to Idleneſs and Debauchery, we regard that Species of Charity rather as a Weakneſs than a Virtue.

Tyrannicide or the Aſſaſſination of Uſurpers and oppreſſive Princes was highly prais'd in antient Times; becauſe it both freed Mankind from many of theſe Monſters, and ſeem'd to keep the others in Awe, whom the Poinard or the Poiſon could not reach. But Hiſtory and Experience having ſince convinc'd

us, that this Practice encreaſes the Jealouſy and Cruelty of Princes; a *Timoleon* and a *Brutus*, tho' treated with Indulgence on Account of the Prejudices of their Times, are now conſider'd as very improper Models for Imitation.

LIBERATITY in Princes is regarded as a Mark of Beneficence: But when it occurs, that the homely Bread of the Honeſt and Induſtrious is often thereby converted into delicious Cates for the Idle and the Prodigal, we ſoon retract our heedleſs Praiſes. The Regrets of a Prince, for having loſt a Day, were noble and generous: But had he intended to have ſpent it in Acts of Generoſity to his greedy Courtiers, 'twas better loſt than miſemploy'd after that Manner.

LUXURY, or a Refinement on the Pleaſures and Conveniencies of Life, had long been ſuppos'd the Source of every Corruption and Diſorder in Government, and the immediate Cauſe of Faction, Sedition, civil Wars, and the total Loſs of Liberty. It was, therefore, univerſally regarded as a Vice, and was an Object of Declamation to all Satyriſts and ſevere Moraliſts. Thoſe, who prove, or attempt to prove, that ſuch Refinements rather tend to the Encreaſe of Induſtry, Civility, and Arts, regulate a-new our *moral* as well as *political* Sentiments, and

and repreſent as laudable and innocent, what had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable.

UPON the Whole, then, it ſeems undeniable, *that* there is ſuch a Sentiment in human Nature as diſintereſted Benevolence; *that* nothing can beſtow more Merit on any human Creature than the Poſſeſſion of it in an eminent Degree; and *that* a *Part*, at leaſt, of its Merit ariſes from its Tendency to promote the Intereſts of our Species, and beſtow Happineſs on human Society. We carry our View into the ſalutary Conſequences of ſuch a Character and Diſpoſition; and whatever has ſo benign an Influence, and forwards ſo deſirable an End is beheld with Complacency and Pleaſure. The ſocial Virtues are never regarded without their beneficial Tendencies, nor view'd as barren and unfruitful. The Happineſs of Mankind, the Order of Society, the Harmony of Families, the mutual Support of Friends are always conſider'd as the Reſult of their gentle Dominion over the Breaſts of Men.

How conſiderable a *Part* of their Merit we ought to aſcribe to their Utility, will better appear from future Diſquiſitions *; as well as the Reaſon, why this Circumſtance has ſuch a Command over our Eſteem and Approbation. †

* Sect. 3d and 4th. † Sect. 5th.

SECTION III.

Of JUSTICE.

PART I.

THAT JUSTICE is useful to Society, and consequently that *Part* of its Merit, at least, must arise from that Consideration; 'twould be a superfluous Undertaking to prove. That public Utility is the *sole* Origin of Justice, and that Reflections on the beneficial Consequences of this Virtue are the *sole* Foundation of its Merit; this Proposition, being more curious and important, will better deserve our Examination and Enquiry.

LET us suppose, that Nature has bestow'd on human Race such profuse *Abundance* of all *external* Conveniencies, that, without any Uncertainty in the Event, without any Care or Industry on our Part, every Individual finds himself fully provided of

whatever his moſt voracious Appetites can want, or luxurious Imagination wiſh or deſire. His natural Beauty, we ſhall ſuppoſe, ſurpaſſes all acquir'd Ornaments: The perpetual Clemency of the Seaſons renders uſeleſs all Cloaths or Covering: The raw Herbage affords him the moſt delicious Fare; the clear Fountain, the richeſt Beverage. No laborious Occupation requir'd: No Tillage: No Navigation. Muſic, Poetry, and Contemplation form his ſole Buſineſs: Converſation, Mirth, and Friendſhip his ſole Amuſement.

It ſeems evident, that, in ſuch a happy State, every other ſocial Virtue would flouriſh, and receive a tenfold Encreaſe; but the cautious, jealous Virtue of Juſtice would never once have been dreamt of. For what Purpoſe make a Partition of Goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why give Riſe to Property, where there cannot poſſibly be any Injury? Why call this Object *mine*, when, upon the Seizure of it by another, I need but ſtretch out my Hand to poſſeſs myſelf of what is equally valuable? Juſtice, in that Caſe, being totally USELESS, would be an idle Ceremonial, and could never poſſibly have Place amongſt the Catalogue of Virtues.

WE ſee, even in the preſent neceſſitous Condition of Mankind, that, wherever any Benefit is beſtow'd by Nature in an unlimited Abundance, we leave it always in common amongſt the whole human Race, and make no Subdiviſions of Right and Property. Water and Air, tho' the moſt neceſſary of all Objects, are not challeng'd by Individuals; nor can any one commit Injuſtice by the moſt laviſh Uſe and Enjoyment of theſe Bleſſings. In fertile, extenſive Countries, with few Inhabitants, Land is regarded on the ſame Footing. And no Topic is ſo much inſiſted on by thoſe, who defend the Liberty of the Seas, as the unexhauſted Uſe of them in Navigation. Were the Advantages, procur'd by Navigation, as inexhauſtible, theſe Reaſoners never had had any Adverſaries to refute; nor had any Claims been ever advanc'd of a ſeparate, excluſive Dominion over the Ocean.

IT may happen in ſome Countries, at ſome Periods, that there be eſtabliſh'd a Property in Water, none in Land *; if the latter be in greater Abundance than can be us'd by the Inhabitants, and the former be found, with Difficulty, and in very ſmall Quantities.

* *Geneſis*, chap. xiii, and xxi.

Again; ſuppoſe, that, tho' the Neceſſities of human Race continue the ſame as at preſent, yet the Mind is ſo enlarg'd, and ſo replete with Friendſhip and Generoſity, that every Man has the utmoſt Tenderneſs for every Man, and feels no more Concern for his own Intereſt than for that of his Fellow: It ſeems evident, that the USE of Juſtice would, in this Caſe, be ſuſpended by ſuch an extenſive Benevolence, nor would the Diviſions and Barriers of Property and Obligation have ever been thought of. Why ſhould I bind another, by a Deed or Promiſe, to do me any Good-office, when I know he is before-hand prompted, by the ſtrongeſt Inclination, to ſeek my Happineſs, and would, of himſelf, perform the deſir'd Service; except the Hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than the Benefit accruing to me: In which Caſe, he knows, that, from my innate Humanity and Friendſhip, I ſhould be the firſt to oppoſe myſelf to his imprudent Generoſity? Why raiſe Land-marks betwixt my Neighbour's Field and mine, when my Heart has made no Diviſion betwixt our Intereſts; but ſhares all his Joys and Sorrows with equal Force and Vivacity as if originally my own? Every Man, upon this Suppoſition, being a Second-ſelf to another, would truſt all his Intereſts to the Diſcretion of every Man, without Jealouſy, without Partition, without Diſtinction.

And

And the whole Race of Mankind would form only one Family; where all lay in common, and was us'd, freely, without Regard to Property; but cautiouſly too, with as entire Regard to the Neceſſities of each Individual, as if our own Intereſts were moſt intimately concern'd.

IN the preſent Diſpoſition of the human Heart, 'twould, perhaps, be difficult to find compleat Inſtances of ſuch enlarg'd Affections; but ſtill we may obſerve, that the Caſe of Families approaches towards it; and the ſtronger is the mutual Benevolence amongſt the Individuals, the nearer it approaches; till all Diſtinction of Property be, in a great Meaſure, loſt and confounded amongſt them. Betwixt marry'd Perſons, the Cement of Friendſhip is by the Laws ſuppos'd ſo ſtrong as to aboliſh all Diviſion of Poſſeſſions; and has often, in Reality, the Force aſcribed to it. And 'tis obſervable, that, during the Ardour of new Enthuſiaſms, where every Principle is inflam'd into Extravagance, the Community of Goods has frequently been attempted; and nothing but Experience of its Inconveniencies, from the returning or diſguis'd Selfiſhneſs of Men, could make the imprudent Fanatics adopt a-new the Ideas of Juſtice and of ſeparate Property. So true is it, that that Virtue de-

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rives its Exiſtence altogether from its neceſſary *Uſe* to the Intercourſe and Society of Mankind.

To make this Truth more evident, let us reverſe the foregoing Suppoſitions; and carrying every Thing to the oppoſite Extreme, conſider what would be the Effect of theſe new Situations. Suppoſe a Society to fall into ſuch Want of all common Neceſſaries, that the utmoſt Frugality and Induſtry cannot preſerve the greateſt Number from periſhing, and the whole from extreme Sufferance: It will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the ſtrict Laws of Juſtice are ſuſpended, in ſuch a preſſing Emergence, and give Place to the ſtronger Motives of Neceſſity and Self-preſervation. Is it any Crime, after a Shipwreck, to ſeize whatever Means or Inſtrument of Safety one can lay hold of, without Regard to former Limitations of Property? Or if a City beſieg'd were ſtarving with Hunger; can we imagine, that Men will ſee any Means of Life before them, and periſh, from a ſcrupulous Regard to what, in other Situations, would be the Rules of Equity and Juſtice? The USE and TENDENCY of that Virtue is to procure Happineſs and Security, by preſerving Order in Society: But where the Society is ready to periſh from extreme Neceſſity, no greater Evil can be dreaded from Violence and Inuſtice; and every Man may now provide for himſelf,

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by all Means, which Prudence can dictate, or Humanity permit. The Public, even in leſs urgent Neceſſities, open Granaries, without the Conſent of Proprietors; as juſtly ſuppoſing, that the Authority of Magiſtracy may, conſiſtent with Equity, extend ſo far: But were any Number of Men to aſſemble, without the Tye of Laws or civil Juriſdiction; would an equal Partition of Bread in a Famine, even without the Proprietor's Conſent, be regarded as criminal or injurious?

SUPPOSE alſo, that it ſhould be a virtuous Man's Fate to fall into the Society of Ruffians, remote from the Protection of Laws and Government; what Conduct muſt he embrace in that melancholy Situation? He ſees ſuch a deſperate Rapaciouſneſs prevail; ſuch a Diſregard to Equity, ſuch Contempt of Order, ſuch ſtupid Blindneſs to future Conſequences, as muſt immediately have the moſt tragical Concluſion, and muſt terminate in Deſtruction to the greater Number, and in a total Diſſolution of Society to the reſt. He, mean while, can have no other Expedient, than to arm himſelf, to whomever the Sword he ſeizes, or the Buckler may belong: Make Proviſion of all Means of Defence and Security: And his particular Regard to Juſtice being no longer of USE to his own Safety or that of others, he muſt conſult alone the Dictates of Self-

preſervation, without Concern for thoſe, who no longer merit his Care and Attention.

When any Man, even in political Society, renders himſelf, by his Crimes, obnoxious to the Public, he is puniſh'd by the Laws in his Goods and Perſon; that is, the ordinary Rules of Juſtice are, with Regard to him, ſuſpended for a Moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for the *Benefit* of Society, what, otherwiſe, he could not ſuffer without Wrong or Injury.

The Rage and Violence of public War; what is it but a Suſpenſion of Juſtice amongſt the warring Parties, who perceive, that that Virtue is now no longer of any *Uſe* or *Advantage* to them? The Laws of War, which then ſucceed to thoſe of Equity and Juſtice, are Rules calculated for the *Advantage* and *Utility* of that particular State, in which Men are now plac'd. And were a civiliz'd Nation engag'd with Barbarians, who obſerv'd no Rules even of War; the former muſt alſo ſuſpend their Obſervance of them, where they no longer ſerve to any Purpoſe; and muſt render every Action or Rencounter as bloody and pernicious as poſſible to the firſt Aggreſſors.

THUS the Rules of Equity or Juſtice depend entirely on the particular State and Condition, in which Men are plac'd, and owe their Origin and Exiſtence to that UTILITY, which reſults to the Public from their ſtrict and regular Obſervance. Reverſe, in any conſiderable Circumſtance, the Condition of Men: Produce extreme Abundance or extreme Neceſſity: Implant in the human Breaſt perfect Moderation and Humanity, or perfect Rapaciouſneſs and Malice: By rendering Juſtice totally *uſeleſs*, you thereby totally deſtroy its Eſſence, and ſuſpend its Obligation upon Mankind.

THE common Situation of Society is a Medium amidſt all theſe Extremes. We are naturally partial to Ourſelves, and to our Friends; but are capable of learning the Advantage, reſulting from a more equal Conduct. Few Enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal Hand of Nature; but by Art, Labour, and Induſtry, we can extract them in great Abundance. Hence the Ideas of Property become neceſſary in all civil Society: Hence Juſtice derives its Uſefulneſs to the Public: And hence alone ariſes its Merit and moral Obligation.

THESE Concluſions are ſo natural and obvious, that they have not eſcap'd even the Poets, in their Deſcrip-

Deſcriptions of the Felicity, attending the Golden Age or the Reign of *Saturn*. The Seaſons, in that firſt Period of Nature, were ſo temperate, if we credit theſe agreeable Fictions, that there was no Neceſſity for Men to provide themſelves with Cloaths and Houſes, as a Security againſt the Violence of Heat and Cold: The Rivers flow'd with Wine and Milk: The Oaks yielded Honey; and Nature ſpontaneouſly produc'd her greateſt Delicacies. Nor were theſe the chief Advantages of that happy Age. The Storms and Tempeſts were not alone remov'd from Nature; but thoſe more furious Tempeſts were unknown to human Breaſts, which now cauſe ſuch Uproar, and engender ſuch Confuſion. Avarice, Ambition, Cruelty, Selfiſhneſs were never heard of: Cordial Affection, Compaſſion, Sympathy were the only Movements, with which the Mind was yet acquainted. Even the punctilious Diſtinction of *Mine* and *Thine* was baniſh'd from amongſt that happy Race of Mortals, and carry'd with it the very Notion of Property and Obligation, Juſtice and Injuſtice.

THIS *poetical* Fiction of the *Golden Age* is, in ſome Reſpects, of a Piece with the *philoſophical* Fiction of the *State of Nature*; only that the former is repreſented as the moſt charming and moſt peaceable Condition, that can poſſibly be imagin'd; whereas the latter

latter is pointed out as a State of mutual War and Violence, attended with the moſt extreme Neceſſity. On the firſt Origin of Mankind, as we are told, their Ignorance and ſavage Nature were ſo prevalent, that they could give no mutual Truſt, but muſt each depend upon himſelf, and his own Force or Cunning for Protection and Security. No Law was heard of: No Rule of Juſtice known: No Diſtinction of Property regarded: Power was the only Meaſure of Right; and a perpetual War of All againſt All was the Reſult of their untam'd Selfiſhneſs and Barbarity *.

WHETHER

* This Fiction of a State of Nature, as a State of War, was not firſt ſtarted by Mr. *Hobbes*, as is commonly imagin'd. *Plato* endeavours to refute an Hypotheſis very like it in the 2d, 3d and 4th Books de Republica. *Cicero*, on the contrary, ſuppoſes it certain and univerſally acknowledged in the following beautiful Paſſage, which is the only Authority I ſhall cite for theſe Reaſonings: Not imitating in this the Example of *Puffendorf*, nor even that of *Grotius*, who think a Verſe from *Ovid* or *Plautus* or *Petronius* a neceſſary Warrant for every moral Truth; or the Example of Mr. *Woolaſton*, who has conſtant Recourſe to *Hebrew* and *Arabic* Authors for the ſame Purpoſe. *Quis enim veſtrûm, judices, ignorat, ita naturam rerum tuliſſe, ut quodam tempore homines, nondum neque naturali, neque civili jure deſcripto, fuſi per agros, ac diſperſi vagarentur, tantumque haberent quantum manu ac viribus, per cædem ac vulnera, aut eripere, aut retinere potuiſſent? Qui igitur primi virtute & conſilio præſtanti extiterunt, ii perſpecto genere humanæ docilitatis atque ingenii, diſſipatos, unum in locum congregarunt, coſque ex feritate illa ad juſtitiam ac manſuetudinem tranſdu xerunt.*

WHETHER ſuch a Condition of human Nature could ever exiſt, or if it did, could continue ſo long as to merit the Appellation of a *State*, may juſtly be doubted. Men are neceſſarily born in a Family-ſociety, at leaſt; and are train'd up by their Parents to ſome Rule of Conduct and Behaviour. But this muſt be admitted, that if ſuch a State of mutual War and Violence was ever real, the Suſpenſion of all Laws of Juſtice, from their abſolute Inutility, is a neceſſary and infallible Conſequence.

THE more we vary our Views of human Life, and the newer and more unuſual the Lights are, in which we ſurvey it, the more ſhall we be convinc'd, that the Origin here aſſign'd for the Virtue of Juſtice is real and ſatisfactory.

WERE there a Species of Creatures, intermingled with Men, which, tho' rational, were poſſeſt of ſuch

tranſduxerunt. Tum res ad communem utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula hominum, quæ poſtea civitates nominatæ ſunt, tum domicilia conjuncta, quas urbes dicamus, invento & divino & humano jure, mœnibus ſepſerunt. Atque inter hanc vitam, perpolitam humanitate, & illam immanem, nihil tam intereſt quam JUS *atque* VIS. *Horum utro uti nolimus, altero eſt utendum. Vim volumus extingui? Jus valeat neceſſe eſt, id eſt, judicia, quibus omne jus continetur. Judicia diſplicent, aut nulla ſunt? vis dominetur neceſſe eſt? Hæc vident omnes.* Pro Sext. l. 42.

inferior

inferior Strength, both of Body and Mind, that they were incapable of all Reſiſtance, and could never, upon the higheſt Provocation, make us feel the Effects of their Reſentment; the neceſſary Conſequence, I think, is, that we ſhould be bound, by the Laws of Humanity, to give gentle Uſage to theſe Creatures, but ſhould not, properly ſpeaking, lie under any Reſtraint of Juſtice with Regard to them, nor could they poſſeſs any Right or Property, excluſive of ſuch arbitrary Lords. Our Intercourſe with them could not be call'd Society, which ſuppoſes a Degree of Equality; but abſolute Command on the one Side, and ſervile Obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they muſt inſtantly reſign: Our Permiſſion is the only Tenure, by which they hold their Poſſeſſions: Our Compaſſion and Kindneſs the only Check, by which they curb our lawleſs Will: And as no Inconvenience ever reſults from the Exerciſe of a Power, ſo firmly eſtabliſh'd in Nature, the Reſtraints of Juſtice and Property, being totally *uſeleſs*, would never have Place, in ſo unequal a Confederacy.

THIS is plainly the Situation of Men with regard to Animals; and how far theſe may be ſaid to poſſeſs Reaſon, I leave it to others to determine. The great Superiority of civiliz'd *Europeans* above barbarous *Indians*, tempted us to imagine ourſelves on the

the ſame Footing with regard to them, and made us throw off all Reſtraints of Juſtice, and even of Humanity, in our Treatment of them. In many Nations, the female Sex are reduc'd to like Slavery, and are render'd incapable of all Property, in Oppoſition to their lordly Maſters. But tho' the Males, when united, have, in all Countries, brute Force ſufficient to maintain this ſevere Tyranny; yet ſuch are the Inſinuation, Addreſs, and Charms of their fair Companions, that they are commonly able to break the Confederacy, and ſhare with the ſuperior Sex in all the Rights and Privileges of Society.

Were the human Species ſo fram'd by Nature as that each Individual poſſeſt within himſelf every Faculty, requiſite both for his own Preſervation and for the Propagation of his Kind: Were all Society and Intercourſe cut off betwixt Man and Man, by the primary Intention of the ſupreme Creator: It ſeems evident, that ſo ſolitary a Being would be as much incapable of Juſtice, as of ſocial Diſcourſe and Converſation. Where mutual Regards and Forbearance ſerve no Manner of Purpoſe, they would never direct the Conduct of any reaſonable Man. The headlong Courſe of the Paſſions would be check'd by no Reflection on future Conſequences. And as each Man is here ſuppos'd to love himſelf alone, and to depend only on himſelf and his own

Activity

Activity for Safety and Happineſs, he would, on every Occaſion, to the utmoſt of his Power, challenge the Preference above every other Being, to whom he is not bound by any Ties, either of Nature or of Intereſt.

BUT ſuppoſe the Conjunction of the Sexes to be eſtabliſh'd in Nature, a Family immediately ariſes; and particular Rules being found requiſite for its Subſiſtance, theſe are immediately embrac'd; tho' without comprehending the reſt of Mankind within their Preſcriptions. Suppoſe, that ſeveral Families unite together into one Society, which is totally diſjoin'd from all others, the Rules, which preſerve Peace and Order, enlarge themſelves to the utmoſt Extent of that Society; but, being entirely uſeleſs, loſe their Force when carry'd one Step farther. But again ſuppoſe, that ſeveral diſtinct Societies maintain a Kind of Entercourſe for mutual Convenience and Advantage, the Boundaries of Juſtice ſtill grow larger and larger, in Proportion to the Largeneſs of Men's Views, and the Force of their mutual Connexions. Hiſtory, Experience, Reaſon ſufficiently inſtruct us in this natural Progreſs of human Sentiments, and the gradual Encreaſe of our Regards to Property and Juſtice in Proportion as we become acquainted with the extenſive *Utility* of that Virtue.

PART

PART II.

IF we examine all the *particular* Laws, by which Juſtice is directed, and Property determin'd; we ſhall ſtill be preſented with the ſame Concluſion. The Good of Mankind is the only Object of all theſe Laws and Regulations. Not only 'tis requiſite, for the Peace and Intereſt of Society, that Men's Poſſeſſions ſhould be ſeparated; but the Rules, which we follow in making the Separation, are ſuch as can beſt be contriv'd to ſerve farther the Intereſts of Society.

WE ſhall ſuppoſe, that a Creature, poſſeſt of Reaſon, but unacquainted with human Nature, deliberates with himſelf what RULES of Juſtice or Property would beſt promote public Intereſt, and eſtabliſh Peace and Security amongſt Mankind: His moſt obvious Thought would be, to aſſign the largeſt Poſſeſſions to the moſt extenſive Virtue, and give every one the Power of doing Good, propor-tion'd to his Inclination. In a perfect Theocracy, where a Being, infinitely intelligent, governs by particular Volitions, this Rule would certainly have Place, and might ſerve the wiſeſt Purpoſes: But were Mankind to execute ſuch a Law; (ſo great is the Uncertainty of Merit, both from its natural Obſcurity,

ſcurity, and from the Self-conceit of each Individual) that no determinate Rule of Conduct would ever reſult from it; and the total Diſſolution of Society muſt be the immediate Conſequence. Fanatics may ſuppoſe, *that Dominion is founded in Grace*, and *that Saints alone inherit the Earth*; but the civil Magiſtrate very juſtly puts theſe ſublime Theoriſts on the ſame Footing with common Robbers, and teaches them, by the ſevereſt Diſcipline, that a Rule, which, in Speculation, may ſeem the moſt advantageous to Society, may yet be found, in Practice, totally pernicious and deſtructive.

THAT there were *religious* Fanatics of this kind in *England*, during the civil Wars, we learn from Hiſtory; tho' 'tis probable, that the obvious *Tendency* of theſe Principles excited ſuch Horrour in Mankind, as ſoon oblig'd the dangerous Enthuſiaſts to renounce, or at leaſt conceal their Tenets. Perhaps, the *Levellers*, who claim'd an equal Diſtribution of Property, were a Kind of *political* Fanatics, which aroſe from the religious Species, and more openly avow'd their Pretenſions, as carrying a more plauſible Appearance, of being practicable, as well as uſeful to human Society.

IT muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that Nature is ſo liberal to Mankind, that were all her Preſents equally

divided amongſt the Species, and improv'd by Art and Induſtry, every Individual would enjoy all the Neceſſaries, and even moſt of the Comforts of Life; nor would ever be liable to any Ills, but ſuch as might accidentally ariſe from the ſickly Frame and Conſtitution of his Body. It muſt alſo be confeſt, that, wherever we depart from this Equality, we rob the Poor of more Satisfaction than we add to the Rich, and that the ſlight Gratification of a frivolous Vanity, in one Individual, frequently coſts more than Bread to many Families, and even Provinces. It may appear withal, that the Rule of Equality, as it would be highly *uſeful*, is not altogether *impracticable*; but has taken Place, at leaſt, in an imperfect Degree, in ſome Republics; particularly, that of *Sparta*; where it was attended, as 'tis ſaid, with the moſt beneficial Conſequences. Not to mention, that the *Agrarian* Laws, ſo frequently claim'd in *Rome*, and carry'd to Execution in many *Greek* Cities, proceeded, all of them, from a general Idea of the Utility of this Principle.

But Hiſtorians, and even common Senſe, may inform us, that, however ſpecious theſe Ideas of *perfect* Equality may ſeem, they are really, at the Bottom, *impracticable*; and were they not ſo, would be extremely *pernicious* to human Society. Render the Poſſeſſions of Men ever ſo equal, their different De-

grees

grees of Art, Care, and Induſtry will immediately break that Equality. Or if you check theſe Virtues, you reduce Society to the extremeſt Indigence; and inſtead of preventing Want and Beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole Community. The moſt rigorous Inquiſition too, is requiſite to watch every Inequality on its firſt Appearance; and the moſt ſevere Juriſdiction, to puniſh and redreſs it. But beſides, that ſo much Authority muſt ſoon degenerate into Tyranny, and be exerted with great Partialities; who can poſſibly be poſſeſt of it, in ſuch a Situation as is here ſuppos'd? Perfect Equality of Poſſeſſions, deſtroying all Subordination, weakens extremely the Authority of Magiſtracy, and muſt reduce all Power nearly to a Level, as well as Property.

WE may conclude, therefore, that, in order to eſtabliſh Laws for the Regulation of Property, we muſt be acquainted with the Nature and Situation of Man, muſt reject Appearances, which may be falſe, tho' ſpecious, and muſt ſearch for thoſe Rules, which are, on the whole, moſt *uſeful* and *beneficial*. Vulgar Senſe and ſlight Experience are ſufficient for this Purpoſe; where Men give not way to too ſelfiſh Avidity, or too extenſive Enthuſiaſm.

WHO ſees not, for Inſtance, that whatever is produc'd or improv'd by a Man's Art or Induſtry ought, for ever, to be ſecur'd to him, in order to give Encouragement to ſuch *uſeful* Habits and Accompliſhments? That the Property ought alſo to deſcend to Children and Relations, for the ſame *uſeful* Purpoſe? That it may be alienated by Conſent, in order to beget that Commerce and Intercourſe, which is ſo *beneficial* to human Society? And that all Contracts and Promiſes ought carefully to be fulfill'd, in order to ſecure mutual Truſt and Confidence, by which the general *Intereſt* of Mankind is ſo much promoted?

EXAMINE the Writers on the Laws of Nature; and you will always find, that, whatever Principles they ſet out with, they are ſure to terminate here at laſt, and to aſſign, as the ultimate Reaſon for every Rule they eſtabliſh, the Convenience and Neceſſities of Mankind. A Conceſſion thus extorted, in Oppoſition to Syſtems, has more Authority, than if it had been made, in Proſecution of them.

WHAT other Reaſon, indeed, could Writers ever give, why this muſt be *mine* and that *yours*; ſince uninſtructed Nature, ſurely, never made any ſuch Diſtinction? Theſe Objects are, of themſelves, foreign

foreign to us; they are totally disjoin'd and ſeparate; and nothing but the general Intereſts of Society can form the Connection.

SOMETIMES, the Intereſts of Society may require a Rule of Juſtice in a particular Caſe; but may not determine any particular Rule, amongſt ſeveral, which are all equally beneficial. In that Caſe, the ſlighteſt *Analogies* are laid hold of, in order to prevent that Indifference and Ambiguity, which would be the Source of perpetual Quarrels and Diſſentions. Thus Poſſeſſion alone, and firſt Poſſeſſion, is ſuppos'd to convey Property, where no-body elſe has any precedent Claim and Pretenſion. Many of the Reaſonings of Lawyers are of this analogical Nature, and depend on very ſlight Connexions of the Imagination.

Is it ever ſcrupled, in extraordinary Caſes, to violate all Regard to the private Property of Individuals, and ſacrifice to public Intereſt a Diſtinction, which had been eſtabliſh'd for the Sake of that Intereſt? The Safety of the People is the ſupreme Law: All other particular Laws are ſubordinate to it, and dependant on it: And if, in the *common* Courſe of Things, they be followed and regarded; 'tis only becauſe the public Safety and Intereſt, *commonly* demand ſo equal and impartial an Adminiſtration.

Sometimes both *Utility* and *Analogy* fail, and leave the Laws of Juſtice in total Uncertainty. Thus, 'tis highly requiſite, that Preſcription or long Poſſeſſion ſhould convey Property; but what Number of Days or Months or Years ſhould be ſufficient for that Purpoſe, 'tis impoſſible for Reaſon alone to determine. *Civil Laws* here ſupply the Place of the natural *Code*, and aſſign different Terms for Preſcription, according to the different *Utilities*, propos'd by the Legiſlator. Bills of Exchange and promiſſory Notes, by the Laws of moſt Countries, preſcribe ſooner than Bonds and Mortgages, and Contracts of a more formal Nature.

In general we may obſerve, that all Queſtions of Property are ſubordinate to the Authority of civil Laws, which extend, reſtrain, modify, and alter the Rules of natural Juſtice, according to the particular *Convenience* of each Community. The Laws have, or ought to have, a conſtant Reference to the Conſtitution of Government, the Manners, the Climate, the Religion, the Commerce, the Situation of each Society. A late Author of great Genius, as well as extenſive Learning, has proſecuted this Subject at large, and has eſtabliſh'd, from theſe Principles, the beſt Syſtem of political Knowledge, that, perhaps,

perhaps, has ever yet been communicated to the World *.

WHAT

* The Author of *L'Eſprit des Loix*. This illuſtrious Writer, however, ſets out with a different Theory, and ſuppoſes all Right to be founded on certain *Rapports* or Relations; which is a Syſtem, that, in my Opinion, never will reconcile with true Philoſophy. Father *Malebranche*, as far as I can learn, was the firſt, that ſtarted this abſtract Theory of Morals, which was afterwards adopted by Dr. *Clarke* and others; and as it excludes all Sentiment, and pretends to found every Thing on Reaſon, it has not wanted Followers in this philoſophic Age. See *Eſſay* 1. and *Appendix* 1. With regard to Juſtice, the Virtue here treated of, the Inference againſt this Theory ſeems ſhort and concluſive. Property is allow'd to be dependant on civil Laws: Civil Laws are allow'd to have no Object but the Intereſt of Society: This therefore muſt be allow'd to be the ſole Foundation of Property and Juſtice. Not to mention, that our Obligation itſelf to obey the Magiſtrate and his Laws is founded on nothing but the Intereſts of Society.

If the Ideas of Juſtice, ſometimes, do not follow the Diſpoſitions of civil Law; we ſhall find, that theſe Caſes, inſtead of Objections, are Confirmations of the Theory deliver'd above. Where a civil Law is ſo perverſe as to croſs all the Intereſts of Society, it loſes all its Authority, and Men judge by the Ideas of natural Juſtice, which are conformable to thoſe Intereſts. Sometimes alſo civil Laws, for uſeful Purpoſes, require a Ceremony or Form; and where that is wanting, their Decrees run contrary to the uſual Tenor of Juſtice; but one, who takes Advantage of ſuch Chicanes, is not regarded as an honeſt Man. Thus, the Intereſts of Society require, that Contracts be fulfill'd; and there is not a more material Article either of natural or civil Juſtice: But the Omiſſion of a trifling Circumſtance will often, by Law, invalidate a Contract, *in foro humano*, but not *in foro conſcientiæ*, as Divines expreſs themſelves. In theſe Caſes, the Magiſtrate is ſuppos'd only to with-

WHAT is a Man's Property? Any Thing, which it is lawful for him and for him alone, to uſe. *But what Rule have we, by which we can diſtinguiſh theſe Objects?* Here we muſt have Recourſe to Statutes, Cuſtoms, Precedents, Analogies, and a hundred other Circumſtances; ſome of which are conſtant and inflexible, ſome variable and arbitrary. But the ultimate Point, in which they all profeſſedly terminate, is, the Intereſt and Happineſs of human Society. Where this enters not into Conſideration, nothing can appear more whimſical, unnatural, and even ſuperſtitious than all or moſt of the Laws of Juſtice and of Property.

THOSE, who ridicule vulgar Superſtitions, and expoſe the Folly of particular Regards to Meats, Days, Places, Poſtures, Apparel, have an eaſy Taſk; while they conſider all the Qualities and Relations of the Objects, and diſcover no adequate Cauſe for that Affection or Antipathy, Veneration or Horrour, which have ſo mighty an Influence over a conſiderable Part of Mankind. A *Syrian* would have ſtarv'd rather than taſte Pigeon; an *Egyptian* would

draw his Power of enforcing the Right, not to have alter'd the Right. Where his Intention extends to the Right, and is conformable to the Intereſts of Society; it never fails to alter the Right; a clear Proof of the Origin of Juſtice and of Property, as aſſign'd above.

not

not have approach'd Bacon: But if theſe Species of Food be examin'd by the Senſes of Sight, Smell or Taſte, or ſcrutiniz'd by the Sciences of Chymiſtry, Medicine, or Phyſics; no Difference is ever found betwixt them and any other Species, nor can that preciſe Circumſtance be pitch'd on, which may afford a juſt Foundation for the religious Paſſion. A Fowl on Thurſday is lawful Food; on Friday, abominable: Eggs in this Houſe, and in this Dioceſe are permitted during Lent; a hundred Paces farther, to eat them is a damnable Sin. This Earth or Building, yeſterday, was prophane; to-day, by the muttering of certain Words, it has become holy and ſacred. Such Reflections, as theſe, in the Mouth of a Philoſopher, one may ſafely ſay, are too obvious to have any Influence; becauſe they muſt always, to every Man, occur at firſt Sight; and where they prevail not, of themſelves, they are ſurely obſtructed by Education, Prejudice and Paſſion, not by Ignorance or Miſtake.

IT may appear, to a careleſs View; or rather, a too abſtracted Reflection; that there enters a like Superſtition into all the Regards of Juſtice; and that, if a Man ſubjects its Objects, or what we call Property, to the ſame Scrutiny of Senſe and Science, he will not, by the moſt accurate Enquiry, find any Foundation for the Difference made by moral

Sentiment. I may lawfully nouriſh myſelf from this Tree; but the Fruit of another of the ſame Species, ten Paces off, 'tis criminal for me to touch. Had I wore this Apparel an Hour ago, I had merited the ſevereſt Puniſhment; but a Man, by pronouncing a few magical Syllables, has now render'd it fit for my Uſe and Service. Were this Houſe plac'd in the neighbouring Territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it; but being built on this Side the River, it is ſubject to a different municipal Law, and I incur no Blame or Cenſure. The ſame Species of Reaſoning, it may be thought, which ſo ſucceſsfully expoſes Superſtition, is alſo applicable to Juſtice; nor is it poſſible, in the one Caſe more than in the other, to point out, in the Object, that preciſe Quality or Circumſtance, which is the Foundation of the Sentiment.

But there is this material Difference betwixt *Superſtition* and *Juſtice*, that the former is frivolous, uſeleſs, and burthenſome; the latter is abſolutely requiſite to the Well-being of Mankind and Exiſtence of Society. When we abſtract from this Circumſtance (for 'tis too apparent ever to be overlookt) it muſt be confeſt, that all Regards to Right and Property, ſeem entirely without Foundation, as much as the groſſeſt and moſt vulgar Superſtition. Were the Intereſts of Society no way concern'd, 'tis as unintelligible, why another's articulating certain Sounds, implying

implying Conſent, ſhould change the Nature of my Actions with regard to a particular Object, as why the reciting of a Liturgy by a Prieſt, in a certain Habit and Poſture, ſhould dedicate a Heap of Brick and Timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, ſacred *

THESE

* 'Tis evident, that the Will or Conſent alone never transfers Property, nor cauſes the Obligation of a Promiſe (for the ſame Reaſoning extends to both) but the will muſt be expreſt by Words or Signs, in order to impoſe a Tye upon any Man. The Expreſſion, being once brought in as ſubſervient to the Will, ſoon becomes the principal Part of the Promiſe; nor will a Man be leſs bound by his Word, tho' he ſecretly give a different Direction to his Intention, and with-hold the Aſſent of his Mind. But tho' the Expreſſion makes, on moſt Occaſions, the whole of the Promiſe, yet it does not always ſo; and one, who ſhould make uſe of any Expreſſion, of which he knows not the Meaning, and which he uſes without any Senſe of the Conſequences, would not certainly be bound by it. Nay, tho' he know its Meaning, yet if he uſes it in Jeſt only, and with ſuch Signs as ſhow evidently, he has no ſerious Intention of binding himſelf, he would not lie under any Obligation of Performance; but 'tis neceſſary, that the Words be a perfect Expreſſion of the Will, without any contrary Signs. Nay, even this we muſt not carry ſo far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our Quickneſs of Underſtanding, we conjecture, from certain Signs, to have an Intention of deceiving us, is not bound by his Expreſſion or verbal Promiſe, if we accept of it; but muſt limit this Concluſion to thoſe Caſes, where the Signs are of a different Nature from thoſe of Deceit. All thoſe Contradictions are eaſily accounted for, if Juſtice ariſes entirely from its Uſefulneſs to Society; but will never be explain'd on any other Hypotheſis.

THESE Reflections are far from weakening the Obligations of Juſtice, or diminiſhing any Thing from the moſt ſacred Attention to Property. On the contrary, ſuch Sentiments muſt acquire new Force from the preſent Reaſoning. For what ſtronger Foundation can be deſir'd or conceiv'd for any Duty than to obſerve, that human Society, or even human Nature could not ſubſiſt, without the Eſtabliſhment of it, and will ſtill arrive at greater Degrees of Happineſs and Perfection, the more inviolable the Regard is, which is pay'd to that Duty?

'TIS remarkable, that the moral Deciſions of the *Jeſuits* and other relax'd Caſuiſts, were commonly form'd in Proſecution of ſome ſuch Subtilities of Reaſoning as are here pointed at, and proceeded as much from the Habit of ſcholaſtic Refinement as from any Corrruption of the Heart, if we may follow the Authority of Monſr. *Bayle*. See his Dictionary, Article *Loyola*. And why has the Indignation of Mankind roſe ſo ſtrong againſt theſe Caſuiſts; but becauſe every one perceiv'd, that human Society could not ſubſiſt were ſuch Practices authoriz'd, and that Morals muſt always be handled with a View to public Intereſt, more than philoſophical Regularity? If the ſecret Direction of the Intention, ſaid every Man of Senſe, could invalidate a Contract; where is our Security? And yet a metaphyſical Schoolman might think, that where an Intention was ſuppos'd to be requiſite, if that Intention really had not Place, no Conſequence ought to follow, and no Obligation be impos'd. The caſuiſtical Subtilities may not be greater than the Subtilities of Lawyers, hinted at above; but as the former are *pernicious*, and the latter *innocent* and even *neceſſary*, this is the Reaſon of the very different Reception they meet with from the World.

THUS

THUS we ſeem, upon the Whole, to have attain'd a Knowledge of the Force of that Principle here inſiſted on, and can determine what Degree of Eſteem or moral Approbation may reſult from Reflections on public Intereſt and Utility. The Neceſſity of Juſtice to the Support of Society is the SOLE Foundation of that Virtue; and ſince no moral Excellence is more highly eſteem'd, we may conclude, that this Circumſtance of Uſefulneſs has, in general, the ſtrongeſt Energy, and moſt entire Command over our Sentiments. It muſt, therefore, be the Source of a conſiderable Part of the Merit, aſcrib'd to Humanity, Benevolence, Friendſhip, public Spirit, and other ſocial Virtues of that Stamp; as it is the SOLE Source of the moral Approbation pay'd to Fidelity, Juſtice, Veracity, Integrity, and thoſe other eſtimable and uſeful Qualities and Principles. 'Tis entirely agreeable to the Rules of Philoſophy, and even of common Reaſon; where any Principle has been found to have a great Force and Energy in one Inſtance, to aſcribe to it a like Energy in all ſimilar Inſtances *.

* This is Sir *Iſaac Newton*'s ſecond Rule of philoſophizing. *Principia*, Lib. 3.

SECT.

SECTION IV.

Of POLITICAL SOCIETY.

HAD every Man ſufficient *Sagacity* to perceive, at all Times, the ſtrong Intereſt, which binds him to the Obſervance of Juſtice and Equity, and *Strength of Mind* ſufficient to perſevere in a ſteady Adherence to a general and a diſtant Intereſt, in Oppoſition to the Allurements of preſent Pleaſure and Advantage: There had never, in that Caſe, been any ſuch Thing as Government or political Society, but each Man following his natural Liberty, had liv'd in entire Peace and Harmony with all others. What Need of poſitive Laws, where natural Juſtice is, of itſelf, a ſufficient Reſtraint? Why create Magiſtrates, where there never ariſes any Diſorder or Iniquity? Why abridge our native Freedom, when, in every Inſtance, the utmoſt Exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? 'Tis evident, that, if Government were totally uſeleſs, it never could have Place, and that the SOLE Foundation of the

Duty of ALLEGIANCE is the *Advantage* which it procures to Society, by preſerving Peace and Order amongſt Mankind.

When a Number of political Societies are erected, and maintain a great Entercourſe together, a new Set of Rules are immediately diſcover'd to be *uſeful* in that particular Situation; and accordingly take place, under the Title of LAWS of NATIONS. Of this Kind are, the Sacredneſs of the Perſons of Ambaſſadors, abſtaining from poiſon'd Arms, Quarter in War, with others of that Kind; which are plainly calculated for the *Advantage* of States and Kingdoms, in their Entercourſe with each other.

The Rules of Juſtice, ſuch as prevail amongſt Individuals, are not altogether ſuſpended amongſt political Societies. All Princes pretend a Regard to the Rights of others; and ſome, no doubt, without Hypocriſy. Alliances and Treaties are every Day made betwixt independent States, which would only be ſo much Waſte of Parchment, if they were not found, by Experience, to have *ſome* Influence and Authority. But here is the Difference betwixt Kingdoms and Individuals. Human Nature cannot, by any Means, ſubſiſt, without the Aſſociation of Individuals; and that Aſſociation never could have Place, were no Regard pay'd to the Laws of Equity

and Juſtice. Diſorder, Confuſion, the War of All againſt All are the neceſſary Conſequences of ſuch a licentious Conduct. But Nations can flouriſh without Entercourſe. They may even ſubſiſt, in ſome Degree, under a general War. The Obſervance of Juſtice, tho' uſeful among them, is not guarded by ſo ſtrong a Neceſſity as among Individuals; and the *moral Obligation* holds Proportion with the *Uſefulneſs*. All Politicians will allow, and moſt Philoſophers, that REASONS of STATE may, in particular Emergencies, diſpence with the Rules of Juſtice, and invalidate any Treaty or Alliance, where the ſtrict Obſervance of it would be prejudicial, in a conſiderable Degree, to either of the contracting Parties. But nothing leſs than the extremeſt Neceſſity, 'tis confeſt, can juſtify Individuals in a Breach of Promiſe, or an Invaſion of the Properties of others.

IN a confederated Commonwealth, ſuch as the *Achæan* Republic of old, or the *Swiſs* Cantons and United Provinces in modern Times; as the League has here a peculiar *Utility*, the Conditions of Union have a peculiar Sacredneſs and Authority, and a Violation of them would be equally criminal, or even more criminal, than any private Injury or Injuſtice.

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THE

THE long and helpleſs Infancy of Man requires the Combination of Parents for the Subſiſtance of their Young; and that Combination requires the Virtue of CHASTITY or Fidelity to the Marriage-bed. Without ſuch an *Utility*, 'twill readily be own'd, ſuch a Virtue would never have been thought of *.

AN Infidelity of this Nature is much more *pernicious* in *Women* than in *Men*. Hence the Laws of Chaſtity are much ſtricter over the one Sex than over the other †.

THOSE

* The only Solution, which *Plato* gives to all the Objections, that might be rais'd againſt the Community of Women, eſtabliſh'd in his imaginary Common-wealth, is, Καλλιςα γαρ δη τυτο και λεγεται και λελεξεται, οτι το μεν ωφελιμον καλον. Το δε βλαβερον αισχρον. *Scite enim iſtud & dicitur & dicetur, Id quod utile ſit honeſtum eſſe, quod autem inutile ſit turpe eſſe.* De Rep. Lib. 5. P. 457. Ex edit. Serr. And this Maxim will admit of no Doubt, where public Utility is concern'd; which is *Plato*'s Meaning. And indeed to what other Purpoſe do all the Ideas of Chaſtity and Modeſty ſerve? *Niſi utile eſt quod facimus, fruſtra eſt gloria*, ſays *Phædrus*. Καλον των βλαβερων υδεν, ſays *Plutarch de vitioſo pudore*. Nihil eorum quæ damnoſa ſunt, pulchrum eſt. The ſame was the Opinion of the Stoics. Φασιν ων οι Στωικοι αγαθον ειναι ωφελειαν η ων ετεραν ωφελειας, ωφελειν μεν λεγοντες την αρετην και την σπυδαιαν πραξιν. Sext. Emp. Lib. 3. Cap. 20.

† THESE Rules have all a Reference to Generation; and yet Women paſt Child-bearing are no more ſuppos'd to be exempted from them than thoſe is in the Flower of their Youth and Beauty. *General*

THOSE who live in the ſame Family have ſo many Opportunities of Licences of this Kind, that nothing could preſerve Purity of Manners, were Marriage allow'd amongſt the neareſt Relations, or any Intercourſe of Love betwixt them ratify'd by Law and Cuſtom. INCEST, therefore, being *pernicious* in a ſuperior Degree, has alſo a ſuperior Turpitude and moral Deformity, annex'd to it.

WHAT is the Reaſon, why, by the *Greek* Laws, one might marry a Half-ſiſter by the Father, but not by the Mother? Plainly this. The Manners of the *Greeks* were ſo reſerv'd, that a Man was never per-

General Rules are often extended beyond the Principle, whence they firſt ariſe; and this in all Matters of Taſte and Sentiment. 'Tis a vulgar Story at *Paris*, that during the Rage of the *Miſſiſſippi*, a hump-back'd Fellow went every Day into the *Ruë de Quincempoix*, where the Stock-jobbers met in great Crowds, and was well pay'd for allowing them to make uſe of his Hump as a Deſk, in order to ſign their Contracts upon it. Would the Fortune he rais'd by this Invention make him a handſome Fellow; tho' it be confeſt, that perſonal Beauty ariſes very much from Ideas of Utility? The Imagination is influenced by Aſſociations of Ideas; which, tho' they ariſe, at firſt, from the Judgment, are not eaſily alter'd by every particular Exception, that occurs to us. To which we may add, in the preſent Caſe of Chaſtity, that the Example of the Old would be pernicious to the Young; and that Women continually thinking, that a certain Time would bring them the Liberty of Indulgence, would naturally advance that Period, and think more lightly of this whole Duty, ſo requiſite to Society.

mitted

mitted to approach the Women's Apartment, even in the ſame Family, unleſs where he viſited his own Mother. His Step-mother and her Children were as much ſhut up from him as the Women of any other Family, and there was as little Danger of any criminal Intercourſe betwixt them: Uncles and Nieces, for a like Reaſon, might marry at *Athens*; but neither theſe nor Half-brothers and Siſters could contract that Alliance at *Rome*, where the Intercourſe was more open betwixt the Sexes. Public Utility is the Cauſe of all theſe Variations.

To repeat, to a Man's Prejudice, any Thing that eſcap'd him in private Converſation, or to make any ſuch Uſe of his private Letters, is highly blam'd. The free and ſocial Intercourſe of Minds muſt be extremely checkt, where no ſuch Rules of Fidelity are eſtabliſh'd.

Even in repeating Stories, whence we can ſee no ill Conſequences to reſult, the giving one's Authors is regarded as a Piece of Indiſcretion, if not of Immorality. Theſe Stories, in paſſing from Hand to Hand, and receiving all the uſual Variations, frequently come about to the Perſons concern'd, and produce Animoſities and Quarrels among People, whoſe Intentions are the moſt innocent and inoffenſive.

To

To pry into Secrets, to open or even read the Letters of others, to play the Spy upon their Words and Looks and Actions: What Habits more inconvenient in Society? What Habits, of conſequence, more blameable?

THIS Principle is alſo the Foundation of moſt of the Laws of Good-manners; a Kind of leſſer Morality calculated for the Eaſe of Company and Converſation. Too much or too little Ceremony are both blam'd, and every Thing, that promotes Eaſe, without an indecent Familiarity, is uſeful and laudable.

CONSTANCY in Friendſhips, Attachments, and Familiarities is commonly very laudable, and is requiſite to ſupport Truſt and good Correſpondence in Society. But in Places of general, tho' caſual Concourſe, where Health and Pleaſure bring People promiſcuouſly together, public Conveniency has diſpens'd with this Maxim; and Cuſtom there promotes an unreſerv'd Converſation for the Time, by indulging the Privilege of dropping afterwards every indifferent Acquaintance, without Breach of Civility or Good-manners.

EVEN

EVEN in Societies, that are eſtabliſh'd on Principles the moſt immoral, and the moſt deſtructive to the Intereſts of the general Society, there are requir'd certain Rules and Maxims, which a Species of falſe Honour, as well as private Intereſt, engages the Members to obſerve. Robbers and Pyrates, it has often been remark'd, could not maintain their pernicious Confederacy, did they not eſtabliſh a new diſtributive Juſtice amongſt themſelves, and recall thoſe Laws of Equity, which they have violated with the reſt of Mankind.

I HATE a drinking Companion, ſays the *Greek* Proverb, who never forgets. The Follies of the laſt Debauch ſhould be buried in eternal Oblivion, in order to give full Scope to the Follies of the next.

AMONGST Nations, where an immoral Gallantry, if cover'd with a thin Veil of Myſtery, is, in ſome Degree, authoriz'd by Cuſtom, there immediately ariſe a Set of Rules, calculated for the Conveniency of that Attachment. The famous Court or Parliament of Love in *Provence* decided formally all difficult Caſes of this Nature.

IN Societies for Play, there are Laws requir'd for the Conduct of the Game, and theſe Laws are different

ferent in each Game. The Foundation, I own, of ſuch Societies is frivolous; and the Laws are, in a great Meaſure, tho' not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a material Difference betwixt them and the Rules of Juſtice, Fidelity and Loyalty. The general Societies of Men are abſolutely requiſite for the Subſiſtence of the Species; and the public Conveniency, which regulates Morals, is inviolably eſtabliſh'd in the Nature of Man, and of the World, in which he lives. The Compariſon, therefore, in theſe Reſpects, is very imperfect. We may only learn from it the Neceſſity of Rules, wherever Men have any Intercourſe with each other.

THEY cannot even paſs each other on the Road without Rules. Waggoners, Coachmen, and Poſtilions have Principles, by which they give way; and theſe are chiefly founded on mutual Eaſe and Convenience. Sometimes alſo they are arbitrary, or at beſt dependant on a Kind of capricious Analogy, like many of the Reaſonings of Lawyers *.

* That the lighter Machine yields to the heavier, and in Machines of the ſame Kind, that the empty yield to the loaded; this Rule is founded on Convenience. That thoſe who are going to the Capital take place of thoſe who are coming from it; this ſeems to be founded on ſome Idea of the Dignity of the great City, and of the Preference of the future to the paſt. From like Reaſons amongſt Foot-walkers, the Right-hand entitles a Man to the Wall, and prevents joſtling, which peaceable People find very diſagreeable and inconvenient.

To

To carry the Matter farther, we may obſerve, that 'tis impoſſible for Men ſo much as to murther each other without Statutes and Maxims, and an Idea of Juſtice and Honour. War has its Laws as well as Peace; and even that ſportive Kind of War carried on amongſt Wreſtlers, Boxers, Cudgel-players, Gladiators, is ſupported by fixt Principles and Regulations. Common Intereſt and Utility beget infallibly a Standard of Right and Wrong amongſt the Parties concern'd.

SECTION V.

Why UTILITY *pleaſes.*

PART I.

IT ſeems ſo natural a Thought to aſcribe to their Utility the Praiſe which we beſtow on the ſocial Virtues, that one would expect to meet with this Principle every-where in moral Writers, as the chief Foundation of their Reaſoning and Inquiry. In common Life, we may obſerve, that the Circumſtance of Utility is always appeal'd to; nor is it ſuppos'd, that a greater Elogy can be given to any Man, than to diſplay his Uſefulneſs to the Public, and enumerate the Services he has perform'd to Mankind and Society. What Praiſe, even of an inanimate Form, if the Regularity and Elegance of its Parts deſtroy not its Fitneſs for any uſeful Purpoſe! And how ſatisfactory an Apology for any Diſproportion or ſeeming Deformity, if we can ſhow the Neceſſity of that

particular Conſtruction for the Uſe intended! A Ship appears infinitely more beautiful to an Artiſt, or one moderately ſkill'd in Navigation; where its Prow is wide and ſwelling beyond its Poop, than if it were fram'd with a preciſe geometrical Regularity, in Contradiction to all the Laws of Mechanics. A Building, whoſe Doors and Windows were exact Squares, would hurt the Eye by that very Proportion; as ill adapted to the human Figure, for whoſe Service the Fabric was intended. What Wonder then, that a Man, whoſe Habits and Conduct are hurtful to Society, and dangerous or pernicious to every one, that has an Intercourſe with him, ſhould, on that Account, be an Object of Diſapprobation, and communicate to every Spectator the ſtrongeſt Sentiments of Diſguſt and Hatred *?

But

* We ought not to imagine, becauſe an inanimate Object may be uſeful as well as a Man, that therefore it ought alſo, according to this Syſtem, to merit the Appellation of *virtuous*. The Sentiments, excited by Utility, are, in the two Caſes, very different; and the one is mixt with Affection, Eſteem, Approbation, *&c.* and not the other. In like Manner, an inanimate Object may have good Colour and Proportions as well as a human Figure. But can we ever be in Love with the former? There are a numerous Set of Paſſions and Sentiments, of which thinking rational Beings are, by the original Conſtitution of Nature, the only proper Objects: And tho' the very ſame Qualities be transferr'd to an inſenſible, inanimate Being, they will not excite the

BUT perhaps the Difficulty of accounting for theſe Effects of Uſefulneſs, or its contrary, has kept Philoſophers from admitting them into their Syſtems of Ethics, and has induc'd them rather to employ any other Principle, in explaining the Origin of moral Good and Evil. But 'tis no juſt Reaſon for rejecting any Principle, confirm'd by Experience, that we can give no ſatisfactory Account of its Origin, nor are able to reſolve it into other more general Principles. And if we would employ a little Thought on the preſent Subject, we need be at no Loſs to account for the Influence of Utility, and to deduce it from Principles, the moſt known and avow'd in human Nature.

the ſame Sentiments. The beneficial Qualities of Herbs and Minerals are, indeed, ſometimes call'd their *Virtues*; but this is an Effect of the Caprice of Language, which ought not to be regarded in Reaſoning. For tho' there be a Species of Approbation, attending even inanimate Objects, when beneficial, yet this Sentiment is ſo weak, and ſo different from what is directed to beneficent Magiſtrates or Stateſmen, that they ought not to be rank'd under the ſame Claſs or Appellation.

A very ſmall Variation of the Object, even where the ſame Qualities are preſerv'd, will deſtroy a Sentiment. Thus; the ſame Beauty, transferr'd to a different Sex, excites no amorous Paſſion, where Nature is not extremely perverted.

FROM the apparent Uſefulneſs of the ſocial Virtues, it has readily been inferr'd by Sceptics, both antient and modern, that all moral Diſtinctions ariſe from Education, and were, at firſt, invented, and afterwards encourag'd, by the Arts of Politicians, in order to render Men tractable, and ſubdue their natural Ferocity and Selfiſhneſs, which incapacitated them for Society. This Principle, indeed, of Precept and Education muſt be ſo far own'd to have a powerful Influence, that it may frequently encreaſe or diminiſh, beyond their natural Standard, the Sentiments of Approbation or Diſlike; and may even, in particular Inſtances, create, without any natural Principle, a new Sentiment of this Kind; as is evident in all ſuperſtitious Practices and Obſervances: But that *all* moral Affection or Diſlike ariſes from this Origin will never ſurely be allow'd by any judicious Enquirer. Had Nature made no ſuch Diſtinction, founded on the original Frame and Conſtitution of the Mind, the Words, *honourable* and *ſhameful*, *lovely* and *odious*, *noble* and *deſpicable*, never had had place in any Language; nor could Politicians, had they invented theſe Terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any Idea to the Audience. So that nothing can be more ſuperficial than this Paradox of the Sceptics; and 'twere well, if, in the abſtruſer Studies of Logics and Metaphyſics,

taphyſics, we could as eaſily get rid of the Cavils of that Sect, as in the more practical and intelligible Sciences of Politics and Morals.

THE ſocial Virtues muſt, therefore, be allow'd to have a natural Beauty and Amiableneſs, which, at firſt, antecedent to all Precept or Education, recommends them to the Eſteem of uninſtructed Mankind, and engages their Affections. And as the Utility of theſe Virtues is the chief Circumſtance, whence they derive their Merit, it follows, that the End, which they have a Tendency to promote, muſt be ſome way agreeable to us, and take hold of ſome natural Affection. It muſt pleaſe, either from Conſiderations of Self-intereſt, or from more generous Motives and Regards.

IT has often been aſſerted, that, as every Man has a ſtrong Connexion with Society, and perceives the Impoſſibility of his ſolitary Subſiſtence, he becomes, on that Account, favourable to all thoſe Habits or Principles, which promote Order in Society, and enſure to him the quiet Poſſeſſion of ſo ineſtimable a Bleſſing. As much as we value our own Happineſs and Welfare, as much muſt we value the Practice of Juſtice and Humanity, by which alone the ſocial Confederacy can be maintain'd, and every Man reap the Fruits of mutual Protection and Aſſiſtance.

THIS Deduction of Morals from Self-love or a Regard to private Intereſt, is a very obvious Thought, and has not ariſen altogether from the wanton Sallies and ſportive Aſſaults of the Sceptics. To mention no others, *Polybius*, one of the graveſt, and moſt judicious, as well as moſt moral Writers of Antiquity, has aſſign'd this ſelfiſh Origin to all our Sentiments of Virtue *. But tho' the ſolid, practical Senſe of that Author, and his Averſion to all vain Subtilties render his Authority on the preſent Subject very conſiderable; yet this is not an Affair to be decided by Authority; and the Voice of Nature and Experience ſeems plainly to oppoſe the ſelfiſh Theory.

WE frequently beſtow Praiſes on virtuous Actions, perform'd in very diſtant Ages and remote Countries; where the utmoſt Subtilty of Imagination would not diſcover any Appearance of Self-intereſt, or find any

* Undutifulneſs to Parents, is diſapprov'd of by Mankind, προορωμενες το μελλον, και συλλογιζομενες οτι το παραπλησιον εκαςοις αυτων συγκυρησει. Ingratitude for a like Reaſon (tho' he ſeems there to mix a more generous Regard) συναγανακτουντας μεν τω πελας, αναφερονταις δ' επ αυτους το παραπλησιον εξ ων υπογιγνεται τις εννοια παρεκαςω τε καθηκοντος δυναμεως και θεωριας. Lib. 6. Cap. 4. Perhaps the Hiſtorian only meant, that our Sympathy and Humanity was more enlivened, by our conſidering the Similarity of our Caſe with that of the Perſons ſuffering; which is a juſt Sentiment.

Connexion

Connexion of our preſent Happineſs and Security with Events ſo widely ſeparated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble Deed, perform'd by an Adverſary, commands our Approbation; while in its Conſequences it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our particular Intereſts.

WHERE private Advantage concurs with general Affection for Virtue, we readily perceive and avow the Mixture of theſe diſtinct Sentiments, which have a very different Feeling and Influence on the Mind. We praiſe, perhaps, with more Alacrity, where the generous, humane Action contributes to our particular Intereſt: But the Topics of Praiſe we inſiſt on are very wide of this Circumſtance. And we may attempt to bring over others to our Sentiments, without endeavouring to convince them, that they reap any Advantage from the Actions, which we recommend to their Approbation and Applauſe.

FRAME the Model of a praiſe-worthy Character, conſiſting of all the moſt amiable moral Virtues: Give Inſtances, in which theſe diſplay themſelves, after an eminent and extraordinary Manner: You readily engage the Eſteem and Approbation of all your Audience, who never ſo much as enquir'd in what Age and Country the Perſon liv'd, who poſſeſt

theſe noble Qualities: A Circumſtance, however, of all others, the moſt material to Self-love, or a Concern for our own individual Happineſs.

ONCE on a Time, a Stateſmen, in the Shock and Concurrence of Parties, prevail'd ſo far as to procure, by his Eloquence, the Baniſhment of an able Adverſary; whom he ſecretly follow'd, offering him Money for his Support during his Exile, and ſoothing him with Topics of Conſolation on his Misfortunes. *Alas!* cries the baniſh'd Stateſman, *with what Regret muſt I leave my Friends in this City, where even Enemies are ſo generous!* Virtue, tho' in an Enemy, here pleas'd him: And we alſo give it the juſt Tribute of Praiſe and Approbation; nor do we retract theſe Sentiments, when we hear, that the Action paſt at *Athens*, about two thouſand Years ago, and that the Perſons Names were *Eſchines* and *Demoſthenes*.

WHAT is that to me? There are few Occaſions, when this Queſtion is not pertinent: And had it that univerſal, infallible Influence ſuppos'd, it would turn into Ridicule every Compoſition, and almoſt every Converſation, which contain any Praiſe or Cenſure of Men and Manners.

'Tis

'TIS but a weak Subterfuge, when preſs'd by theſe Facts and Arguments, to ſay, that we tranſport ourſelves, by the Force of Imagination, into diſtant Ages and Countries, and conſider the Advantage, which we ſhould have reapt from theſe Characters, had we been Contemporaries, and had any Commerce with the Perſons. 'Tis not conceivable, how a *real* Sentiment or Paſſion can ever ariſe from a known *imaginary* Intereſt; eſpecially when our *real* Intereſt is ſtill kept in View, and is often acknowledg'd to be entirely diſtinct from the imaginary, and even ſometimes oppoſite to it.

A Man, brought to the Brink of a Precipice, cannot look down without trembling; and the Sentiment of *imaginary* Danger actuates him, in Oppoſition to the Opinion and Belief of *real* Safety. But the Imagination is here aſſiſted by the Preſence of a ſtriking Object; and yet prevails not, except it be alſo aided by Novelty, and the unuſual Appearance of the Object. Cuſtom ſoon reconciles us to Heights and Precipices, and wears off theſe falſe and deluſive Terrors. The Reverſe is obſervable in the Eſtimates we form of Characters and Manners; and the more we habituate ourſelves to an accurate Scrutiny of the moral Species, the more delicate Feeling do we acquire of the moſt minute Diſtinctions betwixt Vice

and Virtue. Such frequent Occaſion, indeed, have we, in common Life, to pronounce all Kinds of moral Determinations, that no Object of this Kind can be new or unuſual to us; nor could any *falſe* Views or Prepoſſeſſions maintain their Ground againſt an Experience, ſo common and familiar. Experience and Cuſtom being chiefly what form the Aſſociations of Ideas, 'tis impoſſible, that any Aſſociation could eſtabliſh and ſupport itſelf, in direct Oppoſition to theſe Principles.

USEFULNESS is agreeable, and engages our Approbation. This is a Matter of Fact, confirm'd by daily Obſervation. But, *uſeful?* For what? For ſome Body's Intereſt, ſurely. Whoſe Intereſt then? Not our own only: For our Approbation frequently extends farther. It muſt, therefore, be the Intereſt of thoſe, who are ſerv'd by the Character or Action approv'd of; and then we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this Principle, we ſhall diſcover the great Secret of moral Diſtinctions.

PART II.

SELF-LOVE is a Principle in human Nature of ſuch extenſive Energy, and the Intereſt of each Individual is, in general, ſo cloſely connected with that of Community, that thoſe Philoſophers were excuſable, who fancy'd, that all our Concern for the Public might, perhaps, be reſolv'd into a Concern for our own Happineſs and Preſervation. They ſaw, every Moment, Inſtances of Approbation or Blame, Satisfaction or Diſpleaſure towards Characters and Actions; they denominated the Objects of theſe Sentiments, *Virtues* or *Vices*; they obſerv'd, that the former had a Tendency to encreaſe the Happineſs, and the latter the Miſery of Society; they aſk'd, if it was poſſible we could have any general Concern for Society, or any diſintereſted Reſentment of the Welfare or Injury of others; they found it ſimpler to conſider all theſe Sentiments as Modifications of Self-love; and they diſcover'd a Pretext, at leaſt, for this Unity of Principle, in that cloſe Union of Intereſt, which is ſo obſervable betwixt the Public and each Individual.

BUT notwithſtanding this frequent Confuſion of Intereſts, 'tis eaſy to attain what natural Philoſophers, after my Lord *Bacon*, have affected to call the

the *Experimentum crucis*, or that Experiment, which points out the Way we ſhould follow, in any Doubt or Ambiguity. We have found Inſtances, wherein private Intereſt was ſeparate from public; wherein it was even contrary: And yet we obſerv'd the moral Sentiment to continue, notwithſtanding this Disjunction of Intereſts. And wherever theſe diſtinct Intereſts ſenſibly concur'd, we always found a ſenſible Encreaſe of the Sentiment, and a more warm Affection to Virtue, and Deteſtation of Vice, or what we properly call, *Gratitude* and *Revenge*. Compell'd by theſe Inſtances, we muſt renounce the Theory, which accounts for every moral Sentiment by the Principle of Self-love. We muſt adopt a more public Affection, and allow, that the Intereſts of Society are not, even on their own Account, altogether indifferent to us. Uſefulneſs is only a Tendency to a certain End; and 'tis a Contradiction in Terms, that any Thing pleaſes as Means to an End, where the End itſelf does no way affect us. If therefore Uſefulneſs be a Source of moral Sentiment, and if this Uſefulneſs be not always conſider'd with a Reference to Self; it follows, that every Thing, which contributes to the Happineſs of Society, recommends itſelf directly to our Approbation and Good-will. Here is a Principle, which accounts, in great Part, for the Origin of Morality: And what need we ſeek

for

for abſtruſe and remote Syſtems, when there occurs one ſo obvious and natural * ?

HAVE we any Difficulty to comprehend the Force of Humanity and Benevolence? Or to conceive, that the very Aſpect of Happineſs, Joy, Proſperity, gives Pleaſure; that of Pain, Sufferance, Sorrow, communicates Uneaſineſs? The human Countenance, ſays *Horace* †, borrows Smiles or Tears from the human Countenance. Reduce a Perſon to Solitude, and he loſes all Enjoyment, except merely of the ſpeculative Kind; and that becauſe the Movements of his Heart are not forwarded by correſpondent

* 'Tis needleſs to puſh our Reſearches ſo far as to aſk, why we have Humanity or a Fellow-feeling with others. 'Tis ſufficient, that this is experienc'd to be a Principle in human Nature. We muſt ſtop ſomewhere in our Examination of Cauſes; and there are, in every Science, ſome general Principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any Principle more general. No Man is abſolutely indifferent to the Happineſs and Miſery of others. The firſt has a natural Tendency to give Pleaſure; the ſecond, Pain. This every one may find in himſelf. It is not probable, that theſe Principles can be reſolv'd into Principles more ſimple and univerſal, whatever Attempts may have been made to that Purpoſe. But if it were poſſible, it belongs not to the preſent Subject; and we may here ſafely conſider theſe Principles as original: Happy, if we can render all the Conſequences ſufficiently plain and perſpicuous.

† Uti ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent
Humani vultus. HOR.

Move-

Movements in his Fellow-creatures. The Signs of Sorrow and Mourning, tho' arbitrary, affect us with Melancholy; but the natural Symptoms, Tears, and Cries, and Groans, never fail to infuſe Compaſſion and Uneaſineſs. And if the Effects of Miſery touch us in ſo lively a Manner; can we be ſuppos'd altogether inſenſible or indifferent towards its Cauſes; when a malicious or treacherous Character and Behaviour is preſented to us?

We enter, I ſhall ſuppoſe, into a convenient, warm, well-contriv'd Apartment: We neceſſarily receive a Pleaſure from its very Survey; becauſe it preſents us with the pleaſing Ideas of Eaſe, Satisfaction, and Enjoyment. The hoſpitable, good-humour'd, humane Landlord appears. This Circſtance ſurely muſt embelliſh the whole; nor can we eaſily forbear reflecting, with Pleaſure, on the Satisfaction and Enjoyment, which reſults to every one from his Intercourſe and Good-offices.

His whole Family, by the Freedom, Eaſe, Confidence, and calm Satisfaction, diffus'd over their Countenances, ſufficiently expreſs their Happineſs. I have a pleaſing Sympathy in the Proſpect of ſo much Joy, and can never conſider the Source of it, without the moſt agreeable Emotions.

He

HE tells me, that an oppreſſive and powerful Neighbour had attempted to diſpoſſeſs him of his Inheritance, and had long diſturb'd all his innocent and ſocial Enjoyments. I feel an immediate Indignation ariſe in me againſt ſuch Violence and Injury.

BUT 'tis no Wonder, he adds, that a private Wrong ſhould proceed from a Man, who had enſlav'd Provinces, depopulated Cities, and made the Field and Scaffold ſtream with human Blood. I am ſtruck with Horror at the Proſpect of ſo much Miſery, and am actuated by the ſtrongeſt Antipathy againſt its Author.

IN general, 'tis certain, that wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converſe about; every Thing ſtill preſents us with the View of human Happineſs or Miſery, and excites in our Breaſts a ſympathetic Movement of Pleaſure or Uneaſineſs. In our ſerious Occupations, in our careleſs Amuſements, this Principle ſtill exerts its active Energy.

A MAN, who enters the Theatre, is immediately ſtruck with the View of ſo great a Multitude, participating of one common Amuſement; and experiences, from their very Aſpect, a ſuperior Senſibility

lity or Diſpoſition of being affected with every Sentiment, which he ſhares with his Fellow-creatures.

He obſerves the Actors to be animated by the Appearance of a full Audience; and rais'd to a Degree of Enthuſiaſm, which they cannot command in any ſolitary or calm Moment.

Every Movement of the Theatre, by a ſkillful Poet, is communicated, as it were by Magic, to the Spectators, who weep, tremble, reſent, rejoice, and are enflam'd with all the Variety of Paſſions, which actuate the ſeveral Perſonages of the Drama.

Where any Event croſſes our Wiſhes, and interrupts the Happineſs of the favourite Perſonages, we feel a ſenſible Anxiety and Concern. But where their Sufferings proceed from the Treachery, Cruelty or Tyranny of an Enemy, our Breaſts are affected with the livelieſt Reſentment againſt the Author of theſe Calamities.

'Tis here eſteem'd contrary to the Rules of Art to repreſent any Thing cool and indifferent. A diſtant Friend, or a Confident, who has no immediate Intereſt in the Cataſtrophe, ought, if poſſible, to be avoided by the Poet; as communicating a like Indif-

Indifference to the Audience, and checking the Progreſs of the Paſſions.

No Species of Poetry is more entertaining than *Paſtoral*; and every one is ſenſible, that the chief Source of its Pleaſure ariſes from thoſe Images of a gentle and tender Tranquillity, which it repreſents in its Perſonages, and of which it communicates a like Sentiment to the Readers. *Sannazarius*, who transfer'd the Scene to the Sea-ſhore, tho' he preſented the moſt magnificent Object in Nature, is confeſt to have err'd in his Choice. The Idea of Toil, Labour, and Danger, ſuffer'd by the Fiſhermen, is painful, by an unavoidable Sympathy, which attends every Conception of human Happineſs or Miſery.

WHEN I was twenty, ſays a *French* Poet, *Ovid* was my Choice: Now I am forty, I declare for *Horace*. We enter, to be ſure, more readily into Sentiments, that reſemble thoſe we feel every Moment: But no Paſſion, when well repreſented, can be altogether indifferent to us; becauſe there is none, of which every Man has not within him, at leaſt, the Seeds and firſt Principles. 'Tis the Buſineſs of Poetry to approach every Object by lively Imagery and Deſcription, and make it look like Truth and Reality: A certain Proof, that wherever that

that Reality is found, our Minds are diſpos'd to be ſtrongly affected by it.

ANY recent Event or Piece of News, by which the Fortunes of States, Provinces or many Individuals, are affected, is extremely intereſting even to thoſe whoſe Welfare is not immediately engag'd. Such Intelligence is propagated with Celerity, heard with Avidity, and enquir'd into with Attention and Concern. The Intereſts of Society appear, on this Occaſion, to be, in ſome Degree, the Intereſts of each Individual. The Imagination is ſure to be affected; tho' the Paſſions excited may not always be ſo ſtrong and ſteady as to have great Influence on the Conduct and Behaviour.

THE Peruſal of a Hiſtory ſeems a calm Entertainment; but would be no Entertainment at all, did not our Hearts beat with correſpondent Movements to thoſe deſcribed by the Hiſtorian.

Thucydides and *Guicciardin* ſupport with Difficulty our Attention, while the former deſcribes the trivial Rencounters of the ſmall Cities of *Greece*, and the latter the harmleſs Wars of *Piſa*. The few Perſons intereſted, and the ſmall Intereſt fill not the Imagination, and engage not the Affections. The deep Diſtreſs of the numerous *Athenian* Army before *Syracuſe*;

racuſe; the Danger, which ſo nearly threatens *Venice*; theſe excite Compaſſion; theſe move Terror and Anxiety.

THE indifferent, unintereſting Stile of *Suetonius*, equally with the maſterly Pencil of *Tacitus*, may convince us of the cruel Depravity of *Nero* or *Tiberius*: But what a Difference of Sentiment! While the former coldly relates the Facts; and the latter ſets before our Eyes the venerable Figures of a *Soranus* and a *Thraſea*, intrepid in their Fate, and only mov'd by the melting Sorrows of their Friends and Kindred. What Sympathy then touches every human Heart! What Indignation againſt the inhuman Tyrant, whoſe cauſeleſs Fear or unprovok'd Malice, gave riſe to ſuch deteſtable Barbarity!

IF we bring theſe Subjects nearer: If we remove all Suſpicion of Fiction and Deceit: What powerful Concern is excited, and how much ſuperior, in many Inſtances, to the narrow Attachments of Self-love and private Intereſt! Popular Sedition, Party Zeal, a devoted Obedience to factious Leaders; theſe are ſome of the moſt viſible, tho' leſs laudable Effects of this ſocial Sympathy in human Nature.

THE

THE Frivolouſneſs of the Subject too, we may obſerve, is not able to detach us entirely from what carries an Image of human Sentiment and Affection.

WHEN a Perſon ſtutters, and pronounces with Difficulty, we even ſympathize with this trivial Uneaſineſs, and ſuffer for him. And 'tis a Rule in Criticiſm, that every Combination of Syllables or Letters, which gives Pain to the Organs of Speech in the Recital, appears alſo, from a Species of Sympathy, harſh and diſagreeable to the Ear. Nay, when we run over a Book with our Eye, we are ſenſible of ſuch unharmonious Compoſition; becauſe we ſtill imagine, that a Perſon recites it to us, and ſuffers from the Pronunciation of theſe jarring Sounds. So delicate is our Sympathy!

EASY and unconſtrain'd Poſtures and Motions are always beautiful: An Air of Health and Vigour is agreeable: Cloaths, that warm, without burthening the Body; that cover, without impriſoning the Limbs, are well-faſhion'd. In every Judgment of Beauty, the Sentiments and Feelings of the Perſons affected enter into Conſideration, and communicate to the Spectators ſimilar Touches of Pain or Pleaſure.

ſure *. What Wonder, then, if we can pronounce no Sentence concerning the Characters and Conduct of Men without conſidering the Tendencies of their Actions, and the Happineſs or Miſery, which thence ariſes to Society? What Aſſociation of Ideas would ever operate, were that Principle here totally inactive †?

* *Decentior equus cujus aſtricta ſunt ilia; ſed idem velocior. Pulcher aſpectu ſit athleta, cujus lacertos exercitatis expreſſit; idem certamini paratior. Numquam enim* ſpecies *ab* utilitate *dividitur. Sed hoc quidem diſcernere modici judicii eſt.* Quintilian Inſt. Lib. 8. Cap. 3.

† In Proportion to the Station which a Man poſſeſſes, according to the Relations in which he is plac'd; we always expect from him a greater or leſs Degree of Good, and when diſappointed, blame his Inutility; and much more, do we blame him, if any Ill or Prejudice ariſes from his Conduct and Behaviour. When the Intereſts of one Country interfere with thoſe of another, we eſtimate the Merits of a Stateſman by the Good or Ill, which reſults to his own Country from his Meaſures and Councils, without Regard to the Prejudice he brings on its Enemies and Rivals. His Fellow-citizens are the Objects, which lie neareſt the Eye, while we determine his Character. And as Nature has implanted in every one a ſuperior Affection to his own Country, we never expect any Regard to diſtant Nations, where the ſmalleſt Competition ariſes. Not to mention, that while every Man conſults the Good of his own Community, we are ſenſible, that the general Intereſt of Mankind is better promoted, than by any looſe indeterminate Views to the Good of a Species, whence no beneficial Action could ever reſult, for want of a duly limited Object, on which they could exert themſelves.

IF

If any Man, from a cold Inſenſibility, or narrow Selfiſhneſs of Temper, is unaffected with the Images of human Happineſs or Miſery, he muſt be equally indifferent to the Images of Vice and Virtue: As on the other Hand, 'tis always found, that a warm Concern for the Intereſts of our Species is attended with a delicate Feeling of all moral Diſtinctions; a ſtrong Reſentment of Injury done to Men; a lively Approbation of their Welfare. In this Particular, tho' great Superiority is obſervable of one Man above another; yet none are ſo entirely indifferent to the Intereſt of their Fellow-creatures, as to perceive no Diſtinctions of moral Good and Evil, in conſequence of the different Tendencies of Actions and Principles. How, indeed, can we ſuppoſe it poſſible of any one, who wears a human Heart, that, if there be ſubjected to his Cenſure, one Character or Syſtem of Conduct, which is beneficial, and another, which is pernicious, to his Species or Community, he will not ſo much as give a cool Preference to the former, or aſcribe to it the ſmalleſt Merit or Regard? Let us ſuppoſe ſuch a Perſon ever ſo ſelfiſh; let private Intereſt have ingroſt ever ſo much his Attention; yet in Inſtances, where that is not concern'd, he muſt unavoidably feel *ſome* Propenſity to the Good of Mankind, and make it an Object of Choice, if every Thing elſe be equal.

Would

Would any Man, that is walking alone, tread juſt as willingly on another's gouty Toes, whom he has no Quarrel with, as on the hard Flint and Pavement? There is here ſurely a Difference in the Caſe. We ſurely take into Conſideration the Happineſs and Miſery of others, in weighing the ſeveral Motives of Action, and incline to the former, where no private Regards draw us to ſeek our own Promotion or Advantage by the Injury of our Fellow-Creatures. And if the Principles of Humanity are capable, in many Inſtances, of influencing our Actions, they muſt, at all Times, have *ſome* Authority over our Sentiments, and give us a general Approbation of what is uſeful to Society, and Blame of what is dangerous or pernicious. The Degrees of theſe Sentiments may be the Subject of Controverſy, but the Reality of their Exiſtence, one ſhould think, muſt be admitted, in every Theory or Syſtem.

A CREATURE, abſolutely malicious and ſpiteful, were there any ſuch in Nature, muſt be worſe than indifferent to the Images of Vice and Virtue. All his Sentiments muſt be inverted, and directly oppoſite to thoſe, which prevail in the human Species. Whatever contributes to the Good of Mankind, as it croſſes the conſtant Bent of his Wiſhes and Deſires, muſt produce Uneaſineſs and Diſapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is the Source of Diſ-

order

order and Miſery in Society, muſt, for the ſame Reaſon, be regarded with Pleaſure and Complacency. *Timon*, who probably from his affected Spleen, more than any inveterate Malice, was denominated the Man-hater, embrac'd *Alcibiades*, 'tis ſaid, with great Fondneſs. *Go on, my Boy!* cries he, *Acquire the Confidence of the People: You will one Day, I foreſee, be the Cauſe of great Calamities to them* *. Could we admit the two Principles of the *Manichæans*, 'tis an infallible Conſequence, that their Sentiments of human Actions, as well as of every Thing elſe, muſt be totally oppoſite; and that every Inſtance of Juſtice and Humanity, from its neceſſary Tendency, muſt pleaſe the one Deity, and diſpleaſe the other. All Mankind ſo far reſemble the good Principle, that where Intereſt or Revenge or Envy perverts not our Diſpoſition, we are always enclin'd, from our natural Philanthropy, to give the Preference to the Happineſs of Society, and conſequently to Virtue, above its oppoſite. Abſolute, unprovok'd, diſintereſted Malice has never, perhaps, Place in any human Breaſt; or if it had, muſt there pervert all the Sentiments of Morals, as well as the Feelings of Humanity. If the Cruelty of *Nero* be allow'd altogether voluntary, and not rather the Effect of conſtant Fear and Reſentment; 'tis evident, that *Tigellinus*,

* Plutarch in vita Alc.

preferably

preferably to *Seneca* or *Burrhus*, muſt have poſſeſt his ſteady and uniform Approbation.

A STATESMAN or Patriot, that ſerves our own Country, in our own Time, has always a more paſſionate Regard paid him, than one whoſe beneficial Influence operated on diſtant Ages or remote Nations; where the Good, reſulting from his generous Humanity, being leſs connected with us, ſeems more obſcure, and affects us with a leſs lively Sympathy. We may own the Merit to be equally great, tho' our Sentiments are not rais'd to an equal Height, in both Caſes. The Judgment here corrects the Inequalities of our internal Emotions and Perceptions; in like Manner, as it preſerves us from Error, in the ſeveral Variations of Images, preſented to our external Senſes. The ſame Object, at a double Diſtance, really throws on the Eye a Picture of but half the Bulk; and yet we imagine it appears of the ſame Size in both Situations; becauſe we know, that, on our Approach to it, its Image would expand on the Senſes, and that the Difference conſiſts not in the Object itſelf, but in our Poſition with regard to it. And, indeed, without ſuch Correction of Appearances, both in internal and external Sentiment, Men could never think or talk ſteadily on any Subject; while their fluctuating Situations produce a continual Variation on Objects,

and throw them into ſuch different and contrary Lights and Poſitions *.

THE more we converſe with Mankind, and the greater ſocial Entercourſe we maintain, the more will we be familiariz'd to theſe general Preferences and Diſtinctions, without which our Converſation and Diſcourſe could ſcarcely be render'd intelligible to each other. Every Man's Intereſt is peculiar to himſelf, and the Averſions and Deſires, which reſult from it, cannot be ſuppos'd to affect others in a

* For a like Reaſon, the Tendencies of Actions and Characters, not their real accidental Conſequences, are alone regarded in our moral Determinations or general Judgments; tho' in our real Feeling or Sentiment, we cannot help paying greater Regard to one whoſe Station, join'd to Virtue, renders him really uſeful to Society, than to one, who exerts the ſocial Virtues only in good Intentions and benevolent Affections. Separating the Character from the Fortune, by an eaſy and neceſſary Effort of Thought, we pronounce theſe Perſons alike, and give them the ſame general Praiſe. The Judgment corrects or endeavours to correct the Appearance: But is not able entirely to prevail over Sentiment.

Why is this Peach-tree ſaid to be better than that other; but becauſe it produces more or better Fruit? And would not the ſame Praiſe be given it, tho' Snails or Vermin had deſtroy'd the Fruit, before it came to full Maturity? In Morals too, is not *the Tree known by the Fruit?* And cannot we eaſily diſtinguiſh betwixt Nature and Accident, in the one Caſe as well as in the other?

like

like Degree. General Language, therefore, being form'd for general Uſe, muſt be moulded on ſome more general Views, and muſt affix the Epithets of Praiſe or Blame, in Conformity to Sentiments, which ariſe from the general Intereſts of the Community. And if theſe Sentiments, in moſt Men, be not ſo ſtrong as thoſe, which have a Reference to private Good; yet ſtill they muſt make ſome Diſtinction, even in Perſons the moſt deprav'd and ſelfiſh; and muſt attach the Notion of Good to a beneficent Conduct, and of Evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we ſhall allow, is much fainter than our Concern for Ourſelves, and Sympathy with Perſons, remote from us, much fainter than that with Perſons, near and contiguous; but for this very Reaſon, 'tis neceſſary for us, in our calm Judgments and Diſcourſe concerning the Characters of Men, to neglect all theſe Differences, and render our Sentiments more public and ſocial. Beſides, that we Ourſelves often change our Situation in this Particular, we every Day meet with Perſons, who are in a different Situation from us, and who could never converſe with us on any reaſonable Terms, were we to remain conſtantly in that Poſition and Point of View, which is peculiar to Ourſelf. The Entercourſe of Sentiments, therefore, in Society and Converſation makes us form ſome general, inalterable Standard, by which we may approve or diſapprove of Cha-

racters and Manners. And tho' the Heart takes not part entirely with those general Notions, nor regulates all its Love and Hatred, by the universal, abstract Differences of Vice and Virtue, without regard to Self or the Persons, with whom we are more immediately connected; yet have these moral Differences a considerable Influence, and being sufficient, at least, for Discourse, serve all our Purposes in Company, in the Pulpit, on the Theatre, and in the Schools *.

Thus, in whatever Light we take this Subject, the Merit, ascrib'd to the social Virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that Regard, which the natural Sentiment of Benevolence engages us to pay to the Interests of Mankind and Society. If we consider the Principles of the human Make; such as they appear to daily Experience and Obser-

* 'Tis wisely ordain'd by Nature, that private Connexions should commonly prevail over universal Views and Considerations; otherwise our Affections and Actions would be dissipated and lost, for Want of a proper limited Object. Thus a small Benefit done to Ourselves, or our near Friends, excites more lively Sentiments of Love and Approbation than a great Benefit to a distant Common-wealth: But still we know here, as in all the Senses, to correct these Inequalities by Reflection, and retain a general Standard of Vice and Virtue, founded chiefly on general Usefulness.

vation; we muſt, *a priori*, conclude it impoſſible for ſuch a Creature as Man to be totally indifferent to the Well or Ill-being of his Fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himſelf, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular Byaſs, that what promotes their Happineſs is good, what tends to their Miſery is evil, without any farther Regard or Conſideration. Here then are the faint Rudiments, at leaſt, or Outlines, of a *general* Diſtinction betwixt Actions; and in Proportion as the Humanity of the Perſon is ſuppos'd to encreaſe, his Connexion to thoſe injur'd or benefited, and his lively Conception of their Miſery or Happineſs; his conſequent Cenſure or Approbation acquires proportionable Force and Vigour. There is no Neceſſity, that a generous Action, barely mention'd in an old Hiſtory or remote Gazette, ſhould communicate any ſtrong Feelings of Applauſe and Admiration. Virtue, plac'd at ſuch a Diſtance, is like a fixt Star, which, tho', to the Eye of Reaſon, it may appear as luminous as the Sun in his Meridian, is ſo infinitely remov'd, as to affect the Senſes, neither with Light nor Heat. Bring this Virtue nearer, by our Acquaintance or Connexion with the Perſons, or even by an eloquent Narration and Recital of the Caſe; our Hearts are immediately caught, our Sympathy enliven'd, and our cool Approbation converted into the warmeſt Sentiments of Friendſhip and Regard. Theſe ſeem neceſſary and

infallible Conſequences of the general Principles of human Nature, as diſcover'd in common Life and Practice.

AGAIN; reverſe theſe Views and Reaſonings: Conſider the Matter *a poſteriori*; and weighing the Conſequences, enquire, if the Merit of all ſocial Virtue is not deriv'd from the Feelings of Humanity, with which it affects the Spectators. It appears to be Matter of Fact, that the Circumſtance of *Utility*, in all Subjects, is a Source of Praiſe and Approbation: That it is conſtantly appeal'd to in all moral Deciſions concerning the Merit and Demerit of Actions: That it is the *ſole* Source of that high Regard paid to Juſtice, Fidelity, Honour, Allegiance and Chaſtity: That it is inſeperable from all the other ſocial Virtues of Humanity, Generoſity, Charity, Affability, Lenity, Mercy and Moderation: And in a Word, that it is the Foundation of the chief Part of Morals, which has a Reference to Mankind and Society.

IT appears alſo, in our general Approbation or Judgment of Characters and Manners, that the uſeful Tendency of the ſocial Virtues moves us not by any Regards to Self-intereſt, but has an Influence much more univerſal and extenſive. It appears, that a Tendency to public Good, and to the promoting

moting of Peace, Harmony, and Concord in Society, by affecting the benevolent Principles of our Frame, engages us on the Side of the ſocial Virtues. And it appears, as an additional Confirmation, that theſe Principles of Humanity and Sympathy enter ſo deep into all our Sentiments, and have ſo powerful an Influence, as may enable them to excite the ſtrongeſt Cenſure and Applauſe. The preſent Theory is the ſimple Reſult of all theſe Inferences, each of which ſeems founded on uniform Experience and Obſervation.

WERE it doubtful, whether there was any ſuch Principle in our Nature as Humanity or a Concern for others, yet when we ſee, in numberleſs Inſtances, that, whatever has a Tendency to promote the Intereſts of Society, is ſo highly approv'd of, we ought thence to learn the Force of the benevolent Principle; ſince 'tis impoſſible for any Thing to pleaſe as Means to an End, where the End itſelf is totally indifferent: On the other Hand, were it doubtful, whether there was, implanted in our Natures, any general Principle of moral Blame and Approbation, yet when we ſee, in numberleſs Inſtances, the Influence of Humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that 'tis impoſſible, but that every Thing, which promotes the Intereſts of Society, muſt communicate Pleaſure, and what is pernicious give Uneaſineſs. But when

theſe different Reflections and Obſervations concur in eſtabliſhing the ſame Concluſion, muſt they not beſtow an undiſputed Evidence upon it?

'Tis however hop'd, that the Progreſs of this Argument will bring a farther Confirmation of the preſent Theory, by ſhowing the Riſe of other Sentiments of Eſteem and Regard from the ſame or like Principles.

SECT.

SECTION VI.

Of QUALITIES *useful to Ourselves.*

PART I.

NOTHING is more usual, than for Philosophers to encroach upon the Province of Grammarians; and to engage in Disputes of Words, while they imagine, that they are handling Controversies of the deepest Importance and Concern. Thus, were we here to assert or to deny, *that all laudable Qualities of the Mind were to be consider'd as Virtues or moral Attributes*, many would imagine, that we had enter'd upon one of the profoundest Speculations of Ethics; tho' 'tis probable, all the while, that the greatest Part of the Dispute would be found entirely verbal. To avoid, therefore, all frivolous Subtilties and Altercations, as much as possible, we shall content Ourselves with observing, *first*, that, in common Life, the Sentiments of Censure or Approbation, produc'd by mental Qualities of every Kind, are

very similar; and *secondly*, that all antient Moralists, (the best Models) in treating of them, make little or no Difference amongst them.

FIRST. It seems certain, that the *Sentiment* of conscious Worth, the Self-satisfaction, proceeding from a Review of a Man's own Conduct and Character; it seems certain, I say, that this Sentiment, which, tho' the most common of all others, has no proper Name in our Language *, arises from the Endowments of Courage and Capacity, Industry and Ingenuity, as well as from any other mental Excellencies. Who, on the other Hand, is not deeply mortify'd with reflecting on his own Folly or Dissoluteness, and feels not a secret Sting or Compunction, whenever his Memory presents any past Occurence, where he behav'd with Stupidity or Ill-manners? No Time can efface the cruel Ideas of a Man's own Ill-conduct, or of Affronts, which Cowardice or Impudence have brought upon him. They still

* The Term, Pride, is commonly taken in a bad Sense; but this Sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other Circumstances, that accompany it. The *French* express this Sentiment by the Term, *amour propre*, but as they also express Self-love as well as Vanity, by the same Term, there arises thence a great Confusion in *Rochefoucault*, and many of their moral Writers.

haunt

haunt his solitary Hours, damp his most aspiring Thoughts, and show him, even to himself, in the most contemptible and most odious Colours imaginable.

WHAT is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than such Blunders, Infirmities, and Meannesses, or more dread to have expos'd by Raillery and Satyre? And is not the chief Object of Vanity, our Bravery or Learning, our Wit or Breeding, our Eloquence or Address, our Taste or Ability? These we display with Care, if not with Ostentation; and commonly show more Ambition of excelling in them, than even in the social Virtues themselves, which are, in Reality, of such superior Excellence. Good-nature and Honesty, especially the latter, are so indispensibly requir'd, that, tho' the greatest Censure attends any Violation of these Duties, no eminent Praise follows such common Instances of them, as seem essential to the Support of human Society. And hence the Reason, in my Opinion, why, tho' Men often praise so liberally the Qualities of their Heart, they are shy of commending the Endowments of their Head; because the latter Virtues, being suppos'd more rare and extraordinary, are observ'd to be the more usual Objects of Pride and Self-conceit; and when boasted of, beget a strong Suspicion of these Sentiments.

'Tis hard to tell, whether you hurt a Man's Character moſt by calling him a Knave or a Coward, and whether a beaſtly Glutton or Drunkard be not as odious and contemptible as a ſelfiſh, ungenerous Miſer. Give me my Choice; and I would rather, for my own Happineſs and Self-enjoyment, have a friendly, humane Heart than poſſeſs all the other Virtues of *Demoſthenes* and *Philip* united: But I would rather paſs with the World for one endow'd with extenſive Genius and intrepid Courage, and ſhould thence expect ſtronger Inſtances of general Applauſe and Admiration. The Figure a Man makes in Life, the Reception he meets with in Company, the Eſteem paid him by his Acquaintance; all theſe Advantages depend as much upon his good Senſe and Judgment as upon any other Part of his Character. Had a Man the beſt Intentions in the World, and were the fartheſt remov'd from all Injuſtice and Violence, he would never be able to make himſelf be much regarded, without a moderate Share, at leaſt, of Parts and Underſtanding.

WHAT is it then we can here diſpute about? If Senſe and Courage, Temperance and Induſtry, Wit and Knowledge confeſſedly form a conſiderable Part of *perſonal Merit*; if a Man poſſeſt of them is both better ſatisfy'd with himſelf, and better entitled

to

to the Good-will, Esteem, and Services of others, than one entirely devoid of them; if, in short, the *Sentiments* be similar, that arise from these Endowments and from the social Virtues; is there any Reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a *Word*, or doubting whether they are entitled to the Denomination of Virtue *? It may, indeed, be pretended, that the Sentiment of Approbation, which those Accomplishments produce, besides its being *inferior*, is also somewhat *different* from that, which attends the Virtues of Justice and Humanity. But this seems not a sufficient Reason for ranking them entirely under different Classes and Appellations. The Character of *Cæsar* and that of *Cato*, as drawn by *Salust*, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest Sense of the Word; but in a different Way: Nor are the Sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces Love; the other,

* It seems to me, that in our Language, Courage, Temperance, Industry, Frugality, &c. according to popular Stile, are call'd *Virtues*; but when a Man is said to be *virtuous*, or is denominated a Man of Virtue, we chiefly regard his social Qualities. 'Tis needless for a moral, philosophical Discourse to enter into all these Caprices of Language, which are so variable in different Dialects, and in different Ages of the same Dialect. The *Sentiments* of Men, being more uniform, as well as more important, are a fitter Subject of Speculation: Tho' at the same Time, we may just observe, that wherever the social Virtues are talk'd of, 'tis plainly imploy'd, by this Distinction, that there are also other Virtues of a different Nature.

Eſteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We could wiſh to meet the one Character in a Friend; the other we ſhould be ambitious of in Ourſelves. In like Manner the Approbation, which attends natural Abilities or Temperance or Induſtry, may be ſomewhat different from that which is paid to the ſocial Virtues, without making them entirely of a different Species. And indeed, we may obſerve, that the natural Abilities, no more than the other Virtues, produce not, all of them, the ſame Kind of Approbation. Good Senſe and Genius beget Eſteem and Regard: Wit and Humour excite Love and Affection *.

Most

* Love and Eſteem are nearly the ſame Paſſion, and ariſe from ſimilar Cauſes. The Qualities, which produce both, are ſuch as communicate Pleaſure. But where this Pleaſure is ſevere and ſerious; or where its Object is great and makes a ſtrong Impreſſion, or where it produces any Degree of Humility and Awe: In all theſe Caſes, the Paſſion, which ariſes from the Pleaſure, is more properly denominated Eſteem than Love. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with Love in a more eminent Degree. There ſeems to be ſtill a ſtronger Mixture of Pride in Contempt than of Humility in Eſteem; and the Reaſon would not be difficult to one, who ſtudy'd accurately the Paſſions. All theſe various Mixtures and Compoſitions and Appearances of Sentiment form a very curious Subject of Speculation, but are wide of our preſent Purpoſe. Thro'out theſe Eſſays, we always conſider in general, what Qualities are a Subject of Praiſe or of Cenſure, without entering into all the minute Differences of Sentiment, which they excite. 'Tis evident, that whatever is contemn'd,

MOST People, I believe, will naturally, without Premeditation, assent to the Definition of the elegant and judicious Poet.

> Virtue (for mere Good-nature is a Fool)
> Is Sense and Spirit, with Humanity *.

WHAT Pretensions has a Man to our generous Assistance or Good-offices, who has dissipated his Wealth in profuse Expences, idle Vanities, chimerical Projects, dissolute Pleasures, or extravagant Gaming? These Vices (for we scruple not to call them such) bring Misery unpity'd, and Contempt on every one addicted to them.

ACHÆUS, a wise and prudent Prince, fell into a fatal Snare, which cost him his Crown and Life, after having us'd every reasonable Precaution to guard himself against it. On that Account, says the Historian, he is a just Object of Regard and Compassion: His Betrayers alone of Hatred and Contempt †.

temn'd, is also dislik'd, as well as what is hated; and we here endeavour to take Objects, according to their most simple Views and Appearances. These Sciences are but too apt to appear abstract to common Readers, even with all the Precautions we can take to clear them from superfluous Speculations, and bring them down to every Capacity.

* The Art of preserving Health, Book 4: † Polybius, Lib. 8. Cap. 2.

THE

The precipitate Flight and improvident Negligence of *Pompey*, at the Beginning of the civil Wars, appear'd ſuch notorious Blunders to *Cicero*, as quite pall'd his Friendſhip towards that great Man. *In the ſame Manner*, ſays he, *as Want of Cleanlineſs, Decency, or Diſcretion in a Miſtreſs are found to alienate our Affections.* For ſo he expreſſes himſelf, where he talks, not in the Character of a Philoſopher, but in that of a Stateſman and Man of the World, to his Friend *Atticus* *.

But *ſecondly*, the ſame *Cicero*, in Imitation of all the antient Moraliſts, when he reaſons as a Philoſopher, enlarges very much his Ideas of Virtue, and comprehends every laudable Quality or Endowment of the Mind, under that honourable Appellation. The *Prudence*, explain'd in his *Offices* †, is that Sagacity, which leads to the Diſcovery of Truth, and preſerves us from Error and Miſtake. *Magnanimity*, *Temperance*, *Decency* are there alſo at large diſcours'd of. And as that eloquent Moraliſt follow'd the common receiv'd Diviſion of the four cardinal Virtues, our ſocial Duties form but one Head, in the general Diſtribution of his Subject.

* Lib. 9. Epiſt. 10. † Lib. 1. Cap. 6.

WE need only peruse the Titles of Chapters in *Aristotle*'s Ethics to be convinc'd, that he ranks Courage, Temperance, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Modesty, Prudence, and a manly Freedom amongst the Virtues, as well as Justice and Friendship.

To *sustain* and to *abstain*, that is, to be patient and continent, appear'd to some of the Antients, a summary Comprehension of all Morals.

EPICTETUS has scarce ever mentioned the Sentiment of Humanity and Compassion, but in order to put his Disciples on their Guard against it. The Virtue of the *Stoics* seems to consist chiefly in a firm Temper and a sound Understanding. With them, as with *Solomon* and the Eastern Moralists, Folly and Wisdom are equivalent to Vice and Virtue.

MEN will praise thee, says *David* *, when thou dost well unto thyself. I hate a wise Man, says the *Greek* Poet, who is not wise to himself †.

PLUTARCH is no more crampt by Systems in his Philosophy than in his History. Where he compares the great Men of *Greece* and *Rome*, he fairly

* Psalm 49th. † Μισω σοφιστην οστις ουκ αυτω σοφος. Incert. apud Lucianum, Apologia pro mercede conductis.

sets

ſets in Oppoſition all their Blemiſhes and Accompliſhments of whatever Kind, and omits nothing conſiderable, that can either depreſs or exalt their Characters. His moral Diſcourſes contain the ſame free and natural Cenſure of Men and Manners.

THE Character of *Hannibal*, as drawn by *Livy* *, is eſteem'd partial, but allows him many eminent Virtues. Never was there a Genius, ſays the Hiſtorian, more equally fitted for thoſe oppoſite Offices of Command and Obedience; and 'twere, therefore, difficult to determine whether he render'd himſelf *dearer* to the General or to the Army: To none, would *Haſdrubal* entruſt more willingly the Conduct of any dangerous Enterprize; under none, did the Soldiers diſcover more Courage and Confidence. Great Boldneſs in affronting Danger; great Prudence in the Midſt of it. No Labour could fatigue his Body or ſubdue his Mind. Cold and Heat were indifferent to him: Meat and Drink he ſought as Supplies to the Neceſſities of Nature, not as Gratifications of his voluptuous Appetites: Waking or Reſt he us'd indiſcriminately, by Night or by Day---Theſe great VIRTUES were ballanc'd by great VICES: Inhuman Cruelty; Perfidy more than *Punic*; no Truth, no Faith, no Regard to Oaths, Promiſes or Religion.

* Lib. 21. Cap. 4.

THE

THE Character of *Alexander* the Sixth, to be found in *Guicciardin* *, is pretty similar, but juster; and is a Proof, that even the Moderns, where they speak naturally, hold the same Language with the Antients. In this Pope, says he, there was a singular Capacity and Judgment: Admirable Prudence; a wonderful Talent of Persuasion; and in all momentuous Enterprizes, a Diligence and Dexterity incredible But these *Virtues* were infinitely overballanc'd by his *Vices*; no Faith, no Religion, insatiable Avarice, exorbitant Ambition, and a more than barbarous Cruelty.

POLYBIUS †, reprehending *Timæus* for his Partiality against *Agathocles*, whom he himself allows to be the most cruel and impious of all Tyrants, says: If he took Refuge in *Syracuse*, as asserted by that Historian, flying the Dirt and Smoke and Toil of his former Profession of a Potter; and if, proceeding from such slender Beginnings, he became Master, in a little Time, of all *Sicily*; brought the *Carthaginian* State into the utmost Danger; and at last dy'd in Old-age, and in Possession of kingly Dignity: Must he not be allow'd something prodigious and extraordinary, and to have possest great Talents and Capacity for Business and Action?

* Lib. 1. † Lib. 12.

His Hiſtorian, therefore, ought not to have alone related what tended to his Reproach and Infamy; but alſo what might redound to his PRAISE and HONOUR.

In general, we may obſerve, that the Diſtinction of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by the Antients in their moral Reaſonings; where they frequently treated the Queſtion as very doubtful, *whether Virtue could be taught or not* * ? They juſtly conſider'd, that Cowardice, Meanneſs, Levity, Anxiety, Impatience, Folly, and many other Qualities of the Mind, might appear ridiculous, and deform'd, contemptible and odious, tho' independant of the Will. Nor could it be ſuppos'd, at all Times, in every Man's Power to attain every Kind of mental, more than exterior Beauty.

But modern Philoſophers, treating all Morals, as on a like Footing with civil Laws, guarded by the Sanctions of Reward and Puniſhment, were neceſſarily led to render this Circumſtance, of *voluntary* or *involuntary*, the Foundation of their whole Theory. Every one may employ *Terms* in what Senſe he pleaſes: But this, in the mean Time, muſt

* Vid. *Plato* in *Menone*, *Seneca de otio ſap.* Cap. 31. So alſo *Horace*, *Virtutem doctrina paret, naturane donet.* Epiſt. Lib. 1. Ep. 18.

be

be allow'd, that *Sentiments* are every Day experienc'd of Blame and Praiſe, which have Objects beyond the Dominion of the Will or Choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as Moraliſts, as ſpeculative Philoſophers at leaſt, to give ſome ſatisfactory Theory and Explication.

A BLEMISH, a Fault, a Vice, a Crime; theſe Expreſſions ſeem to denote different Degrees of Cenſure and Diſapprobation; which are, however, all of them, at the Bottom, pretty nearly the ſame Kind of Species. The Explication of one will lead us eaſily into a juſt Conception of the others.

PART II.

IT ſeems evident, that where a Quality or Habit is ſubjected to our Examination, if it appear, in any reſpect, prejudicial to the Perſon, poſſeſt of it, or ſuch as incapacitates him for Buſineſs and Action, it is inſtantly blam'd, and rank'd amongſt his Faults and Imperfections. Indolence, Negligence, Want of Order and Method, Obſtinacy, Fickleneſs, Raſhneſs, Credulity; no one ever eſteem'd theſe Qualities, indifferent to a Character; much leſs, extoll'd them as Accompliſhments or Virtues. The Prejudice, reſulting from them, immediately ſtrikes our Eye,

Eye, and gives us the Sentiment of Pain and Diſapprobation.

No Qualiity, 'tis allow'd, is abſolutely either blameable or praiſe-worthy. 'Tis all according to its Degrees. A due Medium, ſay the *Peripatetics*, is the Characteriſtic of Virtue. But this Medium is chiefly determin'd by Utility. A proper Celerity, for Inſtance, and Diſpatch in Buſineſs is commendable. When defective, no Progreſs is ever made in the Execution of any Purpoſe: When exceſſive, it engages us in precipitate, and ill-concerted Meaſures and Enterprizes. By ſuch Reaſonings as theſe we fix the proper and commendable Mediocrity in all moral and prudential Diſquiſitions; and never loſe View of the Advantages, which reſult from any Character or Habit.

Now as theſe Advantages are enjoy'd by the Perſon, poſſeſt of the Character, it can never be *Self-love*, which renders the Proſpect of them agreeable to us, the Spectators, and prompts our Eſteem and Approbation. No Force of Imagination can convert us into another Perſon, and make us fancy, that we being that Perſon, reap Benefit from thoſe valuable Qualities, which belong to him. Or if it did, no Celerity of Imagination could immediately tranſport us back, into ourſelves, and make us love and eſteem the Perſon, as different from us. Views and

and Sentiments, so opposite to known Truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the same Time, in the same Person. All Suspicion, therefore, of selfish Regards are here totally excluded. 'Tis a quite different Principle, which actuates our Bosom, and interests us in the Felicity of the Person we contemplate. Where his natural Talents and acquir'd Abilities give us the Prospect of Elevation, Advancement, a Figure in Life, prosperous Success, a steady Command over Fortune, and the Execution of great or advantageous Undertakings; we are struck with such agreeable Images, and feel a Complacency and Regard immediately arise towards him. The Ideas of Happiness, Joy, Triumph, Prosperity are connected with every Circumstance of his Character, and diffuse over our Minds a pleasing Sentiment of Sympathy and Humanity *.

LET

* One may venture to affirm, that there is no human Creature, to whom the Appearance of Happiness, (where Envy or Revenge has no Place) does not give Pleasure, that of Misery, Uneasiness. This seems inseperable from our Make and Constitution. But they are only the more generous Minds, that are thence prompted to seek zealously the Good of others, and to have a real Passion for their Welfare. With Men of narrow and ungenerous Spirits, this Sympathy goes not beyond a slight Feeling of the Imagination, which serves only to excite Sentiments of Complacency or Censure, and make them apply to the Object either honourable or dishonourable Appellations. A griping Miser, for Instance, praises extremely *Industry* and *Frugality*, even in others, and sets them, in his Esti-

mation,

Let us ſuppoſe a Perſon originally ſo fram'd as to have no Manner of Concern for his Fellow-creatures, but to regard the Happineſs and Miſery of all ſenſible Beings with greater Indifference even than two contiguous Shades of the ſame Colour. Let us ſuppoſe, if the Proſperity of Nations were lay'd on the one hand and their Ruin on the other, and he were deſir'd to chooſe; that he would ſtand, like the Schoolman's Aſs, irreſolute and undetermin'd, betwixt equal Motives; or rather, like the ſame Aſs betwixt two Pieces of Wood or Marble, without any Inclination or Propenſity on either Side. The Conſequence, I believe, muſt be allow'd juſt, that ſuch a Perſon, being abſolutely unconcern'd, either as to the public Good of a Community or the private Utility of others, would look on every Quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial, to Society or to its Poſſeſſor, with the ſame Indifference as on the moſt common and unintereſting Object.

But if, inſtead of this fancy'd Monſter, we ſuppoſe a *Man* to form a Judgment or Determination in

mation, above all the other Virtues. He knows the Good, that reſults from them, and feels that Species of Happineſs with a more lively Sympathy, than any other you could repreſent to him; tho' perhaps he would not part with a Shilling to make the Fortune of the induſtrious Man, whom he praiſes ſo highly.

the

the Case; there is to him a plain Foundation of Preference, where every Thing else is equal; and however cool his Choice may be, if his Heart be selfish, or if the Persons interested be remote from him; there must still be a Choice, and a Distinction betwixt what is useful, and what is pernicious. Now this Distinction is the same in all its Parts, with the *moral Distinction*, whose Foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquir'd after. The same Endowments of the Mind, in every Circumstance, are agreeable to the Sentiment of Morals and to that of Humanity; the same Temper is susceptible of high Degrees of the one Sentiment and of the other; and the same Alteration in the Objects, by their nearer Approach or by Connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the Rules of Philosophy, therefore, we must conclude, that these Sentiments are originally the same; since, in each particular, even the most minute, they are govern'd by the same Laws, and are mov'd by the same Objects.

WHY do Philosophers infer, with the greatest Certainty, that the Moon is kept in its Orbit by the same Force of Gravity, which makes Bodies fall near the Surface of the Earth, but because these Effects are, upon Computation, found similar and equal? And must not this Argument bring equal Conviction, in moral as in natural Disquisitions?

To prove, by any long Detail, that all the Qualities, uſeful to the Poſſeſſor, are approv'd, and the contrary cenſur'd, would be ſuperfluous. The leaſt Reflection, on what is every Day experienc'd in Life, will be ſufficient. We ſhall only mention a few Inſtances, in order to remove, if poſſible, all Doubt and Heſitation.

THE Quality, the moſt neceſſary for the Execution of any uſeful Enterprize, is DISCRETION; by which we carry on a ſafe Intercourſe with others, give due Attention to our own and to their Character, weigh each Circumſtance of the Buſineſs we undertake, and employ the ſureſt and ſafeſt Means for the Attainment of any End or Purpoſe. To a *Cromwell*, perhaps, or a *De Retz*, Diſcretion may appear an Alderman-like Virtue, as Dr. *Swift* calls it; and being incompatible with thoſe vaſt Deſigns, to which their Courage and Ambition prompted them, it might really, in them, be a Fault or Imperfection. But in the Conduct of ordinary Life, no Virtue is more requiſite, not only to obtain Succeſs, but to avoid the moſt fatal Miſcarriages and Diſappointments. The greateſt Parts without it, as obſerv'd by an elegant Writer, may be fatal to their Owner; as *Polyphemus* depriv'd of his Eye was only the more expos'd,

pos'd, on Account of his enormous Strength and Stature.

THE best Character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for human Nature, is that which gives nothing to Temper of any Kind; but alternately employs Enterprize and Caution, as each is *useful* to the particular Purpose intended. Such is the Excellence, which St. *Evremond* ascribes to Mareschal *Turenne*, who display'd every Campaign, as he grew older, more Temerity in his military Enterprizes; and being now, from long Experience, perfectly acquainted with every Incident in War, he advanc'd with greater Firmness and Boldness, in a Road so well known to him. *Fabius*, says *Machiavel*, was cautious; *Scipio* enterprizing: And both succeeded, because the Situation of the *Roman* Affars, during the Command of each, was peculiarly adapted to his Genius; but both would have fail'd, had these Situations been inverted. He is happy, whose Circumstances suit his Temper; but he is more excellent, who can suit his Temper to any Circumstances.

WHAT need is there to display the Praises of INDUSTRY, and to extol its Advantages, in the Acquisition of Power and Riches, or in raising what we call a *Fortune* in the World? The Tortoise, according to the Fable, by his Assiduity, gain'd the

Race of the Hare, tho' poſſeſt of much ſuperior Swiftneſs. A Man's Time, when well huſbanded, is like a cultivated Field, of which a few Acres produce more of what is uſeful to Life, than extenſive Provinces, even of the richeſt Soil, when over-run with Weeds and Brambles.

But all Proſpect of Succeſs in Life, or even of tolerable Subſiſtence, muſt fail, where a reaſonable FRUGALITY is wanting. The Heap, inſtead of encreaſing, diminiſhes daily, and leaves its Poſſeſſor ſo much more unhappy, that not having been able to confine his Expences to a larger Revenue, he will ſtill leſs be able to live contentedly on a ſmaller. The Souls of Men, according to *Plato* *, inflam'd with impure Appetites, and loſing the Body, which alone afforded Means of Satisfaction, hover about the Earth, and haunt the Places, where their Bodies are repoſited; poſſeſt with a longing Deſire to recover the loſt Organs of Senſation So may we ſee worthleſs Prodigals, having conſum'd their Fortunes in wild Debauches, thruſting themſelves into every plentiful Table, and every Party of Pleaſure, hated even by the vicious, and deſpis'd even by Fools.

* Phædo.

THE one Extreme of Frugality is *Avarice*, which, as it both deprives a Man of all Use of his Riches, and checks Hospitality and every social Enjoyment, is justly censur'd on a double Account: *Prodigality*, the other Extreme, is commonly more hurtful to a Man himself; and each of these Extremes is blam'd above the other, according to the Temper of the Person who censures, and according to his greater or less Sensibility to Pleasure, either social or sensual.

ALL Men, 'tis allow'd, are equally desirous of Happiness; but all Men are not equally successful in the Pursuit: Of which one chief Cause is the common Want of STRENGTH of MIND, which might enable us to resist the Temptation of present Ease or Pleasure, and carry us forward in the Search of more distant Profit and Enjoyment. Our Affections, on a general Prospect of their Objects, form certain Rules of Conduct, and certain Measures of Preference of one above another: And these Decisions, tho' really the Result of our calm Passions, and Propensities, (for what else can pronounce any Object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a natural Abuse of Terms, to be the Determinations of pure *Reason* and Reflection. But when some of these Objects approach nearer us, or acquire the Advantages of favourable Lights and Positions, which

catch the Heart or Imagination; our general Reſolutions are frequently confounded, a ſmall Enjoyment preferr'd, and laſting Shame and Sorrow entail'd upon us. And however Poets may employ their Wit and Eloquence, in celebrating preſent Pleaſure, and rejecting all diſtant Views to Fame, Health, or Fortune; 'tis obvious, that this Practice is the Source of all Diſſoluteneſs and Debauchery, Repentance and Miſery. A Man of a ſtrong and determin'd Temper adheres tenaciouſly to his general Reſolutions, and is neither ſeduc'd by the Allurements of Pleaſure, nor terrify'd by the Menaces of Pain; but keeps ſtill in View thoſe diſtant Purſuits, by which he, at once, enſures his Happineſs and his Honour.

SELF-SATISFACTION, at leaſt in ſome Degree, is an Advantage, that equally attends the FOOL and the WISE-MAN: But 'tis the only one; nor is there any other Circumſtance in the Conduct of Life, where they are upon an equal Footing. Buſineſs, Books, Converſation; for all of theſe, a Fool is totally incapacitated, and except condemn'd by his Station to the coarſeſt Drudgery, remains a *uſeleſs* Burthen upon the Earth. Accordingly, 'tis found, that Men are infinitely jealous of their Character in this Particular; and many Inſtances are ſeen of Profligacy and Treachery, the moſt avow'd,

and

and unreserved; none of bearing patiently the Imputation of Ignorance and Stupidity. *Dicæarchus*, the *Macedonian* General, who, as *Polybius* * tells us, openly erected one Altar to Impiety, and another to Injustice, in order to bid Defiance to Mankind; even he, I am well assur'd, would have started at the Epithet of *Fool*, and have meditated Revenge for so injurious an Appellation. Except the Affection of Parents, the strongest and most indissoluble Bond in Nature, no Connexion has Strength sufficient to support the Disgust arising from this Character. Love itself, which can subsist under Treachery, Ingratitude, Malice, and Infidelity, is immediately extinguish'd by it, when perceiv'd and acknowledg'd; nor are Deformity and Old-age more fatal to the Dominion of that Passion. So dreadful are the Ideas of an utter Incapacity for any Purpose or Undertaking, and of continu'd Error and Misconduct in Life!

WHEN 'tis ask'd, whether a quick or a slow Apprehension be most valuable? Whether one, that, at first View, penetrates far into a Subject, but can perform nothing upon Study; or a contrary Character, which must work out every Thing by Dint of Application? Whether a clear Head or a copious

* Lib. 17. Cap. 35.

Invention? Whether a profound Genius or a ſure Judgment? In ſhort, what Character, or peculiar Turn of Underſtanding is more excellent than another? 'Tis evident, we can anſwer none of theſe Queſtions, without conſidering which of thoſe Qualities capacitates a Man beſt for the World, and carries him fartheſt in any of his Undertakings.

If refin'd Senſe and exalted Senſe be not ſo *uſeful* as common Senſe, their Rarity, their Novelty, and the Nobleneſs of their Objects make ſome Compenſation, and render them the Admiration of Mankind: As Gold, tho' leſs ſerviceable than Iron, acquires, from its Scarcity, a Value, which is much ſuperior.

The Defects of Judgment can be ſupply'd by no Art or Invention; but thoſe of MEMORY frequently may, both in Buſineſs and in Study, by Method and Induſtry, and by Diligence in committing every Thing to Paper; and we ſcarce ever hear a ſhort Memory given as a Reaſon for a Man's Want of Succeſs in any Undertaking. But in antient Times, when no Man could make a Figure without the Talent of ſpeaking, and when the Audience were too delicate to bear ſuch crude, undigeſted Harangues as our extemporary Orators offer to public Aſſemblies; the Faculty of Memory was then of the

the utmost Consequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at present. Scarce any great Genius is mention'd in Antiquity, who is not celebrated for this Talent; and *Cicero* enumerates it amongst the other sublime Qualities of *Cæsar* himself *.

PARTICULAR Customs and Manners alter the Usefulness of Qualities: they also alter their Merit. Particular Situations and Accidents have, in some Degree, the same Influence. He will always be more esteem'd, who professes those Talents and Accomplishments, which suit his Station and Profession, than he whom Fortune has misplac'd in the Part she has assign'd him. The private or selfish Virtues are, in this respect, more arbitrary than the public and social. In other respects, they are, perhaps, less liable to Doubt and Controversy.

IN this Kingdom, such continu'd Ostentation, of late Years, has been display'd among Men in *active* Life, with regard to *public Spirit*, and among those in *speculative* with regard to *Benevolence*; and so many false Pretensions to each have been, no doubt, detected, that Men of the World are apt, without

* Fuit in illo ingenium, ratio, memoria, literæ, cura, cogitatio, diligentia, &c. Phillip. 2.

any bad Intention, to diſcover a ſullen Incredulity on the head of theſe moral Endowments, and even ſometimes abſolutely to deny their Exiſtence and Reality. In like Manner, I find, that, of old, the perpetual Cant of the *Stoics* and *Cynics* concerning *Virtue*, their magnificent Profeſſions and ſlender Performances, bred a Diſguſt in Mankind; and *Lucian*, who, tho' licentious on the Article of Pleaſure, is yet, in other reſpects, a very moral Writer, cannot ſometimes, talk of Virtue, ſo much boaſted, without betraying Symptoms of Spleen and Irony *. But ſurely, this peeviſh Delicacy, whence-ever it ariſes, can never be carry'd ſo far as to make us deny the Exiſtence of every Species of Virtue, and all Diſtinction of Manners and Behaviour. Beſides *Diſcretion*, *Caution*, *Enterprize*, *Induſtry*, *Aſſiduity*, *Frugality*, *OEconomy*, *Good-ſenſe*, *Prudence*, *Diſcernment*; beſides theſe Virtues, I ſay, whoſe very Names force an Avowal of their Merit, there are many others, to which the moſt determin'd Sceptiſm cannot, for a Moment, refuſe the Tribute of Praiſe and Approbation: *Temperance*, *Sobriety*, *Patience*, *Conſtancy*,

* Αρετην τινα και ασωματα και ληρως μεγαλη τη φωνη ξυνειροντων. Luc. Timon. Again, Και συναγαγοντες (οι φιλοσοφοι) συεξαπατητα μειρακια τηντε πολυθρυλλητον αρετην τραγωδεσι. Icuro-men. In another Place, Ητις γαρ εστιν η πολυθρυλλητος αρετη, και φυσις, και ειμαρμενη, και τυχη, ανυποστατα και κενα πραγματων ονοματα. Deor. Concil.

6 *Perſeverance*,

Perseverance, Forethought, Considerateness, Secrecy, Order, Insinuation, Address, Presence of Mind, Quickness of Conception, Facility of Expression; these and a thousand more of the same Kind, no Man will ever deny to be Excellencies and Endowments. As their Merit consists in their Tendency to serve the Person, possest of them, without any magnificent Claims of public and social Desert, we are the less jealous of their Pretensions, and readily admit them into the Catalogue of Virtues. We are not sensible, that, by this Concession, we have pav'd the Way for all the other moral Excellencies, and cannot consistently hesitate any longer, with regard to disinterested Benevolence, Patriotism, and Humanity.

IT seems, indeed, certain, that first Appearances are here, as usual, extremely deceitful, and that 'tis more difficult, in a speculative Way, to resolve into Self-love the Merit we ascribe to the selfish Virtues above-mention'd, than that even of the social Virtues of Justice and Beneficence. For this latter Purpose, we need but say, that whatever Conduct and Behaviour promotes the Good of the Community, is lov'd, prais'd, and esteem'd by the Community, on Account of that Utility and Interest, of which every one partakes: And tho' this Affection and Regard be, in Reality, Gratitude, not Self-love, yet a Distinction, even of this obvious Nature, may not

readily be made by ſuperficial Reaſoners; and there is Room, at leaſt, to ſupport the Cavil and Diſpute for a Moment. But as Qualities, which tend only to the Utility of their Poſſeſſor, without any Reference to us, or to the Community, are yet eſteem'd and valu'd; by what Theory or Syſtem can we account for this Sentiment from Self-love, or deduce it from that favourite Origin? There ſeems here a Neceſſity of confeſſing that the Happineſs and Miſery of others are not Spectacles altogether indifferent to us, but that the View of the former, whether in its Cauſes or Effects, like Sun-ſhine or the Proſpect of well-cultivated Plains (to carry our Pretenſions no higher) communicates a ſecret Joy and Satisfaction; the Appearance of the latter, like a lowering Cloud or barren Landſkip, throws a melancholy Damp over the Imagination. And this Conceſſion being once made, the Difficulty is over; and a natural, unforc'd Interpretation of the Phænomena of human Life will afterwards, we may hope, prevail, amongſt all ſpeculative Enquirers.

PART

PART III.

IT may not be improper, in this Place, to examine the Influence of bodily Endowments and of the Goods of Fortune, over our Sentiments of Regard and Esteem, and to consider whether these Phænomena strengthen or weaken the present Theory.

'TIS evident, that one considerable Source of *Beauty* in all Animals is the Advantage they reap from the particular Fabric or Structure of their Limbs and Members, suitable to the particular Manner of Life, to which they are by Nature destin'd. The just Proportions of a Horse, describ'd by *Xenophon* and *Virgil*, are the same, which are receiv'd at this Day by our modern Jockeys; because the Foundation of them is the same, *viz.* Experience of what is detrimental or useful in the Animal.

BROAD Shoulders, a lank Belly, firm Joints, taper Legs; all these are beautiful in our Species, because Signs of Force and Vigour. Ideas of Utility and its contrary, tho' they do not altogether determine what is handsome or deform'd, are evidently the

the Source of a conſiderable Part of Approbation or Diſlike.

In ancient Times, bodily Strength and Dexterity, being of greater *Uſe* and Importance in War, was alſo much more eſteem'd and valu'd, than at preſent. Not to inſiſt on *Homer* and the Poets, we may obſerve, that Hiſtorians ſcruple not to mention *Force of Body* among the other Accompliſhments even of *Epaminondas*, whom they acknowledge to be the greateſt Hero, Stateſman, and General of all the *Greeks* *. A like Praiſe is given to *Pompey*, one of the greateſt of the *Romans* †. This Inſtance is ſimilar to what we obſerv'd above with regard to Memory.

What Deriſion and Contempt, with both Sexes, attend *Impotence*; while the unhappy Object is re-

* Diodorus Siculus, Lib. 15. It may not be improper to give the Character of *Epaminondas*, as drawn by the Hiſtorian, in order to ſhow the Ideas of perfect Merit, which prevailed in thoſe Ages. In other illuſtrious Men, ſays he, you will obſerve, that each poſſeſt ſome one ſhining Quality, which was the Foundation of his Fame: In *Epaminondas* all the *Virtues* are found united; Force of Body, Eloquence of Expreſſion, Vigour of Mind, Contempt of Riches, Gentleneſs of Diſpoſition, and *what is chiefly to be regarded*, Courage and Conduct in War.

† *Cum alacribus, ſaltu; cum velocibus, curſu; cum validis recte certabat.* Salluſt. apud Veget.

garded

garded as one depriv'd of so capital a Pleasure in Life, and at the same Time, as disabled from communicating it to others. *Barrenness* in Women, being also a Species of *Inutility*, is a Reproach, but not in the same Degree: Of which the Reason is very obvious, according to the present Theory *.

THERE is no Rule in Painting or Statuary more indispensible than that of ballancing the Figures, and placing them with the greatest Exactness on their proper Center of Gravity. A Figure, which is not justly ballanc'd is ugly; because it conveys the disagreeable Ideas of Fall, Harm and Pain †.

A

* To the same Purpose, we may observe a Phænomenon, which might appear somewhat trivial and ludicrous; if any Thing could be trivial, which fortify'd Conclusions of such Importance; or ludicrous, which was employ'd in a philosophical Reasoning. 'Tis a general Remark, that those we call good *Women's Men*, who have either signaliz'd themselves by their amorous Exploits, or whose Make of Body or other Symptoms promise any extraordinary Vigour of that Kind, are well receiv'd by the fair Sex, and naturally engage the Affections even of those whose Virtue or Situation prevents any Design of ever giving Employment to those Talents. The Imagination is pleas'd with these Conceptions, and entering with Satisfaction into the Ideas of so favourite an Enjoyment, feels a Complacency and Good-will towards the Person. A like Principle operating more extensively, is the general Source of moral Affection and Approbation.

† All Men are equally liable to Pain and Disease and Sickness; and may again recover Health and Ease. These Circumstances, as they make no Distinction betwixt one Man and another, are no Source

A Disposition or Turn of Mind, which qualifies a Man to rise in the World, and advance his Fortune, is entitled to Esteem and Regard, as has been already explain'd. It may, therefore, naturally be suppos'd, that the actual Possession of Riches and Authority will have a considerable Influence over these Sentiments.

Let us examine any Hypothesis, by which we can account for the Regard, pay'd the Rich and Powerful: We shall find none satisfactory but that which derives it from the Enjoyment, communicated by the Images of Prosperity, Happiness, Ease, Plenty, Command, and the Gratification of every Appetite. Self-love, for Instance, which some affect so much to consider as the Source of every Sentiment, is

Source of Pride or Humility, Regard or Contempt. But comparing our own Species to superior ones, 'tis a very mortifying Consideration, that we should be so liable to all Diseases and Infirmities; and Divines accordingly employ this Topic, in order to depress Self-conceit and Vanity. They would have more Success, if the common Bent of our Thoughts were not perpetually turn'd to compare ourselves with each other. The Infirmities of old Age are mortifying; because a Comparison with the Young may take place. The King's Evil is industriously conceal'd, because it affects others, and is transmitted to Posterity. The Case is nearly the same with such Diseases as convey any nauseous or frightful Images; the Epilepsy, for Instance, Ulcers, Sores, Scabs, &c.

plainly

plainly insufficient to this Purpose. Where no Good-will or Friendship appears, 'tis difficult to conceive on what we can found our Hope of Advantage from the Riches of others; tho' we naturally esteem and respect the Rich, even before they discover any such favourable Disposition towards us.

WE are affected with the same Sentiments, when we lie so much out of the Sphere of their Activity, that they cannot even be suppos'd to possess the Power of serving us. A Prisoner of War, in all civiliz'd Nations, is treated with a Regard, suited to his Condition; and Riches, 'tis evident, go far towards fixing the Condition of any Person. If Birth and Quality enter for a Share, this still affords us an Argument to our present Purpose. For what is it we call a Man of Birth, but one, who is descended from a long Succession of rich and powerful Ancestors, and who acquires our Esteem by his Connexion with Persons, whom we esteem? His Ancestors, therefore, tho' dead, are respected, in some Measure, on Account of their Riches; and consequently, without any Kind of Expectation.

BUT not to go so far as Prisoners of War or the Dead, to find Instances of this disinterested Regard for Riches; we may only observe, with a little Attention, those Phænomena, that occur in common Life

Life and Converſation. A Man, who is himſelf, we ſhall ſuppoſe, of a competent Fortune, and of no Profeſſion, coming into a Company of Strangers, naturally treats them with different Degrees of Reſpect and Deference, as he is inform'd of their different Fortunes and Conditions; tho' 'tis impoſſible he can ſo ſuddenly propoſe, and perhaps would not accept of, any pecuniary Advantage from them. A Traveller is always admitted into Company, and meets with Civility, in Proportion as his Train and Equipage ſpeak him a Man of great or moderate Fortune. In ſhort, the different Ranks of Man are, in a great Meaſure, regulated by Riches; and that with regard to Superiors as well as Inferiors, Strangers as well as Acquaintance.

WHAT remains, therefore, but to conclude, that as Riches are deſir'd for ourſelf only as the Means of gratifying our Appetites, either at preſent or in ſome imaginary future Period; they beget Eſteem in others merely from their having that Influence. This indeed is their very Nature or Eſſence: They have a direct Reference to the Commodities, Conveniencies, and Pleaſures of Life: A Banker's Bill, who is broke, or Gold in a deſart Iſland, would otherwiſe be full as valuable. When we approach a Man, who is, as we ſay, at his Eaſe, we are preſented with the pleaſing Ideas of Plenty, Satisfaction, Cleanlineſs,

Cleanliness, Warmth; a chearful House, elegant Furniture, ready Service, and whatever is desirable in Meat, Drink, or Apparel. On the contrary, when a poor Man appears, the disagreeable Images of Want, Penury, hard Labour, dirty Furniture, coarse or ragged Cloaths, nauseous Meat and distasteful Liquor, immediately strike our Fancy. What else do we mean by saying the one is rich, the other poor? And as Regard or Contempt is the natural Consequence of these different Situations in Life; 'tis easily seen what additional Light and Evidence this throws on our preceding Theory, with Regard to all moral Distinctions *.

* There is something very extraordinary, and seemingly unaccountable in the Operation of our Passions, when we consider the Fortune and Situation of others. Very often another's Advancement and Prosperity produces Envy, which has a strong Mixture of Hatred, and arises chiefly from the Comparison of ourselves with the Person. At the very same Time, or at least, in very short Intervals, we may feel the Passion of Respect, which is a Species of Affection or Good-will, with a Mixture of Humility. On the other hand, the Misfortunes of our Fellows often cause Pity, which has a strong Mixture of Good-will. This Sentiment of Pity is nearly ally'd to Contempt, which is a Species of Dislike, along with a Mixture of Pride. I only point out these Phænomena, as a Subject of Speculation to such as are curious with regard to moral Enquiries. 'Tis sufficient for the present Purpose to observe in general, that Power and Riches commonly cause Respect, Poverty and Meanness Contempt, tho' particular Views and Incidents may sometimes raise the Passions of Envy and of Pity.

A MAN,

A Man, who has cur'd himſelf of all ridiculous Prepoſſeſſions, and is fully, ſincerely, and ſteddily convinc'd, from Experience as well as Philoſophy, that the Differences of Fortune make leſs Difference in Happineſs than is vulgarly imagin'd; ſuch a one meaſures not out Degrees of Eſteem according to the Rent-rolls of his Acquaintance. He may, indeed, externally pay a ſuperior Deference to the great Lord above the Vaſſal; becauſe Riches are the moſt convenient, being the moſt fixt and determinate, Source of Diſtinction: But his internal Sentiments are more regulated by the perſonal Characters of Men, than by the accidental and capricious Favours of Fortune.

In moſt Countries of *Europe*, Family, that is, hereditary Riches, mark'd with Titles and Symbols from the Sovereign, is the chief Source of Diſtinction. In *England*, more Regard is paid to preſent Opulence and Plenty. Each Practice has its Advantages and Diſadvantages. Where Birth is reſpected, unactive ſpiritleſs Minds remain in haughty Indolence, and dream of nothing but Pedigrees and Genealogies: The generous and ambitious ſeek Honour and Command and Reputation and Favour. Where Riches are the chief Idol, Corruption, Venality, Rapine prevail: Arts, Manufactures, Commerce,

merce, Agriculture flouriſh. The former Prejudice, being favourable to military Virtue, is more ſuited to Monarchies. The other being the chief Spur to Induſtry, agrees better with a republican Government. And we accordingly find, that each of theſe Forms of Government, by varying the *Utility* of thoſe Cuſtoms, has commonly a proportionable Effect on the Sentiments of Mankind.

SECTION

SECTION VII.

Of QUALITIES *immediately agreeable to Ourſelves.*

WHOEVER has paſt an Evening with ſerious melancholy People, and has obſerv'd how ſuddenly the Converſation was animated, and what Sprightlineſs diffus'd itſelf over the Countenance, Diſcourſe, and Behaviour of every one, on the Acceſſion of a good-humour'd, lively Companion; ſuch a one, I ſay, will eaſily allow, that CHEERFULNESS carries great Merit with it, and naturally conciliates the Affection and Goodwill of Mankind. No Quality, indeed, more readily communicates itſelf to all around; becauſe none has a greater Propenſity to diſplay itſelf, in jovial Talk and pleaſant Entertainment. The Flame ſpreads thro' the whole Circle; and the moſt ſullen and moroſe are often caught by it. That the melancholy

lancholy hate the merry, even tho' *Horace* ſays it, I have ſome Difficulty to allow; becauſe I have always obſerv'd, that, where the Jollity is moderate and decent, ſerious People are ſo much the more delighted, that it diſſipates the Gloom, with which they are commonly oppreſt; and gives them an unuſual Satisfaction and Enjoyment.

From this Influence of Cheerfulneſs, both to communicate itſelf, and to engage Approbation, we may perceive, that there are another Set of Virtues, which, without any Utility or any Tendency to farther Good, either of the Community or of the Poſſeſſor, diffuſe a Satisfaction on the Beholders, and conciliate Friendſhip and Regard. Their immediate Senſation, to the Perſon poſſeſt of them, is agreeable: Others enter into the ſame Humour, and catch the Sentiment, by a Contagion or natural Sympathy: And as we cannot forbear loving whatever pleaſes, a kindly Emotion ariſes towards the Perſon, who communicates ſo much Delight and Satisfaction. He is a more animating Spectacle: His Preſence diffuſes over us more ſerene Complacency and Enjoyment: Our Imagination, entering into his Feelings and Diſpoſition, is affected in a more agreeable Manner, than if a melancholy, dejected, ſullen, anxious Temper were preſented to our Notice and Obſervation. Hence the Affection and

and Approbation, which attends the former: The Averſion and Diſguſt, with which we regard the latter *.

FEW Men would envy the Character, which *Cæſar* gives *Caſſius*.

> He loves no Play,
> As thou do'ſt, *Anthony*: He hears no Muſic:
> Seldom he ſmiles; and ſmiles in ſuch a Sort,
> As if he mockt himſelf, and ſcorn'd his Spirit
> That could be mov'd to ſmile at any thing.

Not only ſuch Men, as *Cæſar* adds, are commonly *dangerous*, but alſo, having little Enjoyment within themſelves, they can never become agreeable to others, or contribute any Thing to ſocial Pleaſure and Entertainment. In all polite Nations and Ages, a Reliſh of Pleaſure, if accompany'd with Temperance and Decency, is eſteem'd a conſiderable

* There is no Man, who, on particular Occaſions, is not affected with all the diſagreeable Paſſions, Fear, Anger, Dejection, Grief, Melancholy, Anxiety, *&c.* But theſe, ſo far as they are natural, and univerſal, make no Difference betwixt one Man and another, and can never be the Object of Blame. 'Tis only when the Diſpoſition gives a *Propenſity* to any of theſe diſagreeable Paſſions, that they diſfigure the Character, and by giving Uneaſineſs, convey the Sentiment of Diſapprobation to the Spectator.

Merit, even in the greateſt Men; and becomes ſtill more requiſite in thoſe of inferior Rank and Character. 'Tis an agreeable Repreſentation, which a *French* Writer gives of the Situation of his own Mind in this Particular. *Virtue I love*, ſays he, *without Auſterity: Pleaſure, without Effeminacy: And Life, without fearing its End* *.

WHO is not ſtruck with any ſignal Inſtance of GREATNESS of MIND or Dignity of Character; with Elevation of Sentiments, Diſdain of Slavery, and with that noble Pride and Spirit, which ariſes from conſcious Worth and Virtue? The Sublime, ſays *Longinus*, is often nothing but the Echo or Image of Magnanimity; and where this Quality appears in any one, even without uttering a Syllable, it excites our Applauſe and Admiration; as may be obſerv'd of the famous Silence of *Ajax* in the *Odyſſey*, which expreſſes more noble Diſdain and reſolute Indignation, than any Language can convey †.

Were I Alexander, ſay'd *Parmenio, I would accept of theſe Offers made by* Darius. *So would I too*, reply'd *Alexander, were I* Parmenio. This Saying is admirable, ſays *Longinus*, from a like Principle ‡.

* *J'aime la vertu, ſans rudeſſé;*
J'aime le plaiſir, ſans moleſſe;
J'aime la vie, & n'en crains point la fin. St. *Evremond.*

† Cap. 9. ‡ Idem.

GO!

GO! cries the ſame Hero to his Soldiers, when they refus'd to follow him to the *Indies*, *go tell your Countrymen, you left* Alexander *compleating the Conqueſt of the World.* "*Alexander*," ſaid the Prince of *Condé*, who always admir'd the Paſſage, "abandon'd "by his Soldiers, amongſt Barbarians, not yet fully "ſubdu'd, felt in himſelf ſuch a Dignity and Right "of Empire, that he could not believe it poſſible "any one would refuſe to obey him. Whether in "*Europe* or in *Aſia*, amongſt *Greeks* or *Perſians*, all "was indifferent to him: Wherever he found Men, "he fancy'd he would find Subjects."

THE Confident of *Medea* in the Tragedy recommends Caution and Submiſſion; and enumerating all the Diſtreſſes of that unfortunate Heroine, aſks her, what ſhe has to ſupport her againſt ſo many Enemies. *Myſelf*, replies ſhe; *Myſelf, I ſay; and it is enough.* *Boileau* juſtly recommends this Paſſage as an Inſtance of true Sublime *.

WHEN *Phocion*, the modeſt, the gentle *Phocion*, was led to Execution, he turn'd about to one of his Fellow-ſufferers, who was lamenting his own hard

* Reflection 10 ſur Longin.

Fate. *Is it not Glory enough for you,* ſays he, *that you die along with* Phocion * ?

PLACE in Oppoſition the Picture which *Tacitus* draws of *Vitellius*, fallen from Empire, prolonging his Ignominy from a wretched Love of Life, deliver'd over to the mercileſs Rabble; toſt, buffetted, and kickt about; and conſtrain'd, by their holding a Poynard under his Chin, to raiſe his Head, and expoſe himſelf to every Contumely. What abject Infamy! What low Humiliation! Yet even here, ſays the Hiſtorian, he diſcover'd ſome Symptoms of a Mind not altogether degenerate. To a Tribune, who inſulted him, he reply'd, *I am ſtill your Emperor* †.

WE never excuſe the abſolute Want of Spirit and Dignity of Character, or a proper Senſe of what is due to one's ſelf, in Society and the common Inter-

* *Plutarch in Phoc.*

† Tacit. Hiſt. Lib. 3. The Author entering upon the Narration ſays, *Laniata veſte, fædum ſpectaculum ducebatur, multis increpantibus, nullo inlacrimante:* deformitas exitus miſericordiam abſtulerat. To enter thoroughly into this Method of thinking, we muſt make Allowance for the antient Maxims, that no one ought to prolong his Life after it became diſhonourable; but as he had always a Right to diſpoſe of it, it then became a Duty to part with it.

courſe

courſe of Life. This Vice conſtitutes what we properly call *Meanneſs*; when a Man can ſubmit to the baſeſt Slavery, in order to gain his Ends; fawn upon thoſe, who abuſe him; and degrade himſelf by Intimacies and Familiarities with undeſerving Inferiors. A certain Degree of generous Pride or Self-value is ſo requiſite, that the Abſence of it in the Mind diſpleaſes after the ſame Manner, as the Want of a Noſe, Eye, or any of the moſt material Features of the Face or Members of the Body *.

THE Utility of COURAGE, both to the Public and to the Perſon poſſeſt of it, is an obvious Foundation of Merit: But to any one, who conſiders the Matter juſtly, it will appear, that this Quality has a peculiar Luſtre, which it derives altogether from itſelf, and from that noble Elevation inſeperable from it. Its Figure, drawn by Painters and by Poets, diſplays, in each Feature, a Sublimity

* The Abſence of a Virtue may often be a Vice; and that of the higheſt Kind; as in the Inſtance of Ingratitude, as well as Meanneſs. Where we expect a Beauty, the Diſappointment gives an uneaſy Senſation, and produces a real Deformity. An Abjectneſs of Character, likewiſe, is diſguſtful and contemptible in another View. Where a Man has no Senſe of Value in himſelf, we are not likely to have any higher Eſtimation of him. And if the ſame Perſon, who crouches to his Superiors, is inſolent to his Inferiors (as often happens) this Contrariety of Behaviour, inſtead of correcting the former Vice, aggravates it extremely, by the Addition of a Vice, ſtill more odious. See Sect. 8.

and daring Confidence; which catches the Eye, engages the Affections, and diffuſes, by Sympathy, a like Sublimity of Sentiment over every Spectator.

UNDER what glorious Colours does *Demoſthenes* * repreſent *Philip*; where the Orator apologizes for his own Adminiſtration, and juſtifies that pertinacious Love of Liberty, with which he had inſpir'd the *Athenians*. "I beheld *Philip*," ſays he, "he, "with whom was your Conteſt, reſolutely, while "in Purſuit of Empire and Dominion, expoſing "himſelf to every Wound; his Eye goar'd, his "Neck wreſted, his Arm, his Thigh pierc'd, "whatever Part of his Body Fortune ſhould ſeize "on, that cheerfully relinquiſhing, provided that, "with what remain'd, he might live in Honour and "Renown. And ſhall it be ſaid, that he, born in "*Pella*, a Place heretofore mean and ignoble, ſhould "be inſpir'd with ſo high an Ambition and Thirſt "of Fame: While you, *Athenians*," &c. Theſe Praiſes excite the higheſt Admiration; but the Views preſented by the Orator, carry us not, we ſee, beyond the Hero himſelf, nor even regard the future advantageous Conſequences of his Valour.

THE martial Temper of the *Romans*, inflam'd by continual Wars, had rais'd their Eſteem of Courage

* *Pro Corona.*

ſo

ſo high, that, in their Language, it was call'd *Virtue*, by way of Excellence and Diſtinction from all other moral Qualities. *The* Suevi, in the Opinion of *Tacitus* *, *dreſt their Hair with a laudable Intent: Not for the Purpoſes of loving or being belov'd: They adorn'd themſelves only for their Enemies, and in order to appear more terrible.* A Sentiment of the Hiſtorian, which would ſound a little oddly, in other Nations and other Ages.

THE *Scythians*, according to *Herodotus* †, after ſkaing the Skin from the Heads of their Enemies, whom they have ſlain, dreſs it like Leather, and uſe it as a Towel; and whoever has moſt of theſe Towels is moſt eſteem'd amongſt them. So much had martial Bravery, in that Nation, as well as in many others, deſtroy'd the Sentiments of Humanity; a Virtue ſurely much more uſeful and engaging.

'TIS indeed obſervable, that, amongſt all uncultivated Nations, which have not, as yet, had full Experience of the Advantages, attending Beneficence, Juſtice, and the ſocial Virtues, Courage is the predominant Excellence; what is moſt celebrated by Poets, recommended by Parents and Inſtructors, and admir'd by the Public in general. The Ethics

* *De moribus Germ.* † Lib. 4.

of *Homer* are, in this Particular, very different from thoſe of *Fenelon*, his elegant Imitator; and ſuch as are well ſuited to an Age, wherein one Hero, as remarkt by *Thucydides* *, could aſk another, without Offence, if he was a Robber or not. Such alſo, very lately, was the Syſtem of Ethics, that prevail'd in many barbarous Parts of *Ireland*; if we may credit *Spenſer*, in his judicious Account of the State of that Kingdom †.

Of the ſame Claſs of Virtues with Courage is that undiſturb'd, philoſophical TRANQUILLITY, ſuperior to Pain, Sorrow, Anxiety, and each Aſſault of adverſe Fortune. Conſcious of his own Virtue, ſay the Philoſophers, the Sage elevates himſelf above every Accident of Life; and ſecurely plac'd in the Temple of Wiſdom, looks down on inferior Mortals, engag'd in Purſuit of Honours, Riches, Reputation, and each frivolous Enjoyment. Theſe Pretenſions, no doubt, when ſtretch'd to the utmoſt,

* Lib. 1.

† It is a common Uſe, ſays he, amongſt their Gentlemen's Sons, that, as ſoon as they are able to uſe their Weapons, they ſtrait gather to themſelves three or four Stragglers or Kern, with whom wandering a while up and down idly the Country, taking only Meat, he at laſt falleth into ſome bad Occaſion, that ſhall be offer'd; which being once made known, he is thenceforth counted a Man of Worth, in whom there is Courage.

are

are much too magnificent for human Nature. They carry, however, a Grandeur, with them, which ſeizes the Spectator, and ſtrikes him with Admiration. And the nearer we can approach, in Practice, to this ſublime Tranquillity and Indifference (for we muſt diſtinguiſh it from a ſtupid Inſenſibility) the more ſecure Enjoyment ſhall we attain within ourſelves, and the more Greatneſs of Mind ſhall we diſcover to the World. The philoſophical Tranquillity may, indeed, be conſider'd only as a Branch of Magnanimity.

WHO admires not *Socrates*; his perpetual Serenity and Contentment, amidſt the greateſt Poverty and domeſtic Vexations; his reſolute Contempt of Riches, and magnanimous Care of preſerving Liberty, while he refuſed all Aſſiſtance from his Friends and Diſciples, and avoided even the Dependance of an Obligation? *Epictetus* had not ſo much as a Door to his little Houſe or Hovel; and therefore, ſoon loſt his Iron Lamp, the only Furniture he had worth taking. But reſolving to diſappoint all Robbers for the future, he ſupply'd its Place with an earthen Lamp, which he very peaceably kept Poſſeſſion of ever after.

In Antiquity, the Heroes of Philoſophy, as well as thoſe of War and Patriotiſm, have a Grandeur and Force of Sentiment, which aſtoniſhes our narrow Souls, and is raſhly rejected as extravagant and ſupernatural. They, in their Turn, I allow, would have had equal Reaſon to conſider, as romantic and incredible, the Degree of Humanity, Clemency, Order, Tranquillity, and other ſocial Virtues, to which, in the Adminiſtration of Government, we have attain'd in modern Times, had any one been then able to have made a fair Repreſentation of them. Such is the Compenſation, which Nature, or rather Education has made, in the Diſtribution of Excellencies and Virtues, in theſe different Ages.

The Merit of BENEVOLENCE, ariſing from its Utility, and its Tendency to the Good of Mankind, has been already explain'd, and is, no doubt, the Source of a *conſiderable* Part of that Eſteem, which is ſo univerſally pay'd it But it will alſo be allow'd, that the very Softneſs and Tenderneſs of the Sentiment, its engaging Endearments, its fond Expreſſions, its delicate Attentions, and all that Flow of mutual Confidence and Regard, which enter into a warm Attachment of Love and Friendſhip: It will be allow'd, I ſay, that theſe Feelings being delightful in themſelves, are neceſſarily communicated to the Spectators,

Spectators, and melt them into the ſame Fondneſs and Delicacy. The Tears naturally ſtart in our Eyes on the Obſervation of a warm Sentiment of this Nature: Our Breaſt heaves, our Heart is agitated, and every humane tender Principle of our Frame, is ſet in Motion, and gives us the pureſt and moſt ſatisfactory Enjoyment.

WHEN Poets form Deſcriptions of *Elyzian* Fields, where the bleſſed Inhabitants ſtand in no Need of each other's Aſſiſtance, they yet repreſent them, as maintaining a conſtant Entercourſe of Love and Friendſhip, and ſooth our Fancy with the pleaſing Image of theſe ſoft and gentle Paſſions. The Idea of tender Tranquillity in a paſtoral *Arcadia* is agreeable from a like Principle, as has been obſerv'd above *.

WHO would live amidſt perpetual Wrangling, and Scolding, and mutual Reproaches? The Roughneſs and Harſhneſs of theſe Emotions diſturb and diſpleaſe us: We ſuffer by Contagion and Sympathy; nor can we remain indifferent Spectators, even tho' certain, that no pernicious Conſequences would ever follow from ſuch angry Paſſions.

* Sect. 5. Part 2.

As a certain Proof, that the whole Merit of Benevolence is not deriv'd from its Uſefulneſs, we may obſerve, that, in a kind Way of Blame, we ſay, a Perſon is *too good*; when he exceeds his Part in Society, and carries his Attention for others beyond the proper Bounds and Meaſure. In like Manner, we ſay a Man is *too high-ſpirited, too intrepid, too indifferent about Fortune:* Reproaches, which really, at the bottom, imply more Regard and Eſteem than many Panegyrics. Being accuſtom'd to rate the Merit and Demerit of Characters chiefly by their uſeful or pernicious Tendencies, we cannot forbear applying the Epithet of Blame, when we diſcover a Sentiment, which riſes to a Degree that is hurtful: But it may happen, at the ſame Time, that its noble Elevation, or its engaging Tenderneſs ſo ſeizes the Heart, as rather to encreaſe our Friendſhip and Concern for the Perſon *.

The Amours and Attachments of *Harry* the IVth, during the civil Wars of the League, frequently hurt his Intereſt and his Cauſe; but all the young, at

* Cheerfulneſs could ſcarce admit of Blame from its Exceſs, were it not, that diſſolute Mirth, without a proper Cauſe or Subject, is a ſure Symptom and Characteriſtic of Folly, and on that Account, diſguſtful.

leaſt,

leaſt, and amorous, who can ſympathize with that Paſſion, will allow, that this very Weakneſs (for they will readily call it ſuch) chiefly endears that Hero, and intereſts them in his Fortunes.

THE exceſſive Bravery and reſolute Inflexibility of *Charles* the XIIth ruin'd his own Country, and infeſted all his Neighbours: But have ſuch Splendour and Greatneſs in their Appearance, as ſtrike us with Admiration; and they might, in ſome Degree, be even approv'd of, if they betray'd not ſometimes too evident Symptoms of Madneſs and Diſorder.

THE *Athenians* pretended to the firſt Invention of Agriculture and of Laws; and always valu'd themſelves extremely on the Benefit thereby procur'd to the whole Race of Mankind. They alſo boaſted, and with Reaſon, of their warlike Enterprizes; particularly againſt thoſe innumerable Fleets and Armies of *Perſians*, which invaded *Greece* during the Reign of *Darius* and of *Xerxes*. But tho' there be no Compariſon, in Point of Utility, betwixt theſe peaceful and military Honours; yet we find, that the Orators, who have wrote ſuch elaborate Panegyrics on that famous City, have chiefly triumph'd in diſplaying the warlike Atchievments. *Lyſias*, *Thucydides*, *Plato* and *Iſocrates* diſcover, all of them, the ſame Partiality: which, tho' condemn'd by calm

Reaſon and Reflection, appears ſo natural in the Mind of Man.

'Tis obſervable, that the great Charm of Poetry conſiſts in lively Pictures of the ſublime Paſſions, Magnanimity, Courage, Diſdain of Fortune; or thoſe of the tender Affections, Love and Friendſhip; which warm the Heart, and diffuſe over us ſimilar Sentiments and Emotions. And tho' every Kind of Paſſion, even the moſt diſagreeable, ſuch as Grief and Anger, are obſerv'd, when excited by Poetry, to convey a Pleaſure and Satisfaction, from a Mechaniſm of Nature, not eaſy to be explain'd: Yet thoſe more elevated or ſofter Affections have a peculiar Influence, and pleaſe from more than one Cauſe or Principle. Not to mention, that they alone intereſt us in the Fortune of the Perſons repreſented, or communicate any Eſteem and Affection for their Character.

And can it poſſibly be doubted, that this Talent itſelf of Poets, to move the Paſſions, this PATHETIC and SUBLIME of Sentiment, is a very conſiderable Merit, and being enhanc'd by its extreme Rarity, may exalt the Perſon poſſeſt of it, above every Character of the Age, in which he lives? The Prudence, Addreſs, Steadineſs, and benign Government of *Auguſtus*, adorn'd with all the Splendour

Splendour of his noble Birth and imperial Crown, render him but an unequal Competitor for Fame with *Virgil*, who lays nothing into the oppoſite Scale but the divine Beauties of his poetical Genius.

THE very Senſibility to theſe Beauties or a DELICACY of Taſte, is itſelf a Beauty in any Character; as conveying the pureſt, the moſt durable, and moſt innocent of all Enjoyments.

THESE are ſome Inſtances of the Species of Virtue, that are prais'd from the immediate Pleaſure, which they communicate to the Perſon, poſſeſt of them. No Views of Utility or of future beneficial Conſequences enter into this Sentiment of Approbation; yet is it of a ſimilar Kind to that other Sentiment, which ariſes from Views of public or private Utility. The ſame ſocial Sympathy, we may obſerve, or Fellow-feeling with human Happineſs or Miſery, gives Riſe to both; and this Analogy in all the Parts of the preſent Theory may juſtly be regarded as a Confirmation of it.

SECT.

SECTION VIII.

Of QUALITIES *immediately agreeable to Others* *.

AS the mutual Shocks, in *Society*, and the Oppoſitions of Intereſt and Self-love have conſtrain'd Mankind to eſtabliſh the Laws of *Juſtice*; in order to preſerve the Advantages of common Aſſiſtance and Protection: in like Manner, the eternal Contrarieties, in *Company*, of Men's Pride and Self-conceit have introduc'd the Rules of GOOD-MANNERS or POLITENESS, in order to facilitate the Intercourſe of Minds, and an undiſturb'd Commerce and Converſation. Amongſt

* 'Tis the Definition of Virtue, that 'tis *a Quality of the Mind agreeable to or approv'd of by every one, that conſiders or contemplates it.* But ſome Qualities produce Pleaſure, becauſe they are uſeful to Society, or uſeful or agreeable to the Perſon himſelf; others produce it more immediately: Which is the Claſs of Virtues here conſider'd.

well-bred

well-bred People, a mutual Deference is affected; Contempt of others diſguiſ'd: Authority conceal'd: Attention given to each in his Turn: And an eaſy Stream of Converſation maintain'd, without Vehemence, without mutual Interruption, without Eagerneſs for Victory, and without any Airs of Superiority. Theſe Attentions and Regards are immediately *agreeable* to others, abſtracted from any Regard to Utility or beneficial Tendencies: They conciliate Affection, promote Eſteem, and enhance extremely the Merit of the Perſon, who regulates his Behaviour by them.

MANY of the Forms of Breeding are arbitrary and caſual: But the Thing expreſt by them is ſtill the ſame. A *Spaniard* goes out of his own Houſe before his Gueſt, to ſignify, that he leaves him Maſter of all. In other Countries, the Landlord walks out laſt, as a common Mark of Deference and Regard.

BUT in order to render a Man perfect *Good-company*, he muſt have WIT and INGENUITY as well as Good-manners. What Wit is, it may not be eaſy to define; but 'tis eaſy ſurely to determine, that 'tis a Quality immediately *agreeable* to others, and communicating, on its firſt Appearance, a lively Joy and Satisfaction to every one, that has any Comprehenſion

ſion of it. The moſt profound Metaphyſics, indeed, might be employ'd, in explaining the various Kinds and Species of Wit; and many Claſſes of it, which are now receiv'd on the ſimple Teſtimony of Taſte and Sentiment, might, perhaps, be reſolv'd into more general Principles. But this is ſufficient for our preſent Purpoſe, that it does affect Taſte and Sentiment, and beſtowing an immediate Enjoyment, is a ſure Source of Approbation and Affection.

IN Countries, where Men paſs all their Time in Converſation, and Viſits and Aſſemblies, theſe *companionable* Qualities, ſo to ſpeak, are of high Eſtimation, and form a chief Part of perſonal Merit. In Countries, where Men live a more domeſtic Life, and either are employ'd in Buſineſs or amuſe themſelves in a narrower Circle of Acquaintance, the more ſolid Qualities are chiefly regarded. Thus, I have obſerv'd, that, amongſt the *French*, the firſt Queſtions, with regard to a Stranger, are, *Is he polite? Has he Wit?* In our own Country, the chief Praiſe beſtow'd is always that of a *good-natur'd, ſenſible Fellow.*

IN Converſation, the lively Spirit of Dialogue is *agreeable*, even to thoſe who deſire not to have any Share of the Diſcourſe: Hence a Teller of long Stories or a pompous Declaimer is very little approv'd of.

of. But moſt Men deſire likewiſe their Share in the Converſation, and regard, with a very evil Eye, that *Loquacity*, which deprives them of a Right they are naturally ſo jealous of.

THERE are a Set of harmleſs *Lyars*, frequently to be met with in Company, who deal much in the Marvelous and Extraordinary. Their uſual Intention is to pleaſe and entertain; but as Men are delighted with nothing but what they conceive to be Truth, theſe People miſtake extremely the Means of pleaſing, and incur univerſal Blame. Some Indulgence, however, to Lying or Fiction is given in *humourous* Stories; becauſe it is there agreeable and entertaining; and Truth is not of any Importance.

ELOQUENCE, Genius of all Kinds, even good Senſe, and ſound Reaſoning, when it riſes to an eminent Degree, and is employ'd upon Subjects of any conſiderable Dignity and nice Diſcernment; all theſe Qualities ſeem immediately agreeable, and have a Merit diſtinct from their Uſefulneſs. Rarity, likewiſe, which ſo much enhances the Price of every Thing, muſt ſet an additional Value on theſe noble Talents of the human Mind.

MODESTY may be underſtood in different Senſes, even abſtracted from Chaſtity, which has been

been already treated of. It ſometimes means that Tenderneſs and Nicety of Honour, that Apprehenſion of Blame, that Dread of Intruſion or Injury towards others, that *Pudor*, which is the proper Guardian of every Kind of Virtue, and a ſure Preſervative againſt Vice and Corruption. But its moſt uſual Meaning is, when it is oppos'd to *Impudence* and *Arrogance*, and expreſſes a Diffidence of our own Judgment, and a due Attention and Regard to others. In young Men chiefly, this Quality is a ſure Sign of Good-ſenſe; and is alſo the certain Means of augmenting that Endowment, by preſerving their Ears open to Inſtruction, and making them ſtill graſp after new Attainments. But it has a farther Charm to every Spectator; by flattering each Man's Vanity, and preſenting the Appearance of a docile Pupil, who receives, with proper Attention and Reſpect, every Word they utter *.

A

* Men have in general a much greater Propenſity to over-value than under-value themſelves; notwithſtanding the Opinion of *Ariſtotle*. This makes us more jealous of the Exceſs on the former Side, and cauſes us to regard, with a particular Indulgence, all Tendency to Modeſty and Self-diffidence; as eſteeming the Danger leſs of falling into any vicious Extreme of that Nature. 'Tis thus, in Countries, where Men's Bodies are apt to exceed in Corpulency, perſonal Beauty is plac'd in a much greater Degree of Slenderneſs, than in Countries where that is the moſt uſual Defect. Being ſo often ſtruck with Inſtances of one Species of Deformity, Men think they can never keep at too great a Diſtance from it, and wiſh always

A DESIRE of Fame, Reputation, or a Character with others, is ſo far from being blameable, that it ſeems

always to have a Leaning to the oppoſite Side. In like Manner, were the Door open'd to Self-praiſe, and were *Montaigne*'s Maxim obſerv'd, that one ſhould ſay as frankly, *I have Senſe, I have Learning, I have Courage, Beauty, or Wit*; as 'tis ſure we often think ſo; were this the Caſe, I ſay, every one is ſenſible, that ſuch a Flood of Impertinence would break in upon us as would render Society altogether intolerable. For this Reaſon Cuſtom has eſtabliſh'd it as a Rule, in common Societies, that Men ſhould never praiſe themſelves, and not even ſpeak much of themſelves; and 'tis only amongſt intimate Friends or People of very manly Behaviour, that one is allow'd to do himſelf Juſtice. No body finds fault with *Maurice*, Prince of *Orange*, for his Reply to one, who aſk'd him whom he eſteem'd the firſt General of the Age, *The Marquis de* Spinola, ſaid he, *is the ſecond*. Tho' 'tis even obſervable, that the Self-praiſe imply'd is here better imply'd, than if it had been directly expreſs'd, without any Cover or Diſguiſe.

He muſt be a very ſuperficial Thinker, who imagines, that all Inſtances of mutual Deference are to be underſtood in earneſt, and that a Man would be more eſteemable for being ignorant of his own Merits and Accompliſhments. A ſmall Byaſs towards Modeſty, even in the internal Sentiments, is favourably regarded, eſpecially in young People; and a ſtrong Byaſs is requir'd in the outward Behaviour: But this excludes not a noble Pride and Spirit, which may openly diſplay itſelf in its full Extent, when one lies under Calumny or Oppreſſion of any Kind. The generous Contumacy of *Socrates*, as *Cicero* calls it, has been highly celebrated in all Ages; and when join'd to the uſual Modeſty of his Behaviour, forms a moſt ſhining Character. *Iphicrates*, the *Athenian* General, being accus'd of betraying the Intereſts of his Country, aſk'd his Accuſer, *Would you*, ſays he, *on a like Occaſion*,

ſeems inſeparable from Virtue, Genius, Capacity, and a generous or noble Diſpoſition. An Attention, even to trivial Matters, in order to pleaſe, is alſo expected and demanded by Society; and no one is ſurpriz'd, if he finds a Man in Company, to obſerve a greater Elegance of Dreſs and more pleaſant Flow of Converſation, than when he paſſes his Time, at home, and altogether with his own Family. Wherein, then, conſiſts VANITY, which is ſo juſtly regarded as a Fault or Imperfection? It ſeems to conſiſt chiefly in ſuch an intemperate Diſplay of our Advantages, Honours and Accompliſhments; in ſuch an importunate and open Demand of Praiſe and Admiration, as is offenſive to others, and encroaches too far on *their* ſecret Vanity and Ambition. It is beſides a ſure Symptom of the Want of true Dignity

Occaſion, have been guilty of that Crime? By no Means, reply'd the other. *And can you then imagine*, cry'd the Hero, *that* Iphicrates *would be guilty?* Quinctil. Lib. 5. Cap. 12. In ſhort, a generous Spirit and Self-value, well founded, decently diſguis'd, and courageouſly ſupported under Diſtreſs and Calumny, is a very great Virtue, and ſeems to derive its Merit from the noble Elevation of its Sentiment, or its immediate Agreeableneſs to its Poſſeſſor. In ordinary Characters, we approve of a Byaſs to Modeſty, which is immediately agreeable to others. The vicious Exceſs of the former Virtue, *viz.* Inſolence or Haughtineſs, is immediately diſagreeable to others: The Exceſs of the latter is ſo to the Poſſeſſor. Thus are the Boundaries of theſe Duties adjuſted.

and

and Elevation of Mind, which is ſo great an Ornament to any Character. For why that impatient Deſire of Applauſe; as if you were not juſtly entitled to it, and might not reaſonably expect it would for ever attend you? Why ſo anxious to inform us of the great Company you have kept; the obliging Things, that were ſaid to you; the Honours, the Diſtinctions you met with; as if theſe were not Things of Courſe, and what we could readily, of ourſelves, have imagin'd, without being told of them?

DECENCY, or a proper Regard to Age, Sex, Character and Station in the World, may be rank'd among the Qualities, which are immediately agreeable to others, and which, by that Means, acquire Praiſe and Approbation. An effeminate Behaviour in a Man, a rough Manner in a Woman; theſe are ugly, becauſe unſuitable to each Character, and different from the Qualities we expect in the Sexes. 'Tis as if a Tragedy abounded in comic Beauties, or a Comedy in tragic. The Diſproportions hurt the Eye, and convey a diſagreeable Sentiment to the Spectators, the Source of Blame and Diſapprobation. This is that *Indecorum*, which is explain'd ſo much at large by *Cicero* in his Offices.

AMONGST the other Virtues, we may alſo give CLEANLINESS a Place; ſince it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconſiderable Source of Love and Affection. No one will deny, that a Negligence in this Particular is a Fault; and as Faults are nothing but ſmaller Vices, and this Fault can have no other Origin than the uneaſy Senſation, which it excites in others; we may, in this Inſtance, ſeemingly ſo trivial, clearly diſcover the Origin of moral Diſtinctions, about which the Learned have involved themſelves in ſuch Mazes of Perplexity and Error.

BUT beſides all the *agreeable* Qualities, the Origin of whoſe Beauty we can, in ſome Degree, explain and account for, there ſtill remains ſomething myſterious and unaccountable, which conveys an immediate Satisfaction to the Spectators, but how, or why, or for what Reaſon, they cannot pretend to determine. There is a MANNER, a Grace, a Genteelneſs, an I-know-not-what, which ſome Men poſſeſs above others, which is very different from external Beauty and Comelineſs, and which, however, catches our Affection almoſt as ſuddenly and powerfully. And tho' this *Manner* be chiefly talk'd of in the Paſſion betwixt the Sexes, where the conceal'd Magic is eaſily explain'd, yet ſurely much of it pre-

vails in all our Eſtimation of Characters, and forms no inconſiderable Part of perſonal Merit. This Claſs of Virtues, therefore, muſt be truſted entirely to the blind, but ſure Teſtimony of Taſte and Sentiment; and muſt be conſider'd as a Part of Ethics, left by Nature to baffle all the Pride of Philoſophy, and make her ſenſible of her narrow Boundaries and ſlender Acquiſitions.

We approve of another, becauſe of his Wit, Politeneſs, Modeſty, Decency, or any agreeable Quality he poſſeſſes, although he be not of our Acquaintance, nor has ever given us any Entertainment, by Means of theſe Accompliſhments. The Idea, which we form of their Effect on his Acquaintance, has an agreeable Influence on our Imagination, and gives us the Sentiment of Approbation. This Principle enters into all the Judgments, which we form concerning Morals.

SECT.

SECTION IX.

CONCLUSION *of the Whole.*

PART I.

IT may juſtly appear ſurprizing, that any Man, in ſo late an Age, ſhould find it requiſite to prove, by elaborate Reaſonings, that VIRTUE or PERSONAL MERIT conſiſts altogether in the Poſſeſſion of Qualities, *uſeful* or *agreeable* to the *Perſon himſelf* or to *others*. It might be expected that this Principle would have occur'd even to the firſt rude, unpractis'd Enquirers concerning Morals, and been receiv'd, from its own Evidence, without any Argument or Diſputation. Whatever is valuable in any Kind ſo naturally claſſes itſelf under the Diviſion of *uſeful* or *agreeable*, the *utile* or the *dulce*, that 'tis not eaſy to imagine, why we ſhould ever ſeek farther, or conſider the Queſtion as a Matter of nice Reſearch or Enquiry. And as every Thing

uſeful or agreeable muſt poſſeſs theſe Qualities with regard either to the *Perſon himſelf* or to *others*, the compleat Delineation or Deſcription of Merit ſeems to be perform'd as naturally as a Shadow is caſt by the Sun, or an Image is reflected upon Water. If the Ground, on which the Shadow is caſt, be not broken and uneven, nor the Surface, from which the Image is reflected, diſturb'd and confus'd, a juſt Figure is immediately preſented, without any Art or Attention. And it ſeems a reaſonable Preſumption, that Syſtems and Hypotheſes have perverted our natural Underſtanding, when a Theory, ſo ſimple and obvious, could ſo long have eſcap'd the moſt elaborate Scrutiny and Examination.

But however the Caſe may have far'd with Philoſophy; in common Life, theſe Principles are ſtill implicitely maintain'd; nor is any other Topic of Praiſe or Blame ever recur'd to, when we employ any Panegyric or Satyre, any Applauſe or Cenſure of human Action and Behaviour. If we obſerve Men, in every Intercourſe of Buſineſs or Pleaſure, in each Conference and Converſation, we ſhall find them no where, except in the Schools, at any Loſs upon this Subject. What ſo natural, for Inſtance, as the following Dialogue? You are very happy, we ſhall ſuppoſe one to ſay, addreſſing himſelf to another,

another, that you have given your Daughter to *Cleanthes:* He is a Man of Honour and Humanity. Every one, who has any Intercourſe with him, is ſure of *fair* and *kind* Treatment *. I congratulate you too, ſays another, on the promiſing Expectations of this Son-in-law; whoſe aſſiduous Application to the Sudy of the Laws, whoſe quick Penetration and early Knowledge both of Men and Buſineſs, prognoſticate the greateſt Honours and Advancement †. You ſurprize me much, replies a third, when you talk of *Cleanthes* as a Man of Buſineſs and Application. I met him lately in a Circle of the gayeſt Company, and he was the very Life and Soul of our Converſation: So much Wit with Good-manners; ſo much Gallantry without Affectation; ſo much ingenious Knowledge ſo genteely deliver'd, I have never before obſerv'd in any one ‡. You would admire him ſtill more, ſays a fourth, if you knew him more familiarly. That Cheerfulneſs, which you might remark in him, is not a ſudden Flaſh ſtruck out by Company: It runs thro' the whole Tenor of his Life, and preſerves a perpetual Serenity on his Countenance, and Tranquillity in his Soul. He has met with ſevere Trials, Misfortunes as well as Dangers; and by his Greatneſs of Mind, was ſtill

* Qualities uſeful to others. † Qualities uſeful to the Perſon himſelf. ‡ Qualities immmediately agreeable to others.

ſuperior to all of them *. The Image, Gentlemen, you have here delineated of *Cleanthes*, cry I, is that of accompliſh'd Merit. Each of you has given a Stroke of the Pencil to his Figure; and you have unawares exceeded all the Pictures drawn by *Gratian* or *Caſtiglione*. A Philoſopher might ſelect this Character as a Model of perfect Virtue.

And as every Quality, which is uſeful or agreeable to ourſelves or others, is, in common Life, admitted under the Denomination of Virtue or perſonal Merit; ſo no other will ever be receiv'd, where Men judge of Things by their natural, unprejudic'd Reaſon, without the deluſive Gloſſes of Superſtition and falſe Religion. Celibacy, Faſting, Penances, Mortification, Self-denial, Humility, Silence, Solitude and the whole Train of monkiſh Virtues; for what Reaſon are they every where rejected by Men of Senſe, but becauſe they ſerve no Manner of Purpoſe; neither advance a Man's Fortune in the World, nor render him a more valuable Member of Society; neither qualify him for the Entertainment of Company, nor encreaſe his Power of Self-enjoyment? We obſerve, on the contrary, that they croſs all theſe deſirable Ends; ſtupify the Underſtanding and harden the Heart, obſcure the Fancy

* Qualities immediately agreeable to the Perſon himſelf.

and

and ſower the Temper. We juſtly, therefore transfer them to the oppoſite Column, and place them in the Catalogue of Vices; nor has any Superſtition Force ſufficient, amongſt Men of the World, to pervert entirely theſe natural Sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brain'd Enthuſiaſt, after his Death, may have Place in the Calendar; but will ſcarce ever be admitted, when alive, into Intimacy and Society, except by thoſe who are as delirious and diſmal as himſelf.

IT ſeems a Happineſs in the preſent Theory, that it enters not into that vulgar Diſpute concerning the *Degrees* of Benevolence or Self-love, which prevail in human Nature; a Diſpute, which is never likely to have any Iſſue, both becauſe Men, who have taken Party, are not eaſily convinc'd, and becauſe the Phænomena, which can be produc'd on either Side, are ſo diſpers'd, ſo uncertain, and ſubject to ſo many Interpretations, that 'tis ſcarce poſſible accurately to compare them, or draw from them any determinate Inference or Concluſion. 'Tis ſufficient for our preſent Purpoſe, if it be allow'd, what ſurely, without the greateſt Abſurdity, cannot be diſputed, that there is ſome Benevolence, however ſmall, infus'd into our Boſom; ſome Spark of Friendſhip for human Kind; ſome Particle of the Dove, kneaded into our Frame, along with the Elements of the

Wolf and Serpent. Let these generous Sentiments be supposed ever so weak; let them be hardly sufficient to move even a Hand or Finger of our Body; they must still direct the Determinations of our Mind, and where every Thing else is equal, produce a cool Preference of what is useful and serviceable to Mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A *moral Distinction*, therefore, immediately arises; a general Sentiment of Blame and Approbation; a Tendency, however faint, to the Objects of the one, and a proportionable Aversion to those of the other. Nor will those Reasoners, who so earnestly maintain the predominant Selfishness of human Kind, be any way scandaliz'd at hearing of the weak Sentiments of Virtue, implanted in our Nature. On the contrary, they are found as ready to maintain the one Tenet as the other; and their Spirit of Satyre, (for such it appears, rather than of Corruption) naturally gives Rise to both Opinions; which have, indeed, a great, and almost indissoluble Connexion together.

Avarice, Ambition, Vanity, and all Passions, vulgarly, tho' improperly, compriz'd under the Denominatlon of *Self-love*, are here excluded from our Theory concerning the Origin of Morals, not because they are too weak, but because they have not a proper Direction, for that Purpose. The Notion of Morals implies some Sentiment, common to all Mankind,

Mankind, which recommends the ſame Object to general Approbation, and makes every Man, or moſt Men, agree in the ſame Opinion or Deciſion concerning it. It alſo implies ſome Sentiment, ſo univerſal and comprehenſive as to extend to all Mankind, and render the Actions and Conduct, even of Perſons the moſt remote, an Object of Cenſure or Applauſe, according as they agree or diſagree with that Rule of Right, which is eſtabliſh'd. Theſe two requiſite Circumſtances belong alone to the Sentiment of Humanity here inſiſted on. The other Paſſions produce, in every Breaſt, many ſtrong Sentiments of Deſire and Averſion, Affection and Hatred; but theſe neither are felt ſo much in common, nor are ſo comprehenſive, as to be the Foundation of any general Syſtem and eſtabliſh'd Theory of Blame or Approbation.

WHEN a Man denominates another his *Enemy*, his *Rival*, his *Antagoniſt*, his *Adverſary*, he is underſtood to ſpeak the Language of Self-love, and to expreſs Sentiments, peculiar to himſelf, and ariſing from his particular Circumſtances and Situation: But when he beſtows on any Man the Epithets of *vicious* or *odious* or *deprav'd*, he then ſpeaks another Language, and expreſſes Sentiments, in which he expects all his Audience are to concur with him. He muſt here, therefore, depart from his private and particular

Situation, and muſt chooſe a Point of View, common to him with others: He muſt move ſome univerſal Principle of the human Frame, and touch a String, to which all Mankind have an Accord and Symphony. If he means, therefore, to expreſs, that this Man poſſeſſes Qualities, whoſe Tendency is pernicious to Society, he has choſen this common Point in View, and has touch'd the Principle of Humanity, in which every Man, in ſome Degree, concurs. While the human Heart is compounded of the ſame Elements as at preſent, it will never be altogether indifferent to the Good of Mankind, nor entirely unaffected with the Tendencies of Characters and Manners. And tho' this Affection of Humanity may not generally be eſteem'd ſo ſtrong, as Ambition or Vanity, yet, being common to all Men, it can alone be the Foundation of Morals, or of any general Syſtem of Conduct and Behaviour. One Man's Ambition is not another's Ambition; nor will the ſame Event or Object ſatisfy both: But the Humanity of one Man is the Humanity of every one; and the ſame Object touches this Paſſion in all human Creatures.

But the Sentiments, which ariſes from Humanity, are not only the ſame in all human Creatures, and produce the ſame Approbation or Cenſure; but they alſo comprehend all human Creatures; nor is there any

any one, whoſe Conduct and Character is not, by their Means, an Object, to every one, of Cenſure or Approbation. On the contrary thoſe other Paſſions, commonly denominated ſelfiſh, both produce different Sentiments in each Individual, according to his particular Situation; and alſo contemplate the greateſt Part of Mankind with the utmoſt Indifference and Unconcern. Whoever has a high Regard and Eſteem for me flatters my Vanity; whoever expreſſes Contempt mortifies and diſpleaſes me: But as my Name is known but to a ſmall Part of Mankind, there are few, that come within the Sphere of this Paſſion, or excite, on its Account, either my Affection or Diſguſt. But if you repreſent a tyrannical, inſolent, or barbarous Behaviour, in any Country or in any Age of the World; I ſoon carry my Eye to the pernicious Tendency of ſuch a Conduct, and feel the Sentiments of Repugnance and Diſpleaſure towards it. No Character can be ſo remote as to be, in this Light, altogether indifferent to me. What is beneficial to Society or to the Perſon himſelf muſt ſtill be prefer'd. And every Quality or Action, of every human Being, muſt, by this Means, be rank'd under ſome Claſs or Denomination, expreſſive of general Cenſure or Applauſe.

WHAT more, therefore, can we aſk to diſtinguiſh the Sentiments, dependant on Humanity, from thoſe connected with any other Paſſion, or to ſatisfy us why the former is the Origin of Morals, and not the latter? Whatever Conduct gains my Approbation, by touching my Humanity, procures alſo the Applauſe of all Mankind, by affecting the ſame Principle in them: But what ſerves my Avarice or Ambition pleaſes only theſe Paſſions in me, and affects not the Avarice or Ambition of the reſt of Mankind. No Conduct, in any Man, which has a beneficial Tendency, but is agreeable to my Humanity, however remote the Perſon: But every Man, ſo far remov'd as neither to croſs nor ſerve my Avarice and Ambition, is altogether indifferent to thoſe Paſſions. The Diſtinction, therefore, betwixt theſe different Species of Sentiment being ſo ſtrong and evident, Language muſt ſoon be moulded upon it, and muſt invent a peculiar Set of Terms to expreſs thoſe univerſal Sentiments of Cenſure or Approbation, which ariſe from Humanity or from Views of general Uſefulneſs and its contrary. VIRTUE and VICE become then known: Morals are recogniz'd: Certain general Ideas are fram'd of human Conduct and Behaviour: Such Meaſures are expected from Men, in ſuch Situations: This Action is determin'd conformable

formable to our abſtract Rule; that other, contrary. And by ſuch univerſal Principles are the particular Sentiments of Self-love frequently controul'd and limited *.

FROM Inſtances of popular Tumults, Seditions, Factions, Panics, and all Paſſions, which are ſhar'd with a Multitude; we may learn the Influence of Society, in exciting and ſupporting any Emotion;

* It ſeems certain, both from Reaſon and Experience, that a rude, untaught Savage regulates chiefly his Love and Hatred by the Ideas of private Utility and Injury, and has but faint Conceptions of a general Rule or Syſtem of Behaviour. The Man, who ſtands oppoſite to him in Battle, he hates heartily, not only for the preſent Moment, which is almoſt unavoidable, but for ever after; nor is he ſatisfy'd without the moſt extreme Puniſhment and Vengeance. But we, accuſtom'd to Society and to more enlarg'd Reflections, conſider, that this Man is ſerving his own Country and Community; that any Man, in the ſame Situation, would do the ſame; that we ourſelves, in like Circumſtances, obſerve a like Conduct; that in general human Society is beſt ſupported on ſuch Maxims: And by theſe Suppoſitions and Views, we correct, in ſome Meaſure, our ruder and narrower Paſſions. And tho' much of our Friendſhip and Enmity be ſtill regulated by private Conſiderations of Benefit and Harm, we pay, at leaſt, this Homage to general Rules, which we are accuſtom'd to reſpect, that we commonly pervert our Adverſary's Conduct, by imputing Malice or Injuſtice to him, in order to give Vent to thoſe Paſſions, which ariſe from Self-love and private Intereſt. When the Heart is full of Rage, it never wants Pretexts of this Nature; tho' ſometimes as frivolous, as thoſe, from which *Horace*, being almoſt cruſh'd by the Fall of a Tree, affects to accuſe of Parricide the firſt Planter of it.

while

while the moſt ungovernable Diſorders are rais'd, we find, by that Means, from the ſlighteſt and moſt frivolous Occaſions. *Solon* was no very cruel, tho', perhaps, an unjuſt Legiſlator, who puniſh'd Neuters in civil Wars; and few, I believe, would, in ſuch Caſes, incur the Penalty, were their Affection and Diſcourſe allow'd ſufficient to abſolve them. No Selfiſhneſs, and ſcarce any Philoſophy, has there Force ſufficient to ſupport a total Coolneſs and Indifference; and he muſt be more or leſs than Man, who kindles not in the common Blaze. What Wonder, then, that moral Sentiments are found of ſuch Influence in Life; tho' ſpringing from Principles, which may appear, at firſt Sight, ſomewhat ſmall and delicate? But theſe Principles, we muſt remark, are ſocial and univerſal: They form, in a Manner, the *Party* of Human-kind againſt Vice or Diſorder, its common Enemy: And as the benevolent Concern for others is diffus'd, in a greater or leſs Degree, over all Men, and is the ſame in all, it occurs more frequently in Diſcourſe, is foſter'd by Society and Converſation, and the Blame and Approbation, conſequent on it, are thereby rouz'd from that Lethargy, into which they are probably lull'd, in ſolitary and uncultivated Nature. Other Paſſions, tho' perhaps originally ſtronger, yet being ſelfiſh and private, are often over-power'd by its Force, and yield

yield the Dominion of our Breaſt to thoſe ſocial and public Principles.

ANOTHER Spring of our Conſtitution, that brings great Addition of Force to moral Sentiment, is, the Love of Fame; which rules, with ſuch uncontrol'd Authority, in all generous Minds, and is often the grand Object of all their Deſigns and Undertakings. By our continual and earneſt Purſuit of a Character, a Name, a Reputation in the World, we bring our own Deportment and Conduct frequently in Review, and conſider how they appear in the Eyes of thoſe, who approach and regard us. This conſtant Habit of ſurveying ourſelf, as it were, in Reflexion, keeps alive all the Sentiments of Right and Wrong, and begets, in noble Natures, a certain Reverence for themſelves as well as others; which is the ſureſt Guardian of every Virtue. The animal Conveniencies and Pleaſures ſink gradually in their Value; while every inward Beauty and moral Grace is ſtudiouſly acquir'd, and the Mind is accompliſh'd in each Perfection, that can adorn or embelliſh a rational Creature.

HERE is the moſt perfect Morality we are acquainted with: Here is diſplay'd the Force of many Sympathies. Our moral Sentiment is itſelf a Feeling chiefly of that Nature: And our Regard to a Cha-

racter

racter with others ſeems to ariſe only from a Care of preſerving a Character with ourſelves, in order to which we find it neceſſary to prop our tottering Judgment on the correſpondent Approbation of Mankind.

BUT in order to accommodate Matters, and remove, if poſſible, every Difficulty, let us allow all theſe Reaſonings to be falſe. Let us allow, that when we reſolve the Pleaſure, that ariſes from Views of Utility, into the Sentiments of Humanity and Sympathy, we have embrac'd a wrong Hypotheſis. Let us confeſs it neceſſary to find ſome other Explication of that Applauſe, which is paid to all Objects, whether inanimate, animate or rational, if they have a Tendency to promote the Welfare and Advantage of others. However difficult it be to conceive, that an Object is approv'd of, on Account of its Tendency to a certain End, while the End itſelf is totally indifferent; let us ſwallow this Abſurdity, and conſider what are the Conſequences. The preceding Delineation or Definition of VIRTUE muſt ſtill retain its Evidence and Authority: It muſt ſtill be allow'd, that every Quality of the Mind, which is *uſeful* or *agreeable* to the *Perſon himſelf* or to *others*, communicates a Pleaſure to the Spectator, engages his Eſteem, and is admitted under the honourable Denomination of Virtue or Merit. Are not

not Juſtice, Fidelity, Honour, Veracity, Allegiance, Chaſtity eſteem'd ſolely on Account of their Tendency to promote the Good of Society? Is not that Tendency inſeperable from Humanity, Benevolence, Lenity, Generoſity, Gratitude, Moderation, Tenderneſs, Friendſhip, and all the other ſocial Virtues? Can it poſſibly be doubted, that Induſtry, Diſcretion, Frugality, Secrecy, Order, Perſeverance, Forethought, Judgment, and that whole Claſs of Virtues, of which many Pages would not contain the Catalogue; can it be be doubted, I ſay, that the Tendency of theſe Virtues to promote the Intereſt and Happineſs of their Poſſeſſor is the ſole Foundation of their Merit? Who can diſpute that a Mind, which ſupports a perpetual Serenity and Cheerfulneſs, a noble Dignity and undaunted Spirit, a tender Affection and Good-will to all around; as it has more Enjoyment within itſelf, is alſo a more animating and rejoicing Spectacle, than if dejected with Melancholy, tormented with Anxiety, irritated with Rage, or ſunk into the moſt abject Baſeneſs and Degeneracy? And as to the Qualities, immediately *agreeable to others*, they ſpeak ſufficiently for themſelves; and he muſt be unhappy, indeed, either in his own Temper, or in his Situation and Circumſtances, who has never perceiv'd the Charms of a facetious Wit or flowing Affability, of a delicate

Modeſty

Modeſty or decent Genteelneſs of Addreſs and Manner.

I AM ſenſible, that nothing can be more unphiloſophical than to be poſitive or dogmatical on any Subject; and that, even if *exceſſive* Scepticiſm could be maintain'd, it would not be more deſtructive to all juſt Reaſoning and Enquiry. I am convinc'd, that, where Men are the muſt ſure and arrogant, they are commonly the moſt miſtaken, and have there given Reins to Paſſion, without that proper Deliberation and Suſpence, which can alone ſecure them from the groſſeſt Abſurdities. Yet I muſt confeſs, that this Enumeration puts the Matter in ſo ſtrong a Light, that I cannot, *at preſent*, be more aſſur'd of any Truth, which I learn from Reaſoning and Argument, than that Virtue conſiſts altogether in the Uſefulneſs or Agreeableneſs of Qualities to the Perſon himſelf, poſſeſt of them, or to others, who have any Intercourſe with him. But when I reflect, that, tho' the Bulk and Figure of the Earth have been meaſur'd and delineated, tho' the Motions of the Tides have been accounted for, the Order and Œconomy of the heavenly Bodies ſubjected to their proper Laws, and INFINITE itſelf reduc'd to Calculation; yet Men ſtill diſpute concerning the Foundation of their moral Duties: When I reflect on this, I ſay, I fall back into Diffidence and Scepticiſm,

ticiſm, and ſuſpect, that an Hypotheſis, ſo obvious had it been a true one, would, long 'ere now, have been receiv'd, by the unanimous Suffrage and Conſent of Mankind.

PART II.

THERE remains nothing, but to conſider briefly our *Obligation* to Virtue, and to enquire, whether every Man, who has any Regard to his own Happineſs and Welfare, will not beſt find his Account in the Practice of every moral Duty. If this can be clearly aſcertain'd from the foregoing Theory, we ſhall have the Satisfaction to reflect, that we have advanc'd Principles, which not only, 'tis hop'd, will ſtand the Teſt of Reaſoning and Enquiry, but may contribute to the Amendment of Men's Lives, and their Improvement in Morality and ſocial Virtue. And tho' the philoſophical Truth of any Propoſition by no Means depends on its Tendency to promote the Intereſt of Society; yet a Man has but a bad Grace, who delivers a Theory, however true, which, he muſt confeſs, leads to a Practice, dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into thoſe Corners of Nature, which ſpread a Nuiſance all around? Why dig up the Peſtilence from the Pit, in which it is bury'd? The Ingenuity of your Reſearches

Reſearches may be admir'd; but your Syſtems will be deteſted: And Mankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to ſink them, at leaſt, in eternal Silence and Oblivion: Truths, which are *pernicious* to Society, if any ſuch there be, will yield to Errors, which are ſalutary and *advantageous*.

But what philoſophical Truths can be more advantageous to Society, than thoſe here deliver'd, which repreſent Virtue in all her genuine and moſt engaging Charms, and make us approach her with Eaſe, Familiarity and Affection? The diſmal Dreſs falls off, with which many Divines, and ſome Philoſophers had cover'd her; and nothing appears but Gentleneſs, Humanity, Beneficence, Affability; nay even, at proper Intervals, Play, Frolic, and Gaiety. She talks not of uſeleſs Auſterities and Rigors, Sufferance and Self-denial. She declares, that her ſole Purpoſe is, to make her Votaries and all Mankind, during every Inſtant of their Exiſtence, if poſſible, cheerful and happy; nor does ſhe ever willingly part with any Pleaſure but in Hopes of ample Compenſation in ſome other Period of their Lives. The ſole Trouble ſhe demands is that of juſt Calculation, and a ſteddy Preference of the greater Happineſs. And if any auſtere Pretenders approach her, Enemies to Joy and Pleaſure, ſhe either rejects them as Hypocrites and Deceivers, or, if ſhe admits them in her Train,

Train, they are rank'd, however, among the leaſt favour'd of her Votaries.

AND indeed, to drop all figurative Expreſſion, what Hopes can we ever have of engaging Mankind to a Practice, which we confeſs full of Auſterity and Rigour? Or what Morality can ever ſerve any uſeful Purpoſe, unleſs it can ſhow, by a particular Detail, that all the Duties it recommends, are alſo the true Intereſt of each Individual? And the peculiar Advantage of the foregoing Theory, ſeems to be, that it furniſhes proper Mediums for that Purpoſe.

THAT the Virtues, which are immediately *uſeful* or *agreeable* to the Perſon, poſſeſt of them, are deſirable in a View to Self-intereſt, it would ſurely be ſuperfluous to prove. Moraliſts, indeed, may ſpare themſelves all the Pains they often take in recommending theſe Duties. To what Purpoſe collect Arguments to evince, that Temperance is advantageous, and the Exceſſes of Pleaſure hurtful? When it appears, that theſe Exceſſes are only denominated ſuch, becauſe they are hurtful; and that, if the unlimited Uſe of ſtrong Liquors, for Inſtance, no more impair'd Health or the Faculties of the Mind and Body than the Uſe of Air or Water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

IT

It ſeems equally ſuperfluous to prove, that the *companionable* Virtues of Good-manners and Wit, Decency and Genteelneſs are more deſirable than the contrary Qualities. Vanity alone, without other Conſiderations, is a ſufficient Motive to make us wiſh the Poſſeſſion of theſe Accompliſhments. No Man was ever willingly deficient in this Particular. All our Failures here proceed from bad Education, Want of Capacity, or a perverſe and unpliable Diſpoſition. Would you have your Company coveted, admir'd, follow'd; rather than hated, deſpis'd, avoided? Can any one ſeriouſly deliberate in the Caſe? As no Enjoyment is ſincere, without ſome Reference to Company and Society; ſo no Society can be agreeable or even tolerable, where a Man feels his Preſence unwelcome, and diſcovers all around him Symptoms of Averſion and Diſguſt.

But why, in the greater Society or Confederacy of Mankind, ſhould not the Caſe be the ſame as in particular Clubs and Companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarg'd Virtues of Humanity, Generoſity, Beneficence are deſirable with a View to Happineſs and Self-intereſt, than the limited Endowments of Ingenuity and Politeneſs? Are we apprehenſive, that thoſe ſocial Affections have a greater and more immediate Interference, than any

other Purſuits, with private Utility, and cannot be gratify'd without ſome important Sacrifices of Honour and Advantage? If ſo, we are but ill inſtructed in the Nature of the human Paſſions, and are more influenc'd by verbal Diſtinctions than by real Differences.

WHATEVER Contradiction, may vulgarly be ſuppos'd betwixt the *ſocial* and *ſelfiſh* Sentiments or Diſpoſitions, they are really no more oppoſite than ſelfiſh and ambitious, ſelfiſh and revengeful, ſelfiſh and vain. 'Tis requiſite there be an original Propenſity of ſome Kind, in order to be a Baſis to Self-love, by giving a Reliſh to the Objects of its Purſuit; and none more fit for this Purpoſe than Beneficence or Humanity. The Goods of Fortune are ſpent in one Gratification or other: The Miſer, who accumulates his annual Income, and lends it out at Intereſt, has really ſpent it in the Gratification of his Avarice. And 'twould be difficult to ſhow, why a Man is more a Loſer by a generous Action, than by any other Method of Expence; ſince the utmoſt he can attain, by the moſt elaborate Selfiſhneſs, is the Indulgence of ſome Affection.

Now if Life, without Paſſion, muſt be altogether inſipid and tireſome; let a Man ſuppoſe he has full Power of modelling his own Diſpoſition, and let him

him deliberate what Appetite or Deſire he would chooſe for the Foundation of his Happineſs and Enjoyment. Every Affection, he would obſerve, when gratify'd by Succeſs, gives a Satisfaction, proportion'd to its Force and Violence; but beſides this Advantage, common to all, the immediate Feeling of Benevolence and Friendſhip, Humanity and Kindneſs, is ſweet, ſmooth, tender, and agreeable, independent of all Fortune and Accidents. Theſe Virtues are beſides attended with a pleaſing Conſciouſneſs and Remembrance, and keep us in Humour with ourſelves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable Reflection of having done our Part towards Mankind and Society. And tho' all Men ſhow a Jealouſy of our Succeſs in the Purſuits of Avarice or Ambition; yet are we almoſt ſure of their Good-will and Good-wiſhes, ſo long as we perſevere in the Paths of Virtue, and employ ourſelves in the Execution of generous Plans and Purpoſes. What other Paſſion is there, where we ſhall find ſo many Advantages united; an agreeable Sentiment, a pleaſing Conſciouſneſs, a good Reputation? But of theſe Truths, we may obſerve, Men are, of themſelves, pretty much convinc'd; nor are they deficient in their Duty to Society, becauſe they would not wiſh to be generous, friendly, and humane; but becauſe they do not feel themſelves ſuch.

TREATING

TREATING Vice with the greateſt Candour, and making it all poſſible Conceſſions, we muſt acknowledge, that there is not, in any Inſtance, the ſmalleſt Pretext for giving it the Preference above Virtue, with a View to Self-intereſt; except, perhaps, in the Caſe of Juſtice, where a Man, taking Things in a certain Light, may often ſeem to be a Loſer by his Integrity. And tho' 'tis acknowledg'd, that, without a Regard to Property, no Society could ſubſiſt; yet according to the imperfect Way, in which human Affairs are conducted, a ſenſible Knave, in particular Incidents, may think, that an Act of Iniquity or Infidelity will make a conſiderable Addition to his Fortune, without cauſing any conſiderable Breach in the ſocial Union and Confederacy. That *Honeſty is the beſt Policy*, may be a good general Rule; but is liable to many Exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be judg'd, conducts himſelf with moſt Wiſdom, who obſerves the general Rule, and takes Advantage of all the Exceptions.

I MUST confeſs, that if a Man thinks, that this Reaſoning much requires an Anſwer, 'twill be a little difficult to find any, that will to him appear ſatisfactory and convincing. If his Heart does not rebel againſt ſuch pernicious Maxims, if he feels no

Reluctance to the Thoughts of Villainy or Baſeneſs, he has indeed loſt a conſiderable Motive to Virtue; and we may expect, that his Practice will be anſwerable to his Speculation. But in all ingenuous Natures, the Antipathy to Treachery and Roguery is too ſtrong to be counter-ballanc'd by any Views of Profit or pecuniary Advantage. Inward Peace of Mind, Conſciouſneſs of Integrity, a ſatisfactory Review of our own Conduct; theſe are Circumſtances very requiſite to Happineſs, and will be cheriſh'd and cultivated by every honeſt Man, who feels the Importance of them.

Such a one has, beſides, the frequent Satisfaction of ſeeing Knaves, with all their pretended Cunning and Ability, betray'd by their own Maxims; and while they purpoſe to cheat only with Moderation and Secrecy, a tempting Incident occurs, Nature is frail, and they give into the Snare; whence they can never extricate themſelves, without a total Loſs of Reputation, and the Forfeiture of all future Truſt and Confidence with Mankind.

But were they ever ſo ſecret and ſucceſsful, the honeſt Man, if he has any Tincture of Philoſophy, or even common Obſervation and Reflection, will diſcover, that they themſelves are, in the End, the greateſt Dupes, and have ſacrific'd the invaluable

Enjoyment of a Character, with themſelves at leaſt, for the Acquiſition of worthleſs Toys and Gewgaws. How little is requiſite to ſupply the *Neceſſities* of Nature? And in the View of *Pleaſure*, what Compariſon betwixt the unbought Satisfactions of Converſation, Society, Study, even Health and the common Beauties of Nature, but eſpecially the peaceful Reflection on one's own Conduct: What Compariſon, I ſay, betwixt theſe, and the feveriſh, empty Amuſements of Luxury and Expence? Theſe natural Pleaſures, indeed, are really without Price; both becauſe they are below all Price in their Attainment, and above it in their Enjoyment.

APPENDIX I.

Concerning moral SENTIMENT.

IF the foregoing Hypotheſis be receiv'd, 'twill now be eaſy for us to determine the Queſtion firſt ſtated*, concerning the general Principles of Morals; and tho' we poſtpon'd the Deciſion of that Queſtion, leſt it ſhould then involve us in intricate Speculations, which are totally unfit for moral Diſcourſes, we may reſume it at preſent, and examine how far either *Reaſon* or *Sentiment* enters into all moral Determinations.

THE chief Foundation of moral Praiſe being ſuppos'd to lie in the Uſefulneſs of any Quality or Action; 'tis evident, that *Reaſon* muſt enter for a conſiderable Share in all Determinations of this Kind; ſince nothing but that Faculty can inſtruct us in the Tendency of Qualities and Actions, and point

* Sect. I.

out their beneficial Conſequences to Society and to their Poſſeſſors. In many Caſes, this is an Affair liable to great Controverſy: Doubts may ariſe; oppoſite Intereſts occur; and a Preference muſt be given to one Side, from very nice Views and a ſmall Overballance of Utility. This is particularly remarkable in Queſtions with regard to Juſtice; as is, indeed, natural to ſuppoſe from that Species of Utility, which attends this Virtue *. Were every ſingle Inſtance of Juſtice, like that of Benevolence, beneficial and uſeful to Society; this would be a more ſimple State of the Caſe, and ſeldom liable to great Controverſy. But as ſingle Inſtances of Juſtice are often pernicious, in their firſt and immediate Tendency, and as the Advantage to Society reſults only from the Obſervance of the general Rule, and from the Concurrence and Combination of ſeveral Perſons in the ſame equitable Conduct; the Caſe here becomes more intricate and involv'd. The various Circumſtances of Society; the various Conſequences of any Practice; the various Intereſts, which may be propos'd: Theſe on many Occaſions are doubtful, and ſubject to great Diſcuſſion and Enquiry. The Object of municipal Laws is to fix all Queſtions with regard to Juſtice: The Debates of Civilians; the Reflections of Politicians; the Pre-

* See Appendix II.

cedents

cedents of Hiſtories and public Records, are all directed to the ſame Purpoſe. And a very accurate *Reaſon* or *Judgment* is often requiſite, to give the true Determination, amidſt ſuch intricate Doubts ariſing from obſcure or oppoſite Utilities.

BUT tho' Reaſon, when fully aſſiſted and improv'd, be ſufficient to inſtruct us in the pernicious or uſeful Tendencies of Qualities and Actions; it is not alone ſufficient to produce any moral Blame or Approbation. Utility is only a Tendency to a certain End; and were the End totally indifferent to us, we ſhould feel the ſame Indifference towards the Means. 'Tis requiſite a *Sentiment* ſhould here diſplay itſelf, in order to give a Preference to the uſeful above the pernicious Tendencies. This Sentiment can be no other than a Feeling for the Happineſs of Mankind, and a Reſentment of their Miſery; ſince theſe are the different Ends, which Virtue and Vice have a Tendency to promote. Here therefore, *Reaſon* inſtructs us in the ſeveral Tendencies of Actions, and *Humanity* makes a Diſtinction in favour of thoſe, which are uſeful and beneficial.

THIS Partition betwixt the Faculties of Underſtanding and Sentiment, in all moral Deciſions, ſeems clear from the preceding Hypotheſis. But I ſhall ſuppoſe that Hypotheſis falſe: 'Twill then be

requiſite to look out for ſome other Theory, that may be ſatisfactory; and I dare venture to affirm, that none ſuch will ever be found, as long as we ſuppoſe Reaſon to be the ſole Source of Morals. To prove this, it will be proper to weigh the five following Conſiderations.

I. 'Tis eaſy for a falſe Hypotheſis to maintain ſome Appearance of Truth, while it keeps altogether in Generals, makes uſe of undefin'd Terms, and employs Compariſons, inſtead of Inſtances. This is particularly remarkable in that Philoſophy, which aſcribes the Diſcernment of all moral Diſtinctions to Reaſon alone without the Concurrence of Sentiment. 'Tis impoſſible, in any particular Inſtance, that this Hypotheſis can ſo much as be render'd intelligible; whatever ſpecious Figure it may make in general Declamations and Diſcourſes. Examine the Crime of *Ingratitude*, for Inſtance; which has Place, wherever we obſerve Good-will, expreſt and known, along with Good-offices perform'd, on the one Side, and a Return of Ill-will or Indifference, with Ill-offices or Neglect, on the other: Anatomize all theſe Circumſtances, and examine, by your Reaſon alone, wherein conſiſts the Demerit or Blame: You never will come to any Iſſue or Concluſion.

REASON judges either of *Matter of Fact* or of *Relations*. Enquire then, *firſt*, where is that Matter of Fact, which we here call *Crime*; point it out; determine the Time of its Exiſtence; deſcribe its Eſſence or Nature; explain the Senſe or Faculty, to which it diſcovers itſelf. It reſides in the Mind of the Perſon, who is ungrateful. He muſt, therefore, feel it and be conſcious of it. But nothing is there, except the Paſſion of Ill-will or abſolute Indifference. You cannot ſay, that theſe, of themſelves, always, and in all Circumſtances, are Crimes. No: They are only Crimes, when directed towards Perſons, who have before expreſt and diſplay'd Good-will towards us. Conſequently, we may infer, that the Crime of Ingratitude is not any particular individual *Fact*; but ariſes from a Complication of Circumſtances, which, being preſented to the Spectator, excites the *Sentiment* of Blame, by the particular Structure and Fabric of his Mind.

THIS Repreſentation, you ſay, is falſe. Crime, indeed, conſiſts not in a particular *Fact*, of whoſe Reality we are aſſur'd by *Reaſon*: But it conſiſts in certain *moral Relations*, diſcoverable by Reaſon, in the ſame Manner as we diſcover, by Reaſon, the Truths of Geometry or Algebra. But what are the Relations, I aſk, of which you here talk? In

the Caſe ſtated above, I ſee firſt Good-will and Good-offices, in one Perſon; then Ill-will and Ill-offices in the other: Betwixt theſe, there is the Relation of *Contrariety*. Does the Crime conſiſt in that Relation? But ſuppoſe a Perſon bore me Ill-will or did me Ill-offices; and I, in return, were indifferent towards him, or did him Good-offices: Here is the ſame Relation of *Contrariety*; and yet my Conduct is highly laudable. Twiſt and turn this Matter, as much as you will, you can never reſt the Morality on Relation; but muſt have Recourſe to the Deciſions of Sentiment.

When 'tis affirm'd, that two and three are equal to the half of ten; this Relation of Equality, I underſtand perfectly. I conceive, that if ten be divided into two Parts, of which one has as many Unites as the other; and if any of theſe Parts be compar'd to two added to three, it will contain as many Unites as that compound Number. But when you draw thence a Compariſon to moral Relations, I own, I am altogether at a loſs to underſtand you. A moral Action, a Crime, ſuch as Ingratitude, is a complicated Object. Does the Morality conſiſt in the Relation of its Parts to each other. How? After what Manner? Specify the Relation: Be more particular and explicite in your Propoſitions; and you will eaſily ſee their Falſhood.

No,

No, ſay you, the Morality conſiſts in the Relation of Actions to the Rule of Right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they agree or diſagree with it. What then is this Rule of Right? Wherein does it conſiſt? How is it determin'd? By Reaſon, you'll ſay, which examines the moral Relations of Actions. So that moral Relations are determin'd by the Compariſon of Actions to a Rule. And that Rule is determin'd by conſidering the moral Relations of Objects. Is not this fine Reaſoning?

ALL this is Metaphyſics, you cry. That is enough: There needs nothing more to give a ſtrong Preſumption of Falſhood. Yes, reply I: Here are Metaphyſics ſurely: But they are all on your Side, who advance an abſtruſe Hypotheſis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate to any particular Inſtance or Illuſtration. The Hypotheſis we embrace is plain. It maintains, that Morality is determin'd by Sentiment. It defines Virtue to be, *whatever mental Action or Quality gives to a Spectator the pleaſing Sentiment of Approbation*; and Vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain Matter of Fact, *viz.* what Actions have this Influence: We conſider all the Circumſtances, in which theſe Actions agree: And from thence endeavour to

extract ſome general Obſervations with regard to theſe Sentiments. If you call this Metaphyſics, and find any thing abſtruſe here, you need only conclude, that your Turn of Mind is not ſuited to the moral Sciences.

II. When a Man, at any Time, deliberates concerning his own Conduct, (as, whether he had better, in a particular Emergence, aſſiſt a Brother or a Benefactor) he muſt conſider theſe ſeparate Relations, with the whole Circumſtances and Situation of the Perſons, in order to determine his ſuperior Duty and Obligation: And in order to determine the Proportion of Lines in any Triangle, 'tis neceſſary to examine the Nature of that Figure, and the Relations, which its ſeveral Parts bear to each other. But notwithſtanding this apparent Similarity in the two Caſes, there is, at the bottom, an extreme Difference betwixt them. A ſpeculative Reaſoner concerning Triangles or Circles conſiders the ſeveral known and given Relations of the Parts of theſe Figures; and from thence infers ſome unknown Relation, which is dependent on the former. But in moral Deliberations, we muſt be acquainted, before-hand, with all the Objects, and all their Relations to each other; and from a Compariſon of the whole, fix our Choice or Approbation No new Fact to be aſcertain'd: No new Relation to be diſcover'd.

diſcover'd. The whole Circumſtances of the Caſe are ſuppos'd to be laid before us, 'ere we can fix any Sentence of Blame or Approbation. If any material Circumſtance be yet unknown or doubtful, we muſt firſt employ our Enquiry or intellectual Faculties to aſſure us of it; and ſuſpend for a Time all moral Deciſion or Sentiment. While we are ignorant, whether a Man was Aggreſſor or not, how can we determine, whether the Perſon, who kill'd him, be criminal or innocent? But after every Circumſtance, every Relation is known, the Underſtanding has no farther Room to operate, nor any Object, on which it could employ itſelf. The Approbation or Blame, which then enſues, cannot be the Work of the Judgment, but of the Heart, and is not a ſpeculative Propoſition or Affirmation, but an active Feeling or Sentiment. In the Diſquiſitions of the Underſtanding, from known Circumſtances and Relations, we infer ſome new and unknown. In moral Deciſions, the whole Circumſtances and Relations muſt be antecedently known; and the Mind, from the Contemplation of the Whole, feels ſome new Impreſſion of Affection or Diſguſt, Eſteem or Contempt, Approbation or Blame.

HENCE the great Difference betwixt a Miſtake of *Fact* and one of *Right*; and hence the Reaſon, why the one is commonly criminal and not the other.

When

When *OEdipus* kill'd *Laius*, he was ignorant of the Relation, and from Circumſtances, innocent and involuntary, form'd erroneous Opinions concerning the Action he committed. But when *Nero* kill'd *Agrippina*, all the Relations betwixt himſelf and the Perſon, and all the Circumſtances of the Fact were antecedently known to him: But the Motive of Revenge, or Fear or Intereſt, in his ſavage Heart, prevail'd over the Sentiments of Duty and Humanity. And when we expreſs a Deteſtation againſt him, to which he, himſelf, in a little Time, became inſenſible; 'tis not, that we ſee any Relations, of which he was ignorant, but that, from the Rectitude of our Diſpoſition, we feel Sentiments, againſt which he was harden'd, from Flattery and a long Perſeverance in the moſt enormous Crimes. In theſe Sentiments, then, not in a Diſcovery of Relations of any Kind, do all moral Determinations conſiſt. Before we can pretend to form any Deciſion of this Kind, every Thing muſt be known and aſcertain'd on the Side of the Object or Action. Nothing remains but to feel, on our Part, ſome Sentiment of Blame or Approbation, whence we pronounce the Action criminal or virtuous.

III. This Doctrine will become ſtill more evident, if we compare moral Beauty with natural, to which, in many Particulars, it bears ſo near a Reſemblance.

'Tis

'Tis on the Proportion, Relation, and Poſition of Parts, that all natural Beauty depends; but 'twould be abſurd thence to infer, that the Perception of Beauty, like that of Truth in geometrical Problems, conſiſts altogether in the Perception of Relations, and was perform'd entirely by the Underſtanding or intellectual Faculties. In all the Sciences, our Mind, from the known Relations, inveſtigates the unknown: But in all Deciſions of Taſte or external Beauty, the whole Relations are before-hand obvious to the Eye, and we thence proceed to feel a Sentiment of Complacency or Diſguſt, according to the Nature of the Object, and Diſpoſition of our Organs.

EUCLID has fully explain'd all the Qualities of the Circle; but has not, in any Propoſition, ſaid a Word of its Beauty. The Reaſon is evident. The Beauty is not a Quality of the Circle. It lies not in any Part of the Line, whoſe Parts are all equally diſtant from a common Center. It is only the Effect, which that Figure operates upon the Mind, whoſe peculiar Fabric or Structure renders it ſuſceptible of ſuch Sentiments. In vain, would you look for it in the Circle, or ſeek it, either by your Senſes or by mathematical Reaſonings, in all the Properties of that Figure.

ATTEND to *Palladio* and *Perrault*, while they explain all the Parts and Proportions of a Pillar: They talk of the Cornice and Freeze and Base and Entablature and Shaft and Architrave; and give the Description and Position of each of these Members. But should you ask the Description and Position of its Beauty, they would readily reply, that the Beauty is not any of the Parts or Members of a Pillar, but results from the Whole, when that complicated Figure is presented to an intelligent Mind, susceptible of those finer Sensations. Till such a Spectator appear, there is nothing but a Figure of such particular Dimensions and Proportions: From his Sentiments alone arises its Elegance and Beauty.

AGAIN; attend to *Cicero*, while he paints the Crimes of a *Verres* or a *Catiline*; you must acknowledge, that the moral Turpitude results, in the same Manner, from the Contemplation of the Whole, when presented to a Being, whose Organs have such a particular Structure and Formation. The Orator may paint Rage, Insolence, Barbarity on the one Side: Meekness, Sufferance, Sorrow, Innocence on the other: But if you feel no Indignation or Compassion arise in you from this Complication of Circumstances, you would in vain ask him, wherein consists the Crime or Villainy, which he so vehemently

mently exclaims againſt: At what Time, or on what Subject it firſt began to exiſt: And what has a few Months afterwards become of it, when every Diſpoſition and Thought of all the Actors is totally alter'd or annihilated. No ſatisfactory Anſwer can be given to any of theſe Queſtions, upon the abſtract Hypotheſis of Morals; and we muſt at laſt acknowledge, that the Crime or Immorality is no particular Fact or Relation, which can be the Object of the Underſtanding: But ariſes altogether from the Sentiment of Diſapprobation, which, by the Structure of human Nature, we unavoidably feel on the Apprehenſion of Barbarity or Treachery.

IV. INANIMATE Objects may bear to each other all the ſame Relations, which we obſerve in moral Agents; tho' the former can never be the Object of Love or Hatred, nor are conſequently ſuſceptible of Merit or Iniquity. A young Tree, that over-tops or deſtroys its Parent, from whoſe Seed it ſprung, ſtands in all the ſame Relations with *Nero*, when he murder'd *Agrippina*; and if Morality conſiſted in any abſtract Relations, would, no doubt, be equally criminal.

V. IT appears evident, that the ultimate Ends of human Actions can never, in any Caſe, be accounted for by *Reaſon*, but recommend themſelves entirely to the

the Sentiments and Affections of Mankind, without any Dependance on the intellectual Faculties. Aſk a Man, *why he uſes Exerciſe*; he will anſwer, *becauſe he deſires to keep his Health.* If you then enquire, *why he deſires Health*, he will readily reply, *becauſe Sickneſs is painful.* If you puſh your Enquiries farther, and deſire a Reaſon, *why he hates Pain*, 'tis impoſſible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate End, and is never refer'd to any other Object.

PERHAPS, to your ſecond Queſtion, *why he deſires Health*, he may alſo reply, that *'tis requiſite for the Exerciſe of his Calling.* If you aſk, *why he is anxious on that head*, he will anſwer, *becauſe he deſires to get Money.* If you demand, *Why? It is the Inſtrument of Pleaſure*, ſays he. And beyond this, 'tis an Abſurdity to aſk for a Reaſon. 'Tis impoſſible there can be a Progreſs *in infinitum*; and that one Thing can always be the Reaſon, why another is deſir'd. Something muſt be deſirable on its own Account, and becauſe of its immediate Accord or Agreement with human Sentiment and Affection.

Now as Virtue is an End, and is deſirable on its own Account, without Fee or Reward, merely for the immediate Satisfaction it conveys; 'tis requiſite there ſhould be ſome Sentiment, which it touches; ſome internal Taſte or Feeling, or whatever you pleaſe

pleaſe to call it, which diſtinguiſhes moral Good and Evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.

THUS the diſtinct Boundaries and Offices of *Reaſon* and *Taſte* are eaſily aſcertain'd. The former conveys the Knowledge of Truth and Falſhood: The latter gives the Sentiment of Beauty and Deformity, Vice and Virtue. The one diſcovers Objects, as they really ſtand in Nature, without Addition or Diminution: The other has a productive Faculty, and guilding or ſtaining all natural Objects with the Colours, borrow'd from internal Sentiment, raiſes in a Manner, a new Creation. Reaſon, being cool and diſengag'd, is no Motive to Action, and directs only the Impulſe, receiv'd from Appetite or Inclination, by ſhowing us the Means of obtaining Happineſs or avoiding Miſery: Taſte, as it gives Pleaſure or Pain, and thereby conſtitutes Happineſs or Miſery, becomes a Motive to Action, and is the firſt Spring or Impulſe to Deſire and Volition. From Circumſtances and Relations, known or ſuppos'd, the former leads us to the Diſcovery of the conceal'd and unknown: After all Circumſtances and Relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the Whole a new Sentiment of Blame or Approbation. The Standard of the one, being founded on the Nature of Things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the

the Will of the Supreme Being: The Standard of the other, ariſing from the internal Frame and Conſtitution of Animals, is ultimately deriv'd from that Supreme Will, who beſtow'd on each being its peculiar Nature, and arrang'd the ſeveral Claſſes and Orders of Exiſtence.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX II.

Some farther Conſiderations with regard to JUSTICE.

THE Intention of this Appendix is to give ſome more particular Explication of the Origin and Nature of Juſtice, and mark ſome Differences betwixt it and the other Virtues.

THE ſocial Virtues of Humanity and Benevolence exert their Influence immediately, by a direct Tendency or Inſtinct, which keeps chiefly in View the ſimple Object, that moves the Affections, and comprehends not any Scheme or Syſtem, nor the Conſequences reſulting from the Concurrence, Imitation, or Example of others. A Parent flies to the Relief of his Child; tranſported by that natural Sympathy, which actuates him, and which affords no Leiſure to reflect on the Sentiments or Conduct of the reſt of Mankind in like Circumſtances. A generous Man

Man embraces cheerfully an Opportunity of ſerving his Friend; becauſe he then feels himſelf under the Dominion of the beneficent Affections, nor is he concern'd whether any other Perſon in the Univerſe was ever before actuated by ſuch noble Motives, or will ever afterwards prove their Influence. In all theſe Caſes, the ſocial Paſſions have in View a ſingle individual Object, and purſue alone the Safety or Happineſs of the Perſon, lov'd and eſteem'd. With this, they are ſatisfy'd: In this, they acquieſce. And as the Good reſulting from their benign Influence, is in itſelf compleat and entire, it alſo excites the moral Sentiment of Approbation, without any Reflection on farther Conſequences, or more enlarg'd Views of the Concurrence or Imitation of the other Members of Society. On the contrary, were the generous Friend or diſintereſted Patriot to ſtand alone in the Practice of Beneficence; this would rather inhance his Value in our Eyes, and join the Praiſe of Rarity and Novelty to his other more exalted Merits.

THE Caſe is not the ſame with the ſocial Virtues of Juſtice and Fidelity. They are highly uſeful, or indeed abſolutely neceſſary to the Well-being of Mankind: But the Benefit, reſulting from them, is not the Conſequence of every individual ſingle Act; but ariſes from the whole Scheme or Syſtem, con-

cur'd

cur'd in by the whole, or the greateſt Part of the Society. General Peace and Order is the Attendant of Juſtice or a general Abſtinence from the Poſſeſſions of others: But a particular Regard to the particular Right of one individual Citizen may frequently, conſider'd in itſelf, be attended with pernicious Conſequences. The Reſult of the ſeveral Acts is here often directly oppoſite to that of the whole Syſtem of Actions; and the former may be extremely hurtful, while the latter is, to the higheſt Degree, advantageous. Riches, inherited from a Parent, are, in a bad Man's Hand, the Inſtruments of Miſchief. The Right of Succeſſion may, in one Inſtance, be hurtful. Its Benefit ariſes only from the Obſervance of the general Rule; and 'tis ſufficient, if Compenſation be thereby made for all the Ills and Inconveniencies, which flow from particular Characters and Situations.

CYRUS, young and unexperienc'd, conſider'd only the individual Caſe before him, and reflected on its limited Fitneſs and Convenience, when he aſſign'd the long Coat to the tall Boy, and the ſhort Coat to the other of ſmaller Size. His Governor inſtructed him better; while he pointed out more enlarg'd Views and Conſequences, and inform'd his Pupil of the general, inflexible Rules, requiſite to ſupport general Peace and Order in Society.

The Happineſs and Proſperity of Mankind, ariſing from the ſocial Virtue of Benevolence and its Subdiviſions, may be compar'd to a Wall, built by many Hands; which ſtill riſes by each Stone, that is heap'd upon it, and receives proportional Encreaſe to the Diligence and Care of each Workman. The ſame Happineſs, rais'd by the ſocial Virtue of Juſtice and its Subdiviſions, may be compar'd to the building of a Vault, where each individual Stone would, of itſelf, fall to the Ground; nor does the whole Fabric ſupport itſelf, but by the mutual Aſſiſtance and Combination of its correſpondent Parts.

All the Laws of Nature, which regulate Property, as well as all civil Laws, are general, and regard alone ſome eſſential Circumſtances of the Caſe, without taking into Conſideration the Characters, Situations and Connexions of the Perſons concern'd, or any particular Conſequences, that may reſult from the Determination of theſe Laws, in every particular Caſe, that offers. They deprive, without Scruple, a beneficent Man of all his Poſſeſſions, if acquir'd by Miſtake, without a good Title; in order to beſtow them on a ſelfiſh Miſer, who has already heap'd up immenſe Stores of ſuperfluous Riches Public Utility requires, that Property ſhould be regulated by general inflexible Rules; and tho' ſuch

ſuch Rules are adopted as beſt ſerve the ſame End of public Utility, 'tis impoſſible for them to prevent all particular Hardſhips, or make beneficial Conſequences reſult from every individual Caſe. 'Tis ſufficient, if the whole Plan or Scheme be neceſſary to the Support of civil Society, and if the Ballance of Good, in the main, does thereby preponderate much above that of Evil. Even the general Laws of the Univerſe, tho' plann'd by infinite Wiſdom, cannot exclude all Evil or Inconvenience, in every particular Operation.

It has been aſſerted by ſome, that all Juſtice ariſes from HUMAN CONVENTIONS, and proceeds from the voluntary Choice, Conſent, or Combination of Mankind. If by *Convention* be here meant a *Promiſe* (which is the moſt uſual Senſe of the Word) nothing can be more abſurd, than this Poſition. The Obſervance of Promiſes is itſelf one of the moſt conſiderable Parts of Juſtice; and we are not ſurely bound to keep our Word, becauſe we have given our Word to keep it. But if by Convention be meant a Senſe of common Intereſt; which Senſe each Man feels in his own Breaſt, which he obſerves in his Fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general Plan or Syſtem of Actions, that tend to public Utility; it muſt be own'd, that, in this Senſe, Juſtice ariſes

from human Conventions. For if it be allow'd (what is, indeed, evident) that the particular Conſequences of a particular Act of Juſtice may be hurtful to the Public as well as to Individuals; it follows, that every Man, in embracing that Virtue, muſt have an Eye to the whole Plan or Syſtem, and muſt expect the Concurrence of his Fellows in the ſame Conduct and Behaviour. Were all his Views to terminate in the particular Conſequences of each particular Act of his own, his Benevolence and Humanity, as well as Self-love, might often preſcribe to him Meaſures of Conduct very different from thoſe, which are agreeable to the ſtrict Rules of Right and Juſtice.

Thus two Men pull the Oars of a Boat, by common Convention, for common Intereſt, without any Promiſe or Contract: Thus Gold and Silver are made the Meaſures of Exchange; thus Speech and Words and Language are fixt, by human Convention and Agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more Perſons, if all perform their Part; but what loſes all Advantage, if only one perform, can ariſe from no other Principle. There would otherwiſe be no Motive for any one of them to enter into that Scheme of Conduct *.

The

* This Theory concerning the Origin of Property, and conſequently of Juſtice is, in the main, the ſame with that hinted at and

THE Word, *natural*, is commonly taken in ſo many Senſes, and is of ſuch looſe Signification, that it ſeems to little Purpoſe to diſpute, whether Juſtice be natural or not. If Self-love, if Benevolence be natural to Man; if Reaſon and Forethought be alſo natural; then may the ſame Epithet be apply'd to Juſtice, Order, Fidelity, Property, Society. Men's Inclination, their Neceſſities lead them to combine; their Underſtanding and Experience tell them, that this Combination is impoſſible, where each governs himſelf by no Rule, and pays no Regard to the Poſſeſſions of others: And from theſe Paſſions and Reflections conjoin'd, as ſoon as we obſerve

and adopted by *Grotius*. *Hinc diſcimus, quæ fuerit cauſa, ob quam a primæva communione rerum primo mobilium, deinde & immobilium diſceſſum eſt: nimirum quod cum non contenti homines veſci ſponte natis, antra habitare, corpore aut nudo agere, aut corticibus arborum ferarumve pellibus veſtito, vitæ genus exquiſitius delegiſſent, induſtria opus fuit, quam ſinguli rebus ſingulis adhiberent: Quo minus autem fructus in commune conferrentur, primum obſtitit locorum, in quæ homines diſceſſerunt, diſtantia, deinde juſtitiæ & amoris defectus, per quem fiebat, ut nec in labore, nec in conſumtione fructuum quæ debebat, æqualitas ſervaretur. Simul diſcimus, quomodo res in proprietatem iverint; non animi actu ſolo, neque enim ſcire alii poterant, quid alii ſuum eſſe vellent, ut eo abſtinerent, & idem velle plures poterant; ſed pacto quodam aut expreſſo, ut per diviſionem, aut tacito, ut per occupationem. De jure belli & pacis. Lib. 2. Cap. 2. § 2. Art. 4 & 5.*

like Paſſions and Reflections in others, the Sentiment of Juſtice, thro' all Ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to ſome Degree or other, in every Individual of human Species. In ſo ſagacious an Animal, what neceſſarily ariſes from the Exertion of his intellectual Faculties, may juſtly be eſteem'd natural *.

Amongst all civiliz'd Nations, it has been the conſtant Endeavour to remove every Thing arbitrary and partial from the Deciſion of Property, and to fix the Sentence of Judges by ſuch general Views and Conſiderations, as may be equal to every Member of the Society. For beſides, that nothing could be more dangerous than to accuſtom the Bench, even in the ſmalleſt Inſtance, to regard private Friendſhip or Enmity; 'tis certain, that Men,

* Natural may be oppos'd, either to what is *unuſual*, *miraculous*, or *artificial*. In the two former Senſes, Juſtice and Property are undoubtedly natural. But as they ſuppoſe Reaſon, Forethought, Deſign, and a ſocial Union and Confederacy amongſt Men, perhaps, that Epithet cannot ſtrictly, in the laſt Senſe, be apply'd to them. Had Men liv'd without Society, Property had never been known, and neither Juſtice nor Injuſtice had ever exiſted. But Society amongſt human Creatures, had been impoſſible, without Reaſon and Forethought. Inferior Animals, that unite, are guided by Inſtinct, which ſupplies the Place of Reaſon. But all theſe Diſputes are merely verbal.

where

where they imagine, that there was no other Reaſon for the Preference of their Adverſary but perſonal Favour, are apt to entertain the ſtrongeſt Jealouſy and Ill-will againſt the Magiſtrates and Judges. When natural Reaſon, therefore, points out no fixt View of public Utility, by which a Controverſy of Property can be decided, poſitive Laws are often fram'd to ſupply its Place, and direct the Procedure of all Courts of Judicature. Where theſe too fail, as often happens, Precedents are call'd for; and a former Deciſion, tho' given itſelf without any ſufficient Reaſon, juſtly becomes a ſufficient Reaſon for a new Deciſion. If direct Laws and Precedents be wanting, imperfect and indirect ones are brought in Aid; and the controverted Caſe is rang'd under them, by analogical Reaſonings, and Compariſons, and Similitudes, and Correſpondencies, that are often more fanciful than real. In general, it may ſafely be aſſerted, that Juriſprudence is, in this reſpect, different from all the Sciences; and in many of its nicer Queſtions, there cannot properly be ſaid to be Truth or Falſhood on either Side. If one Pleader brings the Caſe under any former Law or Precedent, by a refin'd Analogy or Compariſon; the oppoſite Pleader is not at a Loſs to find an oppoſite Analogy or Compariſon: And the Preference given by the Judge is often founded more on Taſte and Imagination.

than on any ſolid Argument. Public Utility is the general View of all Courts of Judicature; and this Utility too requires a ſtable Rule in all Controverſies: But where ſeveral Rules, nearly equal and indifferent, preſent themſelves, 'tis a very ſlight Turn of Thought, which fixes the Deciſion in favour of either Party.

A DIA-

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DIALOGUE.

MY Friend, *Palamedes*, who is as great a Rambler in his Principles as in his Perſon, and who has run over, by Study and Travel, almoſt every Region of the intellectual and material World, ſurpriz'd me lately with an Account of a Nation, with whom, he told me, he had paſs'd a conſiderable Part of his Life, and whom he found, in the main, an extreme civiliz'd, intelligent People.

THERE is a State, ſay'd he, in the World, call'd *Fourli*, no matter for its Longitude or Latitude, whoſe Ways of thinking in many Things, particularly in Morals, are diametrically oppoſite to ours. When I came amongſt them, I found I muſt ſubmit to double Pains; firſt to learn the Meaning of the Terms in their Language, and then to know the Import of thoſe Terms, and the Praiſe or Blame attach'd to them. After a Word had been explain'd to me, and the Character, which it expreſt, had

been deſcrib'd, I concluded, that ſuch an Epithet muſt neceſſarily be the greateſt Reproach in the World; and was extremely ſurpriz'd to find one, in a public Company, apply it to a Perſon, with whom he liv'd in the ſtricteſt Intimacy and Friendſhip. *You fancy*, ſaid I, one Day, to an Acquaintance, *that* Changuis *is your mortal Enemy: I love to extinguiſh Quarrels; and I muſt, therefore, tell you, that I heard him talk of you in the moſt advantageous Manner.* But to my great Aſtoniſhment, when I repeated *Changuis*'s Words, tho' I had both remember'd and underſtood them perfectly, I found, that they were taken for the moſt mortal Affront, and that I had very innocently render'd the Breach betwixt theſe Perſons altogether irreparable.

As it was my Fortune to come amongſt this People on a very advantageous Footing, I was immediately introduc'd to the beſt Company; and being deſir'd to live with *Alcheic*, I readily accepted his Invitation, as I found him univerſally eſteem'd for his perſonal Merit; and indeed regarded by every one in *Fourli*, as a perfect Character.

One Evening he invited me, as an Amuſement, to bear him Company in a Serenade, which he intended to give *Gulki*, with whom, he told me, he was extremely enamour'd; and I ſoon found his Taſte

Taſte was not ſingular: For we met many of his Rivals, who had come on the ſame Errand. I very naturally concluded, that this Flame of his muſt be one of the fineſt Women in Town; and I already felt a ſecret Inclination to ſee her, and be acquainted with her. But as the Moon began to riſe, I was much ſurpriz'd to find, that we were in the Midſt of the Univerſity, where *Gulki* ſtudy'd: And I was ſomewhat aſham'd for having attended my Friend, on ſuch an Errand.

I WAS told afterwards, that *Alcheic*'s Choice of *Gulki* was very much approv'd of by all the good Company in Town; and that 'twas expected, while he gratify'd his own Paſſion, he would perform to that young Man the ſame good Office, which he had himſelf ow'd to *Elcouf*. It ſeems *Alcheic* had been very handſome in his Youth, and been courted by many Lovers; but had beſtow'd his Favours chiefly on the ſage *Elcouf*; to whom he was ſuppos'd to owe, in a great Meaſure, the aſtoniſhing Progreſs he had made in Philoſophy and Virtue.

IT gave me ſome Surprize, that *Alcheic*'s Wife (who by-the-bye happen'd alſo to be his Siſter) was no way ſcandaliz'd at this Species of Infidelity.

MUCH about the ſame Time I diſcover'd (for it was not attempted to be kept a Secret from me or any Body) that *Alcheic* was a Murderer and a Parricide, and had put to Death an innocent Perſon, the moſt nearly connected with him, and whom he was oblig'd to protect and defend by all the Ties of Nature and Humanity. When I aſk'd, with all the Caution and Deference imaginable, what was his Motive for this Action; he reply'd coolly, that he was not then ſo much at his Eaſe as he is at preſent, and that he had acted, in that Particular, by the Advice of all his Friends.

HAVING heard *Alcheic*'s Virtue ſo extremely celebrated, I pretended to join in the general Voice of Acclamation, and only aſk'd, by way of Curioſity, as a Stranger, which of all his noble Actions was moſt highly applauded; and I ſoon found, that all Sentiments were united in giving the Preference to the Aſſaſſination of *Usbek*. This *Usbek* had been to the laſt Moment *Alcheic*'s intimate Friend, had lay'd many high Obligations upon him, had even ſav'd his Life on a certain Occaſion, and had, by his Will, which was found after the Murder, made him his Heir to a conſiderable Part of his Fortune. *Alcheic*, it ſeems, conſpir'd with about twenty or thirty more, moſt of them alſo *Usbek*'s Friends; and falling all

together on that unhappy Man, when he was not aware, they had tore him with a hundred Wounds; and given him that Reward for all his paſt Favours and Obligations. *Usbek*, ſaid the general Voice of the People, had many great and good Qualities: His very Vices were ſhining, magnificent, and generous: But this Action of *Alcheic* ſets him far above *Usbek* in the Eyes of all Judges of Merit; and is one of the nobleſt, that ever perhaps the Sun ſhone upon.

ANOTHER Part of *Alcheic*'s Conduct, which I alſo found highly applauded, was his Behaviour towards *Caliſh*, with whom he was join'd in a Project or Undertaking of ſome Importance. *Caliſh*, being a paſſionate Man, gave *Alcheic*, one Day, a ſound Drubbing; which he took very patiently, waited the Return of *Caliſh*'s good Humour, kept ſtill a fair Correſpondence with him; and by that Means brought the Affair, in which they were join'd, to a happy Iſſue, and gain'd himſelf immortal Honour by his remarkable Temper and Moderation.

I HAVE lately receiv'd a Letter from a Correſpondent in *Fourli*, by which I learn, that ſince my Departure, *Alcheic*, falling into a bad State of Health, has fairly hang'd himſelf; and has dy'd univerſally regreted and applauded by every one in that Country. So virtuous and noble a Life, ſays each *Fourlian*,

could not be better crown'd than by ſo noble an End; and he has prov'd by this, as well as by all his other Actions, what was his conſtant Principle during his Life, and what he boaſted of near his laſt Moments, that a wiſe Man is ſcarce inferior to the great God, *Vitzli*. This is the Name of the Supreme Deity amongſt the *Fourlians*.

THE Notions of this People, continu'd *Palamedes*, are as extraordinary with regard to Good-manners and Sociableneſs, as with regard to Morals. My Friend *Alcheic* form'd once a Party for my Entertainment, compos'd of all the prime Wits and Philoſophers of *Fourli*; and each of us brought his Meſs along with him to the Place, where we aſſembled. I obſerv'd one of them to be worſe provided than the reſt, and offer'd him a Share of mine, which happen'd to be a roaſted Pullet: And I could not but remark, that he, and all the reſt of the Company ſtar'd at my Simplicity. I was told, that *Alcheic* had once ſo much Intereſt with his Club as to prevail with them to eat in common, and that he had made uſe of an Artifice to that Purpoſe. He perſuaded thoſe, whom he obſerv'd to be *worſt* provided, to offer their Meſs to the Company; after which, the others, who had brought more delicate Fare, were aſham'd not to make the ſame Offer. This is regarded as ſo extraordinary a Event, that it has ſince, as I learn,

learn, been recorded in the Hiſtory of *Alcheic*'s Life, compos'd by one of the greateſt Geniuſes of *Fourli*.

PRAY, ſays I, *Palamedes*, when you was at *Fourli*, did you alſo learn the Art of turning your Friends into Ridicule, by telling them ſtrange Stories, and then laughing at them, if they believ'd you. I aſſure you, reply'd he, that had I been diſpos'd to learn ſuch a Leſſon, there was no Place in the World more proper. My Friend, ſo often mention'd, did nothing, from Morning to Night, but ſneer, and banter, and railly; and you could ſcarce ever diſtinguiſh, whether he was in Jeſt or Earneſt: But you think, then, that my Story is improbable; and that I have us'd, or rather abus'd the Privilege of a Traveller. To be ſure, ſays I, you was but in Jeſt. Such barbarous and ſavage Manners are not only incompatible with a civiliz'd, intelligent People, ſuch as you ſaid theſe were; but are ſcarce compatible with human Nature. They exceed all we ever read of, amongſt the *Mingrelians* and *Topinamboues*.

HAVE a care, cry'd he, have a care! You are not aware you are ſpeaking Blaſphemy, and are abuſing your Favourites, the *Greeks*, eſpecially the *Athenians*, whom I have couch'd all along, under theſe bizarre Names I employ'd. If you conſider aright, there is not one Stroke of the foregoing Character,

Character, which might not be found in the Man of higheſt Merit at *Athens*, without diminiſhing, in the leaſt, from the Brightneſs of his Character. The *Greek* Love, their Marriages *, and the expoſing of their Children cannot but ſtrike you immediately. The Death of *Usbek* is an exact Counter-part to that of *Cæſar*.

ALL to a Trifle, ſay'd I, interrupting him; you did not mention, that *Usbek* was an Uſurper.

I DID not, reply'd he; leſt you ſhould diſcover the Parallel I aim'd at. But even adding this Circumſtance, we ſhould make no Scruple, according to our Sentiments of Morals, to denomitate *Brutus*, and *Caſſius*, ungrateful Traitors and Aſſaſſins: Tho' you know, that they are, perhaps, the higheſt Characters of all Antiquity; and the *Athenians* erected Statues to them; which they plac'd near thoſe of *Harmodius* and *Ariſtogiton*, their own Deliverers. And if you think this Circumſtance, you mention, ſo material to abſolve theſe Patriots, I ſhall compenſate it by another, not mention'd, which will equally aggravate their Crime. A few Days before the Execution

* The Laws of *Athens* allow'd a Man to marry his Siſter by the Father. *Solon*'s Laws forbid Pæderaſty to Slaves, as being of too great Dignity for ſuch mean Perſons.

of

of their fatal Purpoſe, they all ſwore Fealty to *Cæſar*; and proteſting to hold his Perſon ever ſacred, they touch'd the Altar with thoſe Hands, which they had already arm'd for his Deſtruction *.

I NEED not put you in mind of the famous and applauded Story of *Themiſtocles*, and of his Patience towards *Eurybiades*, the *Spartan*, his commanding Officer, who, heated by a Debate, lifted his Cane to him in a Council of War (the ſame Thing as if he had cudgel'd him) *Strike!* cries the *Athenian*, *Strike! but hear me.*

YOU are too good a Scholar not to diſcover *Socrates* and his *Athenian* Club in my laſt Story; and you would certainly obſerve, that it is exactly copy'd from *Xenophon*, with a Variation only of the Names †. And I think I have fairly made appear, that an *Athenian* Man of Merit might be ſuch a one as with us would paſs for Inceſtuous, a Parricide, an Aſſaſſin, an ungrateful, perjur'd Traitor, and ſomething elſe too abominable to be nam'd; not to mention his Ruſticity and Ill-manners. And having liv'd in this Manner, his Death may be entirely ſuitable: He

* Appian. Bell. Civ. Lib. 3. Suetonius in vita Cæſaris.

† Mem. Soc. Lib. 3. ſub fine.

may

may conclude the Scene by a deſperate Act of Self-murder, and dye with the moſt abſurd Blaſphemies in his Mouth. And notwithſtanding all this, he ſhall have Statues, if not Altars, erected to his Memory; Poems and Orations ſhall be compos'd in his Praiſe; great Sects ſhall be proud of calling themſelves by his Name; and the moſt diſtant Poſterity ſhall blindly continue their Admiration: Tho' were ſuch a one to ariſe amongſt themſelves, they would juſtly regard him with Horror and Execration.

I MIGHT have been aware, reply'd I, of your Artifice. You ſeem to take Pleaſure in this Topic; and are indeed the only Man I ever knew, who was well acquainted with the Antients, and did not extremely admire them. But inſtead of attacking their Philoſophy, their Eloquence, or Poetry, the uſual Subjects of Controverſy betwixt us, you now ſeem to impeach their Morals, and accuſe them of Ignorance in a Science, which is the only one, in my Opinion, wherein they are not ſurpaſs'd by the Moderns. Geometry, Phyſics, Aſtronomy, Anatomy, Botany, Geography, Navigation; in theſe we juſtly claim the Superiority: But what have we to oppoſe to their Moraliſts? Your Repreſentation of Things is fallacious. You have no Indulgence for the Manners and Cuſtoms of different Ages. Would you try

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a *Greek* or *Roman* by the Common-law of *England?* Hear him defend himſelf by his own Maxims; and then pronounce.

THERE are no Manners ſo innocent or reaſonable, which may not be render'd odious or ridiculous, if meaſur'd by a Standard, unknown to the Perſons; eſpecially, if you employ a little Art or Eloquence, in aggravating ſome Circumſtances, and extenuating others, as beſt ſerves the Purpoſe of your Diſcourſe. All theſe Artifices may eaſily be retorted on you. Could I inform the *Athenians*, for Inſtance, there was a Nation, wherein Adultery, both active and paſſive, ſo to ſpeak, was in the higheſt Vogue and Eſteem: Wherein every Man of Education choſe for his Miſtreſs a marry'd Woman, the Wife, perhaps, of his Friend and Companion; and valu'd himſelf upon theſe infamous Conqueſts, as much as if he had been ſeveral Times a Conqueror in Boxing or Wreſtling at the *Olympic* Games. Wherein every Man, alſo, took a Pride in his Tameneſs and Facility with regard to his own Wife, and was glad to make Friends or gain Intereſt by allowing her to proſtitute her Charms; and even, without any ſuch Motive, gave her full Liberty and Indulgence. I aſk, what Sentiments the *Athenians* would entertain of ſuch a People; they who never mention'd the Crime of Adultery but in Conjunction with Robbery and Poiſoning?

ing? Which would they admire moſt, the Villainy or the Meanneſs of ſuch a Conduct?

SHOULD I add, that the ſame People were as proud of their Slavery and Dependance as the *Athenians* were of their Liberty; and tho' a Man among them were oppreſt, diſgrac'd, impoveriſh'd, inſulted, or impriſon'd by the Tyrant, he would ſtill regard it as the higheſt Merit to love, ſerve, and obey him; and even to die for his ſmalleſt Glory or Satisfaction: Theſe noble *Greeks* would probably aſk me, whether I ſpoke of a human Society, or of ſome inferior, ſervile Species.

'TWAS then I might inform my *Athenian* Audience, that theſe People, however, wanted not Spirit and Bravery. If a Man, ſays I, tho' their intimate Friend, ſhould throw out, in a private Company, a Raillery againſt them, nearly approaching any of thoſe, with which your Generals and Demagogues every Day regale each other, in the Face of the whole City, they never can forgive him; but in order to revenge themſelves, they oblige him immediately to run them thro' the Body, or be himſelf murder'd. And if a Man, who is an abſolute Stranger to them, ſhould deſire them, at the Peril of their own Life, to cut the Throat of their Boſom-companion, they immediately obey, and think themſelves

ſelves highly oblig'd and honour'd by the Commiſſion. Theſe are their Maxims of Honour: This is their favourite Morality.

But tho' ſo ready to draw their Sword againſt their Friends and Countrymen; no Diſgrace, no Infamy, no Pain, no Poverty will ever engage theſe People to turn the Point of it againſt their own Breaſt. A Man of Rank would row in the Gallies, would beg his Bread, would languiſh in Priſon, would ſuffer any Tortures; and ſtill preſerve his wretched Life. Rather than eſcape his Enemies by a generous Contempt of Death, he would infamouſly receive the ſame Death from his Enemies, aggravated by their triumphant Inſults, and by the moſt exquiſite Sufferings.

'Tis very uſual too, continu'd I, amongſt this People to ſhut up ſeveral of their Children in a perpetual Priſon (where every Art of plaguing, and tormenting them is carefully ſtudy'd and practis'd) in order, that another Child, whom they own to have no greater or rather leſs Merit than the reſt, may enjoy their whole Fortune, and wallow in every Kind of Voluptuouſneſs and Pleaſure. Nothing ſo virtuous in their Opinion as this barbarous Partiality.

But what is more particular in this whimſical Nation, ſay I to the *Athenians*, is, that a Frolic of yours during the *Saturnalia* *, when the Slaves are ſerv'd by their Maſters, is ſeriouſly continu'd by them thro' the whole Year, and thro' the whole Courſe of their Lives; and accompany'd too with ſome Circumſtances, which ſtill farther augment the Abſurdity and Ridicule. Your Sport only elevates for a few Days thoſe whom Fortune has thrown down, and whom ſhe too, in Sport, may really elevate for ever above you: But this Nation gravely exalt thoſe, whom Nature has ſubjected to them, and whoſe Inferiority and Infirmities are abſolutely incurable. The Women, tho' without Virtue, are their Maſters and Sovereigns: Theſe they reverence, praiſe, and magnify: To theſe, they pay the higheſt Deference and Reſpect: And in all Places and at all Times, the Superiority of the Females is readily acknowledg'd and ſubmitted to by every one, who has the leaſt Pretenſions to Education and Politeneſs. Scarce any Crime would be ſo univerſally deteſted as an Infraction of this Rule.

* The *Greeks* kept the Feaſt of *Saturn* or *Cronus*, as well as the *Romans*. See Lucian. Epiſt. Saturn.

You

You need go no farther, reply'd *Palamedes*, I can eaſily conjecture the People you aim at. The Strokes, with which you have painted them, are pretty juſt; and yet you muſt acknowledge, that ſcarce any People are to be found, either in antient or modern Times, whoſe national Character is, upon the Whole, leſs liable to Exceptions. But I give you Thanks for helping me out with my Argument. I had no Intention of exalting the Moderns at the Expence of the Antients. I only meant to repreſent the Uncertainty of all theſe Judgments concerning Characters; and to convince you, that Faſhion, Vogue, Cuſtom, and Law were the chief Foundation of all moral Determinations. The *Athenians* ſurely, were a civiliz'd, intelligent People, if ever there was one; and yet their Man of Merit might, in this Age, be held in Horror and Execration. The *French* are alſo, without doubt, a very civiliz'd, intelligent People; and yet their Man of Merit might, with the *Athenians*, be an Object of the higheſt Contempt and Ridicule, and even Hatred. And what renders the Matter more extraordinary: Theſe two national Characters are ſuppos'd to be the moſt ſimilar of any in antient or modern Times; and while the *Engliſh* flatter themſelves that they reſemble the *Romans*, their Neighbours on the Continent draw the Parallel betwixt themſelves and theſe polite *Greeks*. What wide

wide Difference, therefore, in the Sentiments of Morals, muſt be found betwixt civiliz'd Nations and Barbarians, or betwixt Nations whoſe Characters have little in common? How ſhall we pretend to fix a Standard for Judgments of this Nature?

By tracing Matters, reply'd I, a little higher, and examining the firſt Principles, which each Nation eſtabliſhes, of Blame or Cenſure. The *Rhine* flows North, the *Rhone* South; yet both ſpring from the *ſame* Mountain, and are alſo actuated, in their oppoſite Directions, by the *ſame* Principle of Gravity: The different Inclinations of the Ground, on which they run, cauſe all the Difference of their Courſes.

In how many Circumſtances would an *Athenian* and *French* Man of Merit certainly concur? Good-ſenſe, Knowledge, Wit, Eloquence, Humanity, Fidelity, Truth, Juſtice, Courage, Temperance, Conſtancy, Dignity of Mind. Theſe you have all omitted; in order to inſiſt only on the Points, in which they may, by Accident, differ. Very well: I am willing to comply with you; and ſhall endeavour to account for theſe Differences from the moſt univerſal, eſtabliſh'd Principles of Morals.

The *Greek* Loves, I care not to examine more particularly. I ſhall only obſerve, that, however blameable,

able, they aroſe from a very innocent Cauſe, the Frequency of the Gymnaſtic Exerciſes amongſt that People; and were recommended, tho' abſurdly, as the Source of Friendſhip, Sympathy, mutual Attachment, and Fidelity *; Qualities eſteem'd in all Nations and all Ages.

The Marriage of Half-brothers and Siſters ſeems no great Difficulty. Love betwixt the nearer Relations is contrary to Reaſon and public Utility; but the preciſe Point, where we are to ſtop, can ſcarcely be determin'd by natural Reaſon; and is therefore a very proper Subject of municipal Law or Cuſtom. If the *Athenians* went a little too far on the one Side, the Canon Law has ſurely puſh'd Matters a great way into the other Extremity †.

Had you aſk'd a Parent at *Athens*, why he bereav'd his Child of that Life, which he had ſo lately given it. 'Tis becauſe I love it, he would reply; and regard the Poverty it muſt inherit from me, as a greater Evil than a Death, which it is not capable of dreading, feeling, or reſenting ‡.

How is public Liberty, the moſt valuable of all Bleſſings, to be recover'd from the Hands of an

* Plat. Symp. P. 182. Ex Edit. Serr. † See Enquiry, Sect. IV. ‡ Plutarch. de amore prolis, ſub fine.

Uſurper

Uſurper or Tyrant, if his Power ſhields him from public Rebellion, and our Scruples from private Vengeance? That his Crime is capital by Law, you acknowledge: And muſt the higheſt Aggravation of his Crime, the putting himſelf above Law, form his full Security? You can reply nothing, but by ſhowing the great Inconveniencies of Aſſaſſination; which, could any one have prov'd clearly to the Antients, he had reform'd their Sentiments in this Particular.

AGAIN, to caſt your Eye on the Picture I have drawn of modern Manners; there is almoſt as great Difficulty, I acknowledge, to juſtify *French* as *Greek* Gallantry; except only, that the former is much more natural and agreeable than the latter. But our Neighbours, it ſeems, have reſolv'd to ſacrifice ſome of the domeſtic to the ſociable Pleaſures; and to prefer Eaſe, Freedom, and an open Commerce to a ſtrict Fidelity and Conſtancy. Theſe Ends are both good, and are ſomewhat difficult to reconcile; nor need we be ſurpriz'd, if the Cuſtoms of Nations encline too much, ſometimes to the one Side, ſometimes to the other.

THE moſt inviolable Attachment to the Laws of our Country is every-where acknowledg'd a capital Virtue; and where the People are not ſo happy, as

to

to have any other Legiſlature but a ſingle Perſon, the ſtricteſt Loyalty is, in that Caſe, the trueſt Patriotiſm.

NOTHING ſurely can be more abſurd and barbarous than the Practice of Duelling; but thoſe, who juſtify it, ſay, that it begets Civility and Good-manners. And a Duelиſt, you may obſerve, always values himſelf upon his Courage, his Senſe of Honour, his Fidelity and Friendſhip; Qualities, which are here indeed very oddly directed, but have been eſteem'd univerſally, ſince the Foundation of the World.

HAVE the Gods forbid Self-murder? An *Athenian* allows, that it ought to be foreborn. Has the Deity permitted it? A *Frenchman* allows, that Death is preferable to Pain and Infamy.

YOU ſee then, continu'd I, that the Principles, upon which Men reaſon in Morals are always the ſame; tho' the Concluſions they draw are often very different. That they all reaſon aright with regard to this Subject, more than with regard to any other, it is not incumbent on any Moraliſt to ſhow. 'Tis ſufficient, that the original Principles of Cenſure or Blame are uniform, and that erroneus Concluſions can be corrected by ſounder Reaſonings and a larger

Experience. As many Ages as have elaps'd ſince the Fall of *Greece* and *Rome*, and ſuch Changes as have arriv'd in Religion, Language, Laws, and Cuſtoms; none of theſe Revolutions has ever produc'd any conſiderable Innovation in the primary Sentiments of Morals, more than in thoſe of external Beauty. Some minute Differences, perhaps, may be obſerv'd in both. *Horace* * celebrates a low Forehead, and *Anacreon* join'd Eye-brows †: But the *Apollo* and the *Venus* of Antiquity are ſtill our Models for Male and Female Beauty; in like Manner as the Character of *Scipio* continues our Standard for the Glory of Heroes, and that of *Cornelia* for the Honour of Matrons.

It appears, that there never was any Quality, recommended by any one, as a Virtue or moral Excellence; but on account of its being *uſeful*, or *agreeable*, to a Man *himſelf*, or to *others*. For what other Reaſon can there ever be for Praiſe or Approbation? Or where would be the Senſe of extolling *good* Character or Action, which, at the ſame Time, is allow'd to be *good for nothing?* All the Differences, therefore, in Morals may be reduc'd to this

* Epiſt. Lib. 1. Epiſt. 7. Alſo Lib. 1. Ode 3.

† Ode 28. Petronius (Cap. 86.) joins both theſe Circumſtances as Beauties.

one

one general Foundation, and may be accounted for by the different Views, which People take of theſe Circumſtances.

Sometimes Men differ in their Judgment about the Uſefulneſs of any Habit or Action: Sometimes alſo the peculiar Circumſtances of Things render one moral Quality more uſeful than others, and give it a peculiar Preference.

'Tis not ſurpriſing, that, during a Period of War and Diſorder, the military Virtues ſhould be more celebrated than the pacific, and attract more the Admiration and Attention of Mankind. "How uſual "is it," ſays *Tully* *, "to find *Cimbrians*, *Celtibe-* "*rians*, and other Barbarians, who bear, with in- "flexible Conſtancy, all the Fatigues and Dangers "of the Field; but are immediately diſpirited "under the Suffrance and Hazard of a languiſhing "Diſtemper: While, on the other hand, the *Greeks* "patiently endure the ſlow Approaches of Death, "when arm'd with Sickneſs and Diſeaſe; but ti- "morouſly fly his Preſence, when he attacks them "violently with Swords and Falchions!" So oppoſite is even the ſame Virtue of Courage amongſt warlike or peaceful Nations! And indeed, we may

* Tuſc. Quæſt. Lib. 2.

obſerve, that as the Difference betwixt War and Peace is the greateſt, that ariſes among Nations and public Societies, it produces alſo the greateſt Variations in moral Sentiment, and diverſifies the moſt our Idea of Virtue and perſonal Merit.

Sometimes too, Magnanimity, Greatneſs of Mind, Diſdain of Slavery, inflexible Rigour and Integrity may ſuit better the Circumſtances of one Age than thoſe of another, and have a more kindly Influence, both on public Affairs, and on a Man's own Safety and Advancement. Our Idea of Merit, therefore, will alſo vary a little with theſe Variations; and *Labeo*, perhaps, be cenſur'd for the ſame Qualities, which procur'd *Cato* the higheſt Approbation.

A Degree of Luxury may be ruinous and pernicious in a Native of *Switzerland*, which only foſters the Arts, and encourages Induſtry in a *Frenchman* or *Engliſhman*. We are not, therefore, to expect, either the ſame Sentiment, or the ſame Laws in *Berne*, that prevail in *London* or *Paris*.

Different Cuſtoms have alſo ſome Influence, as well as different Utilities; and by giving an early Biaſs to the Mind, may produce a ſuperior Propenſity, either to the uſeful or the agreeable Qualities; to thoſe,

thoſe, which regard Self, or thoſe, which extend to Society. Theſe four Sources of moral Sentiment ſtill ſubſiſt; but particular Accidents may, at one Time, make one of them flow with greater Abundance than at another.

THE Cuſtoms of ſome Nations ſhut up the Women from all ſocial Commerce: Thoſe of others make them ſo eſſential a Part of Society and Converſation, that, except where Buſineſs is canvaſs'd, the Male-ſex alone are ſuppos'd abſolutely incapable of mutual Diſcourſe and Entertainment. As this Difference is the moſt material, that can happen in private Life, it muſt alſo produce the greateſt Variation in our moral Sentiments.

OF all Nations in the World, where Polygamy was not allow'd, the *Greeks* ſeem to have been the moſt reſerv'd in their Commerce with the Fair-ſex, and to have impos'd on them the ſtricteſt Laws of Modeſty and Decency. We have a ſtrong Inſtance of this in an Oration of *Lyſias**. A Widow injur'd, ruin'd, undone, calls a Meeting of a few of her neareſt Friends and Relations; and tho' never before accuſtom'd, ſays the Orator, to ſpeak in the Preſence of Men, the Diſtreſs of her Circumſtances conſtrain'd

* Orat. 33.

her to lay the Caſe before them. Her very Opening her Mouth in ſuch Company requir'd, it ſeems, an Apology.

When *Demoſthenes* proſecuted his Tutors, to make them refund his Patrimony, it became neceſſary for him, in the Courſe of the Law ſuit, to prove that the Marriage of *Aphobus*'s Siſter with *Oneter* was entirely fraudulent, and that, notwithſtanding her Sham-marriage, ſhe had liv'd with her Brother at *Athens* for two Years laſt paſt, ever ſince her Divorce from her former Huſband. And 'tis remarkable, that tho' theſe were People of the firſt Fortune and Diſtinction in the City, the Orator could prove this Fact no Way, but by calling for her female Slaves to be put to the Queſtion, and by the Evidence of one Phyſician, who had ſeen her in her Brother's Houſe during her Illneſs *. So reſerv'd were *Greek* Manners.

We may be certain, that an extreme Purity was the Conſequence of this Reſerve. Accordingly, we find, that, except the fabulous Stories of an *Helen* and a *Clytemneſtra*, there ſcarce is an Inſtance of any Event in the *Greek* Hiſtory, that proceeded from the Intrigues of Women. On the other hand, in modern

* In Oneterem.

Times,

Times, particularly in a neighbouring Nation, the Females enter into all Tranſactions and all Management of Church and State; and no Man can ſucceed, who takes not care to obtain their good Graces. *Harry* the third, by incurring the Diſpleaſure of the Fair, endanger'd his Crown, and loſt his Life, as much as by his Indulgence to Hereſy.

'Tis needleſs to diſſemble: The Conſequence of a very free Commerce betwixt the Sexes, and of their living much together, will often terminate in Intrigues and Gallantry. We muſt ſacrifice ſomewhat of the *uſeful*, if we be very anxious to obtain all the *agreeable* Qualities; and cannot pretend to reach alike every Kind of Advantage. Inſtances of Licence, daily multiplying, will weaken the Scandal with the one Sex, and teach the other, by Degrees, to adopt the famous Maxim of *la Fontaine*, with regard to female Infidelity, *that if one knows it, it is but a ſmall Matter; if one knows it not, it is nothing* *.

Some People are inclin'd to think, that the beſt Way of adjuſting all Differences, and of keeping the proper Medium betwixt the *agreeable* and *uſeful* Qualities of the Sex is to live with them after the

* Quand on le ſçait c'eſt peu de choſe:
Quand on ne le ſçait pas, ce n'eſt rien.

Manner of the *Romans* and the *Engliſh* (for the Cuſtoms of theſe two Nations ſeem ſimilar in this Reſpect *) that is, without Gallantry † and without Jealouſy. By a Parity of Reaſon, the Cuſtoms of the *Spaniards* and of the *Italians* of an Age ago (for the preſent are very different) muſt be the worſt of any; becauſe they favour both Gallantry and Jealouſy.

Nor will theſe different Cuſtoms of Nations affect only the one Sex: The Idea of perſonal Merit in the Males muſt alſo be ſomewhat different, with regard, at leaſt, to Converſation, Addreſs, and Humour. The one Nation, where the Men live much apart, will naturally more eſteem Prudence; the other, Gaiety: With the one, Simplicity of Manners will be in the higheſt Reſpect; with the other, Politeneſs. The one will diſtinguiſh themſelves by

* During the Time of the Emperors, the *Romans* ſeem to have been more given to Intrigues and Gallantry than the *Engliſh* are at preſent: And the Women of Condition, in order to retain their Lovers, endeavour'd to fix a Name of Reproach on thoſe, who were addicted to Wenching and low Amours. They were call'd *Ancillarioli*. See Seneca de Beneficiis. Lib. 1. Cap. 9. See alſo Martial, Lib. 12. Epig. 58.

† The Gallantry here meant is that of Amours and Attachments, not that of Complaiſance, which is as much pay'd to the fair Sex in *England* as in any other Country.

Good-

Good-ſenſe and Judgment; the other, by Taſte and Delicacy: The Eloquence of the former will ſhine moſt in the Senate; that of the other, on the Theatre.

THESE, I ſay, are the *natural* Effects of ſuch Cuſtoms. For it muſt be confeſt, that Chance has a great Influence on national Manners; and many Events happen in Society, which are not to be accounted for by general Rules. Who could imagine, for Inſtance, that the *Romans*, who liv'd freely with their Women, ſhould be very indifferent about Muſic, and eſteem Dancing infamous: While the *Greeks*, who never almoſt ſaw a Woman but in their own Houſes, were continually piping, ſinging, and dancing?

THE Differences of moral Sentiment, which naturally ariſe from a republican or monarchical Government, are alſo very obvious; as well as thoſe, which proceed from general Riches or Poverty, Union or Faction, Ignorance or Learning. I ſhall conclude this long Diſcourſe with obſerving, that different Cuſtoms and Situations vary the original Ideas of Merit (however they may, ſome Conſequences) in no very eſſential Point, and prevail chiefly with regard to young Men, who can aſpire

to

to the agreeable Qualities, and may attempt to pleaſe. The MANNER, the ORNAMENTS, the GRACES, that ſucceed in this Shape, are more arbitrary and caſual: But the Merit of riper Years is almoſt every-where the ſame; and conſiſts chiefly in Integrity, Humanity, Ability, Knowledge and the other more ſolid and uſeful Qualities of the human Mind.

WHAT you inſiſt on, reply'd *Palamedes*, may have ſome Foundation, when you ſtick to the Maxims of common Life and ordinary Conduct. Experience and the Practice of the World readily correct any great Extravagance on either Side. But what ſay you to *artificial* Lives and Manners? How do you reconcile the Maxims, on which theſe are founded?

WHAT do you underſtand by *artificial* Lives and Manners, ſaid I? I explain myſelf, reply'd he. You know, that Religion had, in antient Times, very little Influence on common Life, and that, after Men had perform'd their Duty in Sacrifices and Prayers at the Temple, they thought, that the Gods left the reſt of their Conduct to themſelves, and were little pleas'd, or offended with thoſe Virtues and Vices, that only affected the Peace and Happineſs of human Society. In thoſe Ages, 'twas the Buſineſs of Philoſophy alone to regulate Men's ordinary Behaviour

haviour and Deportment; and accordingly, we may obſerve, that this being the ſole Principle, by which a Man could elevate himſelf above his Fellows, it acquir'd a mighty Aſcendant over many, and produc'd great Singularities of Maxims and of Conduct. At preſent, that Philoſophy has loſt the Allurement of Novelty, it has no ſuch extenſive Influence; but ſeems to confine itſelf moſtly to Speculations in the Cloſet; in the ſame Manner, as the antient Religion was limited to Sacrifices in the Temple. Its Place is now ſupply'd by the modern Religion, which inſpects our whole Conduct, and preſcribes an univerſal Rule to our Actions, to our Words, to our very Thoughts and Inclinations; a Rule ſo much the more auſtere, that it is guarded by infinite, tho' diſtant, Rewards and Puniſhments; and no Infraction of it can ever be conceal'd or diſguis'd.

DIOGENES is the moſt celebrated Model of extravagant Philoſophy. Let us ſeek a Parallel to him in modern Times. We ſhall not diſgrace any philoſophic Name by a Compariſon with the *Dominics* or *Loyolas*, or any canoniz'd Monk or Friar. Let us compare him to *Paſcal*, a Man of Parts and Genius as well as *Diogenes* himſelf; and perhaps too,

a Man of Virtue, had he allow'd his virtuous Inclinations to have exerted and diſplay'd themſelves.

The Foundation of *Diogenes*'s Conduct was to render himſelf an independent Being as much as poſſible, and to confine all his Wants and Deſires and Pleaſures within himſelf and his own Mind: The Aim of *Paſcal* was to keep a perpetual Senſe of his Dependance before his Eyes, and never to forget his numberleſs Wants and Neceſſities. The Antient ſupported himſelf by Magnanimity, Oſtentation, Pride, and the Idea of his own Superiority above his Fellow-creatures. The Modern made conſtant Profeſſion of Humility and Abaſement, of the Contempt and Hatred of himſelf; and endeavour'd to attain theſe ſuppos'd Virtues, as far as they are attainable. The Auſterities of the *Greek* were in order to inure himſelf to Hardſhips, and prevent his ever ſuffering: Thoſe of the *Frenchman* were embrac'd merely for their own Sake, aud in order to ſuffer as much as poſſible. ThePhiloſopher indulg'd himſelf in the moſt beaſtly Pleaſures, even in public: The Saint refus'd himſelf the moſt innocent, even in private: The former thought it his Duty to love his Friends, and to rail at them, and reprove them, and ſcold them: The latter endeavour'd to be abſolutely indifferent towards his neareſt Relations, and to love and ſpeak well of his Enemies. The great Object of

of *Diogenes*'s Wit was every Kind of Superſtition, that is, every Kind of Religion known in his Time. The Mortality of the Soul was his Standard Principle; and even his Sentiments of a Divine Providence ſeem to have been very licentious. The moſt ridiculous Superſtitions directed *Paſcal*'s Faith and Practice; and an extreme Contempt of this Life, in Compariſon of the future, was the chief Foundation of his Conduct.

In ſuch a remarkable Contraſt do theſe two Men ſtand: Yet both of them have met with univerſal Admiration in their different Ages, and have been propos'd as Models of Imitation. Where then is the univerſal Standard of Morals, which you talk of? And what Rule ſhall we eſtabliſh for the many different, nay contrary Sentiments of Mankind?

An Experiment, ſaid I, that ſucceeds in the Air, will not always ſucceed in a Vacuum. When Men depart from the Maxims of common Reaſon, and affect theſe *artificial* Lives, as you call them, no-one can anſwer for what will pleaſe or diſpleaſe them. They are in a different Element from the reſt of Mankind; and the natural Principles of their Mind play not with the ſame Regularity, as if left to themſelves, free from the Illuſions of religious Superſtition or philoſophical Enthuſiaſm.

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